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ABSTRACT
Incident response (IR) is an integral part of today’s computer security infrastructure
both at the public and private sectors. The process involves identification of the critical
resources, proposing plans for responding to potential breaches and executing effective
containment and recovery procedures. The current practices emphasize establishing careful
response plans, building technical capabilities and following disciplined procedures for
plan execution. This research builds on the above by adding another dimension to the
process, namely performance evaluation.
Proposing a framework for the performance analysis of computer security incident
response (CSIR) capabilities is the main focus of this research. The various design
considerations and challenges to performance analysis of CSIR are investigated. A
multidisciplinary survey is conducted to derive lessons learnt and best practices for the
design of performance systems. The outcomes of the survey are integrated to the CSIR
discipline to produce a development process for constructing performance evaluation
models. For each development step, the various design possibilities are investigated to
ensure flexibility and applicability to the wide spectrum of CSIR environments.
Expert feedback is used as a method of design validation to ensure conformance to
current CSIR best practices. Issues pertaining to how performance evaluation could be
incorporated into the current industry practices are also explored. As a notable contribution,
the study produces the definition and design considerations for fifty performance indicators
that cover the diverse performance aspects of computer security incident response systems.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Computer Security Incident Response (CSIR)
Computer Security Incident response (CSIR) is an integral part of today’s computer
security infrastructure, both at the public and private sectors. The term CSIR refers to the
collection of organized activities that address the aftermath of computer security incidents.
The CSIR process involves identification of the critical resources that are vulnerable,
implementing plans for responding to potential breaches, and executing effective
containment and recovery procedures.
The rapid increase of security breaches, the complexity of attacking techniques, the
large scope of classified data and critical resources, and the high impact of security
incidents on the operational and fiscal resources of business organizations and government
units, are examples of factors that contributed to the development of CSIR. These factors
triggered the need for systemized and effective methods of handling computer security
incident. The computer security community collaboratively developed the incident
handling procedures that are known today by CSIR. These procedures were later matured
into the form of incident response planning.
There are three main objectives for introducing a CSIR capability to an
organization. The first is to quickly detect and properly diagnose a security incident.
Second, a CSIR capability helps in minimizing the associated damage of incidents through
containment and mitigation procedures. And third,

CSIR brings forward effective

eradication and recovery procedures from cyber incidents.
1

Although incident response capabilities vary in their approaches, strategies and
policies, five major components could be identified as common between all of them [1] [2]
[3]. The five components are: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication and
Review.
The Preparation phase defines the goals, identifies what needs to be protected, and
sets up policies and procedures of how to handle an incident from the moment it is detected
to the moment of full recovery. A notable activity in this step is forming the incident
response teams and defining their roles. The objective of this step is to ensure that when an
incident erupts, all parties are engaged in handling it, not in figuring out what needs to be
done.
The Identification phase refers to the set of mechanisms and procedures to follow
for detecting an incident, determining its severity and declaring it.
The Containment phase is concerned with isolating the incident by preventing it
from spreading outside its scope, ensuring that the incident doesn’t escalate and minimizing
the associated damage.
The Eradication phase involves technical procedures to remove the threat from the
environment, provide remedies for the caused damage and recover the environment to its
normal state.
The final phase: Review identifies potential areas of improvement for future
incidents in the forms of best practices and lessons learned.
To demonstrate the disadvantage of not having a CSIR capability, a recent global
survey sponsored by IBM [4] found that the longer it took to detect and respond to
computer security incidents the higher the loss endured. It was also recorded that having a
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CSIR capability decreased the loss of data breach from $158 to $142, i.e. $16 per record.
Taking the statistics that the US health sector alone was targeted by cybersecurity incidents
against over 112 million record in 2015 [5]; the use of CSIR would have saved 1.792 billion
dollars for the health industry alone. Specific incidents can even cost much higher loss, for
example the 2013 Target credit card breach is estimated to have cost $200 million [6].
The current CSIR practices emphasize careful design, technical capabilities, and
successful execution of incident response plans. This research builds on the work that has
been done in the CSIR literature by adding a fifth essential element to the process, namely
performance evaluation. Performance evaluation refers to the collection of methods and
tools used to measure how good a specific activity contributed to achieving a goal. Within
the context of CSIR, performance evaluation focuses on measuring the effectiveness of
designing and implementing a CSIR plan (CSIRP).
This project analyzes the concept of CSIR performance evaluation by inspecting
why such evaluation is needed and how it could be achieved. A framework for assessing
the effectiveness of a CSIR capability is presented. The framework constitutes of design
parameters, development processes, measurement tools, analysis techniques and modeling
of various aspects of CSIR performance.
This dissertation is structured in seven chapters. The first chapter provides an
introduction to the topic by investigating the need for evaluating CSIR, outlining the
research methodology and defining the major terms. The second chapter surveys the
relevant publications and is remarked by the multi-disciplinary approach of synthesizing
findings of other incident response disciplines into CSIR.

3

Chapters three to five are centered around the development of the performance
evaluation framework. Chapter three provides detailed description of the framework
components and parameters. It also highlights the process of building a performance
evaluation model for various environments. The main measurement tools used in the
evaluation process, called performance indicators, are discussed in chapter four. While
chapter five presents five performance evaluation sub-models that can be viewed as
extensions to the performance framework presented in chapter three.
The sixth chapter analyzes the proposed PE framework through scenario analysis
and expert feedback. Finally, the seventh chapter summarizes the main findings and
outlines directions for future research.

1.2 The Need for Studying CSIR Performance Evaluation
In the past fifteen years, the area of computer security incident response (CSIRP)
has received substantial attention from the academic and industrial fronts. In academia,
researchers in the area of computer security focused on two major areas; the development
of incident response models and mechanisms, and proposing technical solutions for the
identification and containment of various cyber security attacks. On the industrial front,
the attention of security professionals was directed towards three main aspects. The first is
drafting and writing computer security incident response plans (CSIRPs) that coordinate
incident management between various technical and non-technical teams involved in the
process of incident handling. The second is developing industry standards for handling the
response to computer security incidents. And finally proposing technical advisories and
procedures on handling security incidents within specific environment constraints, or

4

vendor specific configurations. This technical information is normally shared in the form
of blog posts and technical reports, normally labeled by the term white papers.
The study and implementation of performance evaluation measures within the
context of CSIRP is expected to have contributions to both the academic and professional
sectors. It mainly builds on the previous contributions and push towards more scientifically
sound and cost effective handling of computer security incidents. The following
subsections provide insights on how the focus of this dissertation on performance
evaluation could enhance the understanding and handling of CSIR.

1.2.1 Academic Need
The vast majority of publications in the area of Computer Security Incident
Response (CSIR), have no detailed or technical description of the issue of performance
evaluation.. It is only the past decade that the issue of CSIR performance started to get
more attention. Nevertheless, there is a distinguishable need for systemized and detailed
approaches towards how to conduct such performance evaluation and which measurement
methods should be used. In addition, discussing performance is normally presented under
the generalities of conducting a post-incident lessons learnt analysis.
The framework proposed in this dissertation aims at providing depth to the aspect
of performance evaluation in the context of computer security incident response, that
transcends the generalities proposed by previous works. This project will address design
considerations, development processes, performance indicators and a variety of
implementation considerations pertaining to CSIR.
There are three possible reasons for why the study of performance evaluation in the
area of CSIR did not get much academic attention.

5

First, the study of computer incident response, in its current developed form of
being systemized and on the scope of large organizations, is a relatively a new area of
study. The previous studies focused on designing models of handling responses,
articulating the specifics of each phase, and developing technical solutions to the common
cyber-attacks. Since this dedication has produced works that build the foundations within
the area of study, it is natural to evolve into studying methods of enhancement. It could be
noticed that performance evaluation is perceived as enhancement activity instead of a core
activity. Therefore, based on the maturity of the field, discussion of performance evaluation
could have been only possible when the field has stabilized in terms of its procedures and
processes.
Second, there is an overall wide gap between the contributions of academia and the
industry, as the latter is ahead in its complexity and depth of study. This is not surprising
as the operational nature of the field dictates that sometimes pseudo solutions or imperfect
but working solutions, which might not be accepted by the academic terms, be proposed
by the industry for immediate countering to the breaches. However, this has led to an
unfortunate outcome of the results being mainly preserved within the classified business
documents, which are not normally circulated to academia or shared with the public. There
is reasonable reckoning that the industry might have already developed some of its
performance evaluation methods, but the locality of these documents remains an obstacle
to the growth of the field. However, as stated by a CSIR responder [7], current evaluation
methods used in the industry are: “semi-formal, ad hoc and conducted by smart people”.
Third, as will be recorded in the literature review, the study of performance
evaluation of incident response is a complex process that depends on a vast number of
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variables and is usually difficult to normalize. This is a lesson learnt from studying the
findings of other disciplines that focus on incident response, like medical emergency.
Although, the reasons for reaching such conclusion is different from one field to another,
there are several shared challenges across the fields that extend to the area of computer
security.
Observing that there is an academic gap between acknowledging the need for
conducting performance evaluation and the lack of models analysis was one of the
motivations of this dissertation. The study aims at proposing a comprehensive framework
that acts as a foundation for the study of performance evaluation the area of computer
security incident response. The framework builds on the previous findings in the field, and
has the flexibility and extendibility to capture the advancements in the field.
Finally, the multidisciplinary nature of the study is another factor that brings academic
significance to the proposed work. The survey of main findings and good practices across
fields should be of interest to both security professional who do not need to re-invent the
wheel, and to researchers who either study performance evaluation or study incident
response across disciplines.

1.2.2 Business Need and Impact
A 2014 survey by SANS found that a quarter of practitioners feel that their
organization’s CSIR capability is ineffective and only 9% reported that they felt it was very
effective [8]. This perception of ineffectiveness captured by the CSIR technical
practitioners is coupled by several concerns highlighted by business owners and
administrators [9] that confirm the need for investigating the effectiveness of CSIR.
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As shall be demonstrated in Chapter two, the need for measuring performance for
incident response is acknowledged across various disciplines. Performance measurement
triggers change in performance, or as summarized by [10] [11] it helps to control, budget,
motivate, promote, learn and improve the response system
The following points summarize the need for incorporating performance evaluation
into incident response handling, from the business standpoint:
[1] Need for reducing costs: the cost of handling security incidents is on the rise
and the industry is dedicating millions of dollars for handling and containing computer
breaches. Despite the observation that the financial implications of not securing the systems
of an organization are far more than the cost of imposing security measures [12], it is still
crucial for an organization to ensure that the security plans it adopts and implements are
cost effective. With the use of performance metrics, an organization can measure the cost
effectiveness of its plans and identify areas where cost could be reduced without
jeopardizing the security of the system.
[2] Need for faster responses: with the high dynamicity of today’s IT environments,
the time factor plays an important role in responding to security threats. It is common to
see threats escalate or even reach an uncontrollable state due to slowness or ineffectiveness
of handling the incident. Performance evaluation will enable responders to identify areas
where they could improve the effectiveness of the response and propose enhancements
based on results of systemized and validated analysis techniques. It is true that performance
collection, measurement and analysis occupies time; however, it “ends up saving more time
than it consumes” [13].
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[3] Enhancing Decision Making: findings of performance evaluation provide
incident responders and executives with data that empowers them to make effective and
accurate decisions [9]. Without using data produced by well-designed performance
metrics, most recommendations and reviews are based on speculations and not scientific
approaches which might lead to counter effects.
[4] Need for information sharing: using performance metrics will enable
organizations to build a common language between security professionals and business
administrators. At the same time, it helps an organization evaluate its performance
compared to other organizations through benchmarking.
[5] Liability Needs: Another aspect of industrial needs comes from the trending
demand for providing insurance and liability over information security [14] [15]. Insurance
companies are demanding objective assessment and quantifiable metrics for enforced
security policies and procedures. Having systemized approaches to the evaluation of CSIR
capabilities is viewed as an essential component of the liability and insurance processes
[7].
[6] Compliance: The NIST document [1] considers performance evaluation as one
of eight policies that need to be considered when designing and preparing incident
response plans. Similarly, the CERT document [2] discusses under the section of quality
assurance the need for “checks: measurement of quality parameters”. However, both
documents do not provide outlines of how to design and implement the measurement
process. This calls for a systemized and formalized approach of conducting performance
measurement and analysis in order to demonstrate compliance with the above two industry
standards.

9

As this project is finalized, the Forum for Incident Response Security Teams
(FIRST) [16] announced its establishment of a special interest group (SIG) for developing
metrics for computer security incident response. This demonstrates that not only the
industry approves the need for performance evaluation, but also that the industry is taking
actual actions towards that direction.

1.3 Problem Description and Methodology
1.3.1 Problem Description and Research Objectives
The research problem of this project is centered around the theme of evaluating the
performance of computer security incident response capabilities. More specifically, the
project will investigate how to build performance evaluation models for CSIR and how
these models could be implemented. This is achieved through presenting a framework for
developing CSIR performance evaluation models which is equipped with a variety of
performance evaluation analysis and measurement methods adapted from current industry
practices and from lessons learnt from other incident response disciplines.
The problem could be more formally described as: “given a computer security
incident response (CSIR) capability, how could an organization construct and apply a
mechanism for assessing the performance effectiveness of the capability.”
To address the above research problem, this dissertations attempts to achieve the
following objectives:
1. Demonstrate the importance of incorporating performance evaluation in computer
security incident response planning and explain how that fits within the CSIR life
cycle.
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2. Conduct a multi-disciplinary survey of the good practices and major findings in
the area of incident response. The results are to be analyzed in reference to
computer security incident response for relevance and potential customization.
3. Design a framework for the performance evaluation of incident response
capabilities. The framework will provide guidance on identifying what needs to
be measured, how to obtain those measurements, and how to analyze the
obtained results. The framework will be having the following four features:
a. Comprehensive: The framework captures the performance of the major
activities in the CSIR life cycle and provides end-to-end development
process.
b. Flexible: The framework is applicable to various environments and can
be used under different incident conditions
c. Compatible: The framework is consistent with current industry
practices of incident handling
d. Multidisciplinary: the framework incorporates lessons learnt from other
IR disciplines.
4. Identify the measurement tools of performance evaluation in the form of
performance indicators
5. Provide operational guidelines for how performance evaluation models could be
implemented in CSIR environments.

1.3.2 Research Methodology
This project uses four main research methodologies for the design and validation
of the proposed performance evaluation framework. The four methods are:
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multidisciplinary analysis, system analysis, industry-driven design and expert feedback.
These methods were selected to suit the nature of the research problem and to match the
approaches used by other researchers who produced publications tackling research
problems that resemble the problem statement of this project. A description of the four
methodologies is provided below:
Multidisciplinary Analysis: A multidisciplinary survey of incident response in
other disciplines, like medical emergency and homeland security, is conducted. The
motivation of conducting this survey is to inspect how the other disciplines designed
performance platforms for their incident response system. The main findings and best
practices suggested by these disciplines are analyzed for their compatibility with the field
of CSIR. Next, the relevant findings are integrated as design tools in the construction of a
framework for evaluating the performance of CSIR.
System Analysis: The major processes and procedures of computer security
incident response system are analyzed. The objective of the analysis is to deconstruct the
CSIR system into components and parameters from the performance evaluation
perspective. The expected output is identifying which aspects/components of the CSIR
system should be subject to performance evaluation and specify which measurement tools
should be used for each component.
Industry-Driven Design: The design of the performance framework is to be
developed within the context of the best practices of the CSIR processes and procedures.
This is achieved by ensuring that all components of the performance framework are in
compliance with the two most common and acknowledged documentations of CSIR,
namely the NIST publication “Computer Security Incident Handing Guide” (August 2012)
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[1] and the CERT publication: “Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs) (April 2003) [2].
Expert Feedback: A group of computer security incident response and cyber
security experts are consulted for their intake into the design considerations and for their
feedback on the proposed framework. The feedback, which is obtained through personal
interviews, are integrated into the design of the framework or recorded for potential
enhancements.
The above research methodology can be summarized as argumentative design
supported by expert feedback. Argumentative design refers to proposing various
components of the framework associated with supported arguments. In the case of this
project, the argument comes from the multidisciplinary survey results, system analysis of
the CSIR or expert opinion.
It is noticed that the above research method does not follow the conventional
computer science research approach of proposing a model and verifying it through
mathematical proofs, algorithms design, software simulation or empirical data. Instead, a
reverse approach is used in which system and multidisciplinary analysis is conducted
beforehand to derive the design of the framework. This explains the length of the second
and third chapter of this dissertation due to the extensive consultation with the literature.
However, To ensure the effectiveness of the proposed design, the proposed design is further
verified through expert feedback and hypothetical scenario analysis.
Several works in CSIR and related disciplines follow research methodologies
similar to the ones adopted in this project. For instance, a collaborative incident response
framework is proposed in [17]. The authors designed the framework by analyzing the needs
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and lessons learnt and is verified through scenario analysis to demonstrate enhancements
resulting from using the framework. A similar methodology is also used in [18] which
proposed a framework for incident information management. Another publication by
CERT [19]

proposed a mission-risk diagnostic platform through conducting a

multidisciplinary survey to derive best practices that drive the platform design. Other works
include [20] that uses interviews and literature survey for development of performance
systems, [21] that uses hypothetical scenario analysis for analyzing performance
frameworks, and [22] [23] that use expert feedback as an assessment for incident response
performance evaluation systems.

1.3.3 Assessment Methods
The proposed performance framework will be evaluated through three main
methods:
Scenario Analysis: hypothetical scenarios will be used to demonstrate the
functionality and impact of using the proposed performance framework. The scenarios are
designed to cover various aspects of the framework applied to a variety of performance
issues.
Expert Feedback: Besides expert feedback being integrated into the design and
implementation of the proposed framework, expert opinion on various components of the
framework will be recorded and discussed.
Framework Feature Evaluation: The four features of the framework, i.e.
comprehensiveness, flexibility, compatibility and multidisciplinary feedback, will be
evaluated. A demonstration of how the framework satisfies the above features will be
presented.
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1.4 Definitions
A summary of the definitions of the main terms used in this project is provided in
Table 1.
Term

Definition

Incident

“an occurrence of a major event or several events, that demonstrates
actual or potential compromise of the system or data, and
demonstrates high impact on the organization operations and
resources, or the need for an organized response”

Computer
Security Incident
Response

“the capability to provide end-to-end, cross enterprise management
of incidents that affect information and technology assets within an
organization”

Computer
Security Incident
Response Plan

“the documentation of a predetermined set of instructions or
procedures to detect, respond to, and limit consequences of a
malicious cyber-attacks against an organization’s information
system(s).”

Computer
Security Incident
Response Team

“Group of individuals usually consisting of Security Analysts
organized to develop, recommend, and coordinate immediate
mitigation actions for containment, eradication, and recovery
resulting from computer security incidents.”

CSIR
Performance
Evaluation

“All activities associated with assessing how well a CSIRT executes
CSIR activities as outlined in the CSIRP to achieve the outlined
goals”

Performance
Framework

“a generic conceptual setting that encompasses several perspectives
and methods for the evaluation of computer security incident
response capability”

Performance
Indicator

“a system quality that reflects some performance behavior”

Performance
Metric

‘a measurement tool used for characterizing or quantifying a quality
of CSIR performance’. OR “a tool used for measuring a single or
multiple performance indicators’

CSIR
Effectiveness

“the extent to which CSIR goals are achieved and harm is reduced
through efficient use of resources”
Table 1: Summary of Definitions
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The basis of the provided definitions comes from the glossary prepared by the
Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) [24]. The subsequent discussion expands
on the various available definitions and the rationale for adopting the selected definitions.

1.4.1 Computer Security Incident Response Terms
Events and Incidents
In order to provide organizational support that is both effective and budgetsensitive, the CSIR capability is not expected to respond to all security alerts. For instance,
an anti-virus alert or an intrusion detection system (IDS) flag are considered simple
activities that do not necessary require the response of a CSIRT. These simple activities
are referred to in the literature as events. The formal definition is: “any observable
occurrence in a network or system” [24]. However, in order to eliminate positive or
expected events, like high access to a commercial website during a promotion period, the
CSIR field narrows down the term into events with adverse nature, i.e. might result in some
negative consequences [1].
There seems to be an agreement in the security community that incidents are
distinguished from events, where incidents are higher than events, such that an incident
constitutes several events or some major event. However, it remains vague about when an
incident can be actually identified, leading to various understandings for the term. Several
works have provided definitions for the term, like: [24] [1] [25] .Other works like the CERT
document [2] has left it to each CSIRT to provide its own definition that fits its operating
environment.
The ISO 17799 defines an incident as: “an occurrence that compromises
information security” [25]. To provide more precise context for the term “information
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security”, The NIST [9] standard expands the definition to “is a violation or imminent
threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard
security practices”. The CNSS [24] expands further as “An occurrence that results in actual
or potential jeopardy to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information
system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or that constitutes a
violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or
acceptable use policies. “.
The common theme in the above definitions is the highlighting of the “security”
nature of the incident, perhaps to draw distinction from the term: “computer incident”
which is more generic [26]. For example, database inconsistency resulting from sever
migration is a major computer incident that disrupts the operation of an organization, but
it is not of security nature.
I suggest amending the definition of an incident to reflect that complexity nature of
security incidents. There are many incidents that satisfy the above definition but are simple
to fix and do not require the execution of a CSIRP or the full potential response of a CSIRT.
Although this is not explicitly mentioned in the above definitions, it is implied when the
above references talk about the organized nature of the CSIRT activities. In that direction,
a distinction is to be drawn between simple incidents and major incidents. A major incident
is one that either require a coordinated response between various parties, or one that have
or potentially have high impact on the organization’s operations or its resources, e.g.
budget.
Based on the above discussion, the following definition is proposed for the context
of this project: an incident is: “an occurrence of a major event or several events, that
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demonstrates actual or potential compromise of the system or data, and demonstrates high
impact on the organization operations and resources, or the need for an organized
response”. Thus, just as computer incidents are not considered of interest to CSIR, minor
incidents are excluded too.
Computer and Security Incidents
There are four common terms used to describe organized responses to computer
security incidents:


Computer Security Incident Response,



Computer Incident Response



Cyber Security Incident Response



Cyber Incident Response.

The difference is in choosing between: “cyber” or “computer” and whether the term
“security” needs to be added.
The above choice of terms is influenced by how various researchers and
practitioners understand and use the terms: “computer security”, “cybersecurity” and
“information security”. Some argue for cybersecurity being more generic than computer
and information security [27] [28], while other publications use the terms interchangeably
[24]. It is also noted in [29] that although the term cybersecurity is used in government
agencies to refer to state-sponsored attacks on critical infrastructure or those that reflect
serious organized crime, the media and many industry practitioners still use it as a synonym
to computer security.
In the major publications in CSIR [2] [1] [30] , the term “computer security” seems
to be more preferred over “cybersecurity”. For the sake of consistency, this preference will
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be maintained for the purposes of this project. In addition, the term “computer security
incident” will be used over “computer incident” to emphasize the security nature of the
handling process.
Based on the above selection, a response plan will be referred to as: “Computer
Security Incident Response Plan (CSIRP), compared to “Cyber Security Incident Response
Plan” and “Computer Incident Response Plan (CIRP)”. Similarly, the term Computer
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) will be used to describe the team tasked with
CSIR responsibilities.
Computer Security Incident Response
The available definitions for computer security incident response (CSIR) are very
similar, and slightly differ by the level of details in the wording of the definition. In this
project, a definition adapted from [31] will be used in which CSIR is defined as: “the
capability to provide end-to-end, cross enterprise management of incidents that affect
information and technology assets within an organization”. Note that, incident
management and incident handling are used interchangeably.
The definition of a computer incident response team (CSIRT) introduced by [24]
and adopted by NIST [9] is: “Group of individuals usually consisting of Security Analysts
organized to develop, recommend, and coordinate immediate mitigation actions for
containment, eradication, and recovery resulting from computer security incidents.”.
Although, the terms CSIRT and CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) refers to
the same capability, the latter term is currently labeled to entities that act as a single point
of contact and focus on coordination responsibilities. Since the focus of this project is
incident handling, the term CSIRT is selected.
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The definition provided by CNSS [24] for an incident response plan (CSIRP) is
adopted in this project, which states: “the documentation of a predetermined set of
instructions or procedures to detect, respond to, and limit consequences of a malicious
cyber-attacks against an organization’s information system(s).” The focus in this project is
on the documentation of how an incident is handled, i.e. actions and procedures, compared
to strategic design, business models and security policies. Also, in many organizations a
CSIRP is broken into several documents and appendices, For simplification purposes, it is
assumed that all incident handling procedures are gathered in a single document.

1.4.2 Performance Evaluation Terms
Performance Framework
The term ‘framework’ is used in this project to refer to the generic conceptual
setting that encompasses several perspectives and methods for the investigation of a
research problem. This definition is derived from how the term is commonly used in works
of computer security that exemplify some resemblance to this project [32] [33] [34] [35].
Based on this, ‘performance framework’ is understood as: ‘a generic conceptual setting
that encompasses several perspectives and methods for the evaluation of computer security
incident response capability”. Compared to a model which is specific and involves some
process, a framework is more abstract and generic. In addition, models are normally
developed within a framework.
Performance Evaluation and Quality Management
There is a diverse range of how the following terminologies pertaining to
performance are used by various researchers: performance evaluation, performance
measurement, performance management and performance appraisal. These terms are also
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sometimes used interchangeably with quality terms like: quality management, quality
control, quality enhancement and quality. The following paragraphs will elaborate on how
these terms are defined for the purposes of this project. Further discussions will appear in
the survey of articles in this chapter or whenever a term is used for the first time in this
document.
The simplest definition of performance is: “how well a person, machine, etc. does
a piece of work or an activity” [36]. Based on this definition, CSIR performance can be
defined in simple terms as “how well the CSIRT executed the CSIR activities”.
Since measuring “how well” an activity is done can be a subjective matter, different
fields view performance in terms of measurements against specific thresholds or standards.
For example, the Business Dictionary defines performance as: “The accomplishment of a
given task measured against present known standards of accuracy, completeness, cost and
speed” [37]. Refining the definition of performance in the context of CSIR, the definition
would be “how well the CSIRT executed CSIR activities as outlined in the CSIRP to
achieve the outlined goals”.
Although performance measurement is the main performance activity, the term
‘performance evaluation’ is used here as a higher level term that encompasses:
performance

planning,

performance

management,

performance

measurement,

performance analysis, performance monitoring and continuous enhancement. Thus,
‘performance evaluation’ and ‘performance evaluation system’ are used as synonyms.
Based on the above, CSIR Performance Evaluation is defined as: “All activities
associated with assessing how well a CSIRT executes CSIR activities as outlined in the
CSIRP to achieve the outlined goals”. Note that this definition presumes the existence of a
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CSIRP and the predefinition of goals. Therefore, it is out of the scope of this project to
evaluate CSIRTs acting with no prior planning.
In several contexts, the term ‘performance appraisal’ is used interchangeably with
the term ‘performance evaluation’. Performance appraisal is “ a formal management
system that provides for the evaluation of the quality of an individual’s performance in an
organization” [38]. From the perspective of CSIR, performance evaluation is not a form of
performance appraisal, because it is focused on the overall system performance compared
to staff performance, and it targets the collective outcomes of the CSIR team not the
individual performance of each member.

Quality Management System

Quality
Planning

Performance
Planning

Performance
Measurement

Quality
Management

Performance
Management

Performance
Indicators

Quality
Surveillance

Performance
Monitoring

Performance
Metrics

Quality
Improvement

Performance
Enhancement

Performance
Analysis

Quality Assurance

CSIR Performance Evaluation System

Figure 1: Taxonomy of Performance and Quality Terminologies used in the project

From an organizational perspective, activities relating to ‘quality management’ and
‘performance management’ are very similar in their aims of leading the organization to
better productivity and profitability [39]. In this project, quality is viewed as a broader
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organizational activity that encompasses performance evaluation of the CSIR capability.
For instance, CSIR performance planning is one of the activities, but not limited to, that
quality planning is concerned with. In Figure 1, a chart that depicts the hierarchy and
relationship between the various terms pertaining to quality and performance are presented,
as understood for the purposes of this project.
Finally, the terms: ‘performance management’ and ‘performance control’ will used
interchangeably.
Performance Indicator
Performance measurement is the process of “quantifying the efficiency and
effectiveness of an action” [40]. This measurement is done through what is known as
performance indicators (PIs) and performance metrics (PMs). Again, there is a diversity of
definitions and usages for the two terms. It is assumed in this project that performance
indicators are in higher order than performance metrics, following the GQIM model
presented in [41]. Thus, for each performance indicator, there is one or more performance
metrics to be used to measure it.
The CSIR system has various qualities and properties that can be subject to
measurement. The term ‘performance indicator’ is given to a system quality that reflects
some performance behavior, positive or negative. Examples include: response time,
response stability, containment effectiveness, recovery cost and detection accuracy. Each
of these indicators can reflect a desirable (e.g. short response time, high response stability,
low recovery cost …etc) or undesirable (e.g. long response time, low response stability,
high recovery cost …etc) system feature that reflect performance. Also, each indicator can
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be measured in various ways and through various tools. These tools can be quantitative or
qualitative, and the number of tools can be singular or multiple.
Performance Metric
The proposed definition of ‘performance metric’ is: ‘a measurement tool used for
characterizing or quantifying a quality of CSIR performance’. It could also be defined as:
“a tool used for measuring a single or multiple performance indicators’. This definition is
aligned with the definition borrowed from measurement theory [42], as both assert the
quantitative nature. An example of a performance metric used to measure the detection
effectiveness is the difference of the incident severity scale identified during the detection
phase and the actual severity scale as approved in the analysis phase. This metric can also
be used in the measurement of other performance metrics like incident handling accuracy.
Also, this metric is not the only possible tool to measure detection effectiveness. The length
of the time period between the first reporting of the incident until the incident declaration
can be another metric to measure detection effectiveness.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
Finally, the terms “effectiveness” and “efficiency” continually appear in the
definitions of performance activities. Effectiveness is “the extent to which planned
activities are realized and planned results are achieved”, and efficiency is: “relationship
between the result achieved and the resources used” [43]. Using the aforementioned
definition, effectiveness and efficiency can be classified as higher-level performance
indicators. It is debatable whether all performance indicators should be mapped to
effectiveness and efficiency. Innovation and traceability are examples of system qualities
that are not straightforward to be mapped to effectiveness and efficiency.
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In some fields like supply chain management (SCM) and engineering systems, it is
easy to distinguish between issues related to effectiveness from those relevant to efficiency.
However, in the field of incident response, the two aspects are strongly related. Therefore,
in this project, a definition of effectiveness that encompasses efficiency will be adopted.
For the context of CSIR, performance effectiveness is defined as: “the extent to which
CSIR goals are achieved and harm is reduced through efficient use of resources”.
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CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND

The research topic of this dissertation can be linked to two general areas of
literature; the first is computer security and the second is performance evaluation. Both of
these fields are too vast to be surveyed. Therefore, this literature review will be narrowed
down to the following two sub-areas: (1) computer security incident response and (2)
performance evaluation of incident response. The common term between these two subareas is: ‘incident response’.
This chapter has three sections in which the first two correspond to surveys of major
works of the above two sub-areas, and the third provides a summary of main findings along
with discussion.
In the first section, an overview of the area of computer security incident response
is presented focusing on its development and the current models and standard planning
procedures. This is followed by a discussion of performance evaluation within the general
context of computer security and within the specific domain of computer security incident
response. Finally, an overview of security metrics is presented as a background for the
discussion on performance metrics of computer security response.
The second section provides a literature review of how other disciplines, like
medical emergency and engineering critical systems, handle the issue of performance
evaluation of incident response. As the area of Computer Security Incident Response
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(CSIR) is relatively new compared to the other disciplines, this survey aims at borrowing
best practices from these fields to the area of CSIR.
The last section provides a summary of the current state of the art in performance
evaluation in CSIR, and lessons learnt from other disciplines. The proposed framework,
outlined in Chapter 3, will make frequent references to these findings which act as a
foundation for the designing and modeling of the framework.

2.1 Computer Security Incident Response (CSIR) Literature Review
2.1.1 History
It is a matter of agreement among computer science historians that issues pertaining
to security started to emerge as soon as computers were invented in the 1960s. Some even
argue for ancient roots found in cryptology and events associated with phone wiretapping
that happened in the late period of 1800s. This rich history was subject to various studies
from various perspectives. For example, history of cryptology can be found in [44], history
of information security in [45], history of hacking in [46], history of viruses and malware
in [47], history of computer crime in [48] [49], and the contemporary rise of Cyber-warfare
can be found in [50].
Although some glimpses on the history of computer security incident response
(CSIR) can be found in some works like [51] [52], there is no dedicated work that fully
trace the history of computer security incident response. However, since issues pertaining
to computer security are interconnected, it is difficult to extract a well-identified history
for CSIR that is independent of the other sub-fields of computer security. For every
computer security incident, dated or contemporary, there are two parties involved: one
party that exploit, attack or hack and one party that responds with a counter measure. In
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such view, it could be argued that CSIR was born on the same day the first incident
occurred, which is a matter of debate among historians. Nevertheless, I will attempt to
identify some milestones that significantly contributed to the development of CSIR as it is
understood today. In that direction, focus will be on activities and incidents that triggered
organized or coordinated response in a manner that is similar to how CSIR teams operate
today. In my view, the following activities and incidents stand as the major milestones in
CSIR development:
The Morris Worm and Creation of CERT (1988): In November 2, 1988 Tappan
Morris, a graduate student at Cornell University, released into the internet one of the
earliest distributed worms that will have a significant impact on shaping the current
understanding of computer security. The worm was designed to be undetectable, and was
launched from an MIT computer as a camouflage of the worm origin. The worm exploited
some vulnerabilities in the UNIX system, more specifically some versions of the Berkeley
Software Distribution (BSD) system, and had the capability to replicate itself to other
machines once it has infected a specific machine.
The worm creator claims that the worm was not designed to cause harm, and hence
the actual intent remains a speculation. The outcomes of the worm release were
unexpected, both to the public and to its own creator, as the scope and magnitude of the
worm spread was outstanding. Although the worm did not cause actual loss of data, it
caused an economic loss in millions of dollars resulting from thousands of machines being
down. It could be considered the earliest distributed denial of service attack, and is
sometimes referred to as: the Great Worm. In terms of CSIR, it was the most influential
incident that sparked public and official discussion on the need for “collective” and
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“organized” response to computer security incidents. The incident triggered the
establishment of the first Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and resulted in
the first prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. For further
information on the technical details and the impact of the Morris worm, consult the
following two works: [53] and [54].
After two weeks of the Morris Worm release, the Computer Emergency Response
Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) was created. The center is a US federally funded
project, mainly funded through the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA), and is positioned within the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon
University. The center was designed to act as a single point of contact for Internet security
problems, and as a platform for sharing response information with the government, private
sector and public at large. The early documents of CERT draws the analogy to a fire
department, as the public can call for assistance to any computer security incident. The
concept of Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) was developed, and
CERT can be considered the first CSIRT. In the next decade, hundreds of CSIRTs were
formed across the US. Today, most of these CSIRTs are members of one umbrella, the
Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). For further information on the
history of CERT and its current activities, consult: [55] and [1].
The Wank Worm and Creation of FIRST (1990): The Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams was established in 1989, and started operating in 1990. It was triggered
by the WANK worm, which revealed the need for coordination between various CSIR
teams across the US. The Wank worm targeted The US Department of Energy and NASA.
It is believed that the worm originated from Australia, and it constitutes the first computer
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breach with a political message, as it displayed an anti-nuclear message. The main
objective of FIRST is to coordinate sharing of information and collaboration between
various CSIRTs across the world. The mission statement states: “Membership in FIRST
enables incident response teams to more effectively respond to security incidents by
providing access to best practices, tools, and trusted communication with member teams.”
As of the end of 2016, the FIRST website displays membership of 370 teams across 79
countries. For more information on FIRST’s history and activities, consult the following
resources: [16].
Using the public data available at the FIRST website, I performed some analysis to
see the rate and pattern of membership. Currently, the vast majority of governments and
large corporates have membership with FIRST, which could be treated as a reasonable
representation of the international appreciation for the need of CSIR. Out of the 370
member CERTs, it was possible to trace the start date of 242 CSIRTs, which is 65.4% of
the total number of members; while there were no available data pertaining to the start date
for the remaining members. This sample, however, covers the 79 countries which is 100%
of the countries that have membership with FIRST. For each member, there is a date of
establishment and a date for joining FIRST which is normally later than the former. The
earlier date, i.e. the date of establishment, is of more interest because it represents the actual
systemized action to implement CSIR.
A chart that represents the number of new members that join FIRST each year, and
the number of countries that they originate from is provided in Figure 2.
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Number of CSIRTs from 1990-2016
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Figure 2: Number of CSIRTs worldwide in the period of 1990-2016

It is noticed that the year 2011 demonstrates the peak of participation, as there were
20 new CSIRTs created in 16 different countries. The second highest year is 2004 with 18
new CSIRTs in 13 countries. I speculate that there was no specific single incident that
triggered such high participation in these years. It is mainly due to the nature of security
threats on the national level that created undisputable need for creating CERTs to
coordinate response at an organized large scale. It also could be credited to the availability
of the series of publications from the pioneering CERT at Carnegie Mellon University,
which proposed a structure and procedure for creating and executing CSIRTs.
Documentation and Standardization of CSIR: It could be argued that the
publication of three main comprehensive documents had a great impact on the development
of the CSIR field. The first is the Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs) [2] by the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute.
There were two versions released, the first in 1998 and the second in April 2003 which is
the one widely used up to this date.
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Figure 3: The three main CSIR publications

The second documentation is the “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide”
published in August 2012 by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). Concurrently, the SANS Institute was developing its own documentation, which
appeared in December 2011 by the title: “The Incident Handlers Handbook” [30]. These
three publications are the three main references used today by the industry for
implementing a CSIRT.
Stuxnet and start of Cyberwar (2010): The Stuxnet malware is considered the first
digital weapon with substantial destructive power. The malware hit the Iranian Natanz
Uranium enrichment facility in early 2010, causing damage to controllers of centrifuges
at the nuclear power plant. Up to this date, no entity had officially called responsibility for
the implant of the malware, although several journalists and scientists speculate that it was
initiated by a US-Israeli operation to hurdle progress to the Iranian Nuclear Weapon.
From the technical side, the Stuxnet malware targeted specific programmable logic
controllers (PLC) such that the malware would only be executed if specific configurations
were found on the destination host. The malware is believed to have been transferred
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through an infected USB exploring its way through worm-like techniques into the intranet
of the Nuclear plant. The malware exploited several zero-day flaws, a term given to
vulnerabilities exploited by hackers without prior knowledge from vendors about its
presence [56]. For further information on the Stuxtnet, the investigative book of the
journalist Kim Zitter is an important resource [57].
In my view, Stuxnet and its aftermath are critical to the development of the CSIR
field. Although there are several noteworthy state-level cyber incidents prior to Stuxnet
[58], the scope and impact of Stuxnet is unprecedented. It takes computer security response
into a very sophisticated and advanced stage that is beyond the capacity of CSIRTs as
defined by the industry. It is analogous to local police responders tasked to respond to a
large scale terrorist attack which require highly trained special forces and the coordination
of several federal agencies. It could be argued that two types of CSIR exist today, one on
the national level with military like techniques and one on the business level which
operated in confined environment and limited budgets. This a divergence from the
traditional CERT model in which responding to security threats appear as joint process
from the public and private sectors.
Furthermore, with Stuxnet targeting industrial PLCs and being used as an offensive
weapon, it adds levels of complexity to the response. The CSIRTs would need to consider
lower-level security breaches in the hardware and industrial systems which is not currently
of high priority. Also, responding to a backlash of an offensive security breach or dealing
with unexpected consequences of an offensive breach would require different techniques
than the defensive ones currently used by CSIRTs.
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In Figure 4, a summary of the timeline for the above activities that contributed to
the development of CSIR is presented.

1988

The Morris Worm triggers the establishment of the
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) in the US

1989

The Wank Worm triggers the creation of FIRST to
coordinate activities between various CERTs

2003

CERT publishes: “Handbook for Computer Security
Incident Response”

2010

The
Stuxnet virus
was discovered starting: “cyber-war”
Teams
(CSIRTs)
expanding the complexity and scope of CSIRT operations

2011

- Peak Participation in FIRST
- The SANS Institute publishes the: “The Incident
Handler’s Handbook”

2012

NIST publishes the Computer Security Incident Handling
Guide

Figure 4: Timeline of Computer Security Incident Response (CSIRT) development

As this study focuses on performance evaluation in CSIR, it is also interested in
identifying the phase at which the field started deliberating the need for integrating
performance evaluation in the CSIR process. The conducted survey of the published works
reveals that the need for using performance evaluation in computer security incident
responses was not acknowledged until a later stage of the field’s development. Most of the
early CSIR studies focused on developing models and procedures for handling computer
incidents. In these publications, the issue of performance evaluation was not considered a
core functionality of the process and hence received minimal or no attention. For example,
the remarkable 2003 CERT publication of “Handbook for Computer Security Incident
Response Teams (CSIRTs)” lacked any reference to the issue. Another comprehensive IR
planning book [3] provides only an indirect reference to performance evaluation in the
context of highlighting the importance of performing performance measurements when
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designing business processes. A similar short indirect reference is found in SANS’s
Incident Handler’s Handbook [30]. The recent publication dates of the latter two works,
August 2012 and December 2011 consecutively, suggest that not only the issue of
performance evaluation is overlooked in the early works, but it also continue to be
overlooked in some major publications in the field.
I found an early reference to “measuring the effectiveness of computer security
incident response capability (CSIRC)” in one of the early publications of NIST [59] dated
in 1991. However, the term was used to refer to how using incident response would
contribute positively to an organization’s performance. In other words, the term was used
in the context of the effectiveness of introducing a CSIR into an organization, which is now
a well-established need, compared to measuring the effectiveness of the response team,
which is the interest of this dissertation.
The earliest direct reference to performance evaluation that I was able to trace was
in the CERT publication of 2008 [60]. However, the more substantive references [1] [61]
[41] had to wait until 2012 to appear. It could be argued that some studies earlier than 2008
made references to performance evaluation in the context of computer security. However,
these were made in other areas of computer security like: vulnerability assessment [62]
(2007), IT service level agreements [23] [63] (2006) and intrusion detection [64] (2001).
A discussion of these references will be presented in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.6.

2.1.2 CSIR Models and Processes
Incident Response Life Cycle Models
There are several models for expressing the main activities performed by incident
responders. In Figure 5, a depiction of four common models to represent the incident
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response life cycle is presented. The four models come from NIST [1], US CERT [65] [31],
SANS [56] and a hybrid model adopted by some professional experts in the field [66].
The four models express the same methodology and only differ in naming,
categorization of activities, and emphasizing some interaction between phases of the life
cycle. For example, the term “identification”, used by SANS and the hybrid model, and the
term “detection” used by NIST and US CERT, are used to describe the same activities
performed at the initial stages of the incident. In the US CERT model, “prepare” and
“protect” are highlighted as separate activities with strong interaction in order to stress the
need to perform both prior to any incident handling. On the other hand, the other models
consider “protect” as part of the “prepare” phase. The same could be said about whether
“containment” and “eradication” should be considered two separate phases, or one phase.
Based on this discussion, choosing which model to adopt is a matter of preference that has
little impact on conceptualizing the main IR activities.
In this work, and for the sake of consistency and without loss of generality, the
hybrid model will be used. The hybrid model captures the processes of both the NIST and
SANS models in a reasonable number of phases, and resembles other industry-based
models like: [29] [67]. Compared to the US CERT model that stresses inputs and
interaction, the hybrid model stresses the actions, which is a simpler way to describe the
IR handling. As there is no statistics on the industry’s usage of these models, at least it is
confirmed from a CSIR practitioner [66] that this model is currently being used in some
large corporates which guarantees that the model is practically used. It also demonstrates
high resemblance to other practically used models like the one in [68]. In Table 2, the major

36

activities in the five phases of the IR life cycle as presented in the hybrid model are
provided.

NIST
Model

Preparation

Containment
, Eradication
& Recovery

Detection &
Analysis

US-CERT
Model

PostIncident
Activity

Prepare

Incident & Vulnerability
Reports, Network
Monitoring, Tech Watch
& Public Monitoring,
General Info Request

Detect

Triage

Respond

Protect

Preparation

Identification

Containment

Lessons
Learned

Recovery

Eradication

Preparation

Identification/
Analysis

Containment

Lessons
Learned

Eradication/
Recovery

SANS Model

Hybrid
Model

Figure 5: Models for Incident Response Life Cycle

The Computer Security Incident Response (CSIR) can be viewed as a proactive and
as a reactive process. It is proactive as the majority of time is spent in planning and
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preparing for incidents, while it is reactive because of its main objective which is to respond
to incidents once they arise.
#

1

Phase

Preparation

Activities






Review of policies and security processes
Prepare and write an incident response plan (CSIRP)
Training and testing the CSIRP
Prepare hardware and software needed for IR
Approve the CSIRP and raise awareness

2



Identification/ 
Analysis




3

Containment







Perform basic triage as outlined in the CSIRP
Isolate “infected” system to ensure minimum loss
Protect critical resources and data
Identify attacking hosts and interrupt any ongoing breach
Collect evidence and document incident timeline

Eradication/
Recovery






Gradually eliminate components of the breach
Restore basic operations of the organization
Identify and mitigate exploited vulnerabilities
Restore to normal operations

Lessons
Learnt








Analyze main causes of the incident
Analyze the response compliance with the CSIRP
Analyze response actions for potential improvement
Recommend protection mechanisms and policy updates
Update CSIRP based on lessons learnt
Provide full technical and non-technical documentation

4

5

Analyze “alerts” and “indicators” for possible incident
Perform initial assessment and validation
Review available evidence and collect further information
Classify and prioritize an incident
Declare an incident and initiate executing the CSIRP
Document and notify management

Table 2: Main activities in the IR life cycle of the Hybrid Model

The proactive side can be further divided into two major activities: planning, i.e.
planning for incident handling, and security, i.e. ensuring that the environment is secure
against breaches. As the field had grown, the second activity pertaining to security
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assurance and enforcement is delegated to designated security teams, which might or might
not be part of the CSIRT. In small size organizations, the whole security team is part of the
CSIRT and is tasked with planning, security and incident handling.
Incident Identification Mechanisms
One of the earliest works on CSIRT [69] outlines five general techniques for the
identification phase of the IR life cycle. The first is called differencing, which is comparing
the current state of the system (post-attack) with one that is previously stored (pre-attack)
and highlighting the differences to understand the sequence of actions taken by the attacker.
The second technique is finding, which investigates a specific part of the system during a
specific time frame looking for flags and unusual behavior. The third is snooping, which
is to place some monitors on the system to observe future steps by the attackers. The fourth
is tracking which relies on the use of logs and audits to backtrack the steps of the attack.
And finally, psychology which relies on using social engineering techniques and sending
specific messages to stimulate the attacker to behave in a specific way.
As the CSIR field had grown and became more sophisticated, more refined
technical steps were developed for the identification phase. However, the above five
general mechanisms would still apply. In Figure 6, a list of major activities performed in
the identification phase is presented. The list is compiled to reflect those outlined in [3].
Note that these activities should be performed before any briefing to the management and
after identifying the portion of the system potentially compromised within a time frame.
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Recent Changes
to the system

Deleted log files

Deleted or altered
system files

Recent super user
activity

Recent escalation
of privileges

New user or super
user IDs created

Basic review of
suspected
software artifacts

Abnormal activity
in suspected
system or users

Unusual Activity
in the access of
system logs

Recent file
transfers from the
system

Recent off hours
activity

Suspicious network
activity

Figure 6: Main activities in the Identification Phase of the IR cycle

Incident Classification Techniques
There are various classification techniques applied at the early stages of incident
handling which work to determine the nature of the incident and guide for a proper
response. The classification techniques differ on factors used for categorizing incidents,
like: incident source, security target, severity level and expected engagement level.
Classifying incidents based on their source are normally used by CSIRTs operating
at the national level or by teams that work closely with prosecutors. Under this
classification technique, the technical method for exploitation are irrelevant. For example,
state-sponsored or organized hacking will be classified under one category compared to
incidents that demonstrate minor crimes conducted by individuals, even if both use the
same hacking method. An example of studies that discuss this method can be found in [29].
It could be argued that this classification is not recommended as the main assessment
method during the initial stages of the incident handling for CSIRTs not operating at the
national level. This is due to the fact that it is practically common that the actual source
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and motivation are only confirmed at the later stages of the incident handling or deduced
through post-incident analysis.
Another classification method is functional [3] and inspects the level of engagement
of various parties in executing the plan. Under this method, there are only two levels:
Priority 1 and Priority 2 incidents. Incidents classified under Priority 1 are those that require
the full support of the CSIRT, full execution of CSIRP and approval of senior management
before execution; while Priority 2 incidents require partial execution of the plan and does
not need the engagement of all parties. In order to determine which category to classify an
incident, the potential harm of the incident would be investigated. For example, incidents
that might impact the organization major services or might cause major financial damage
would be classified as Priority 1, while incidents that do not impose external interaction as
with law enforcement and media can be classified as Priority 2 incidents.
The classification method suggested by NIST [1] is more comprehensive and
considers three aspects of the incident: functional impact, information impact and
recoverability effort. The functional impacts investigates the incident’s impact on the
business operations and services offered by the organization. The information impact
inspects actual and potential harm over the organization’s information through the CIA
model (confidentiality, integrity and availability). The recoverability estimates the time and
resources needed to recover from the incident. A summary of these elements is presented
in Table 3. Note that an incident can be classified higher according to one factor but low
according to another. It is a decision to be made by the CSIRT to take proper actions based
on its investigation of all of the three factors.
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Level 1

Functional Impact

Information Impact

Recoverability Effort

None

None

Regular

No impact on ability
to provide services
Low

Level 2

Proprietary Breach

unable to provide Compromised
some critical service
unclassified or
protected data
High

Level 4

Privacy Breach

Offer services but lost sensitive PII was
efficiency
accessed or exfiltrated
Medium

Level 3

no information
compromised

unable to provide
some critical services

Integrity Loss
Lost Sensitive or
proprietary data

Predictable time with
existing resources
Supplemented
Predictable time with
additional resources
Extended
Unpredictable recovery
time, external help &
additional resources
Not Recoverable
Recovery not possible,
launch investigation

Table 3: Incident Classification Mechanism proposed by the NIST document

2.1.3 Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)
Types of CSIRTs:
The NIST document outlines three models for structuring a CSIRT [1]: centralized,
distributed and coordinating. The centralized CSIRT is the most commonly used model
and constitutes of a single team that handle incidents across the organization. The
distributed team model is structured in several CSIRTs, each handling a specific
geographical segment of the organization or a group of resources. To avoid conflicts, a
mechanism for coordination and collaboration is outlined. The Coordinating Team model
is structured as a central main CSIRT which provides consultation, with no executive
power, to several CSIRTs tasked with incident handling, or part of its operations.
Another method to classify CSIRTs is relative to their association with the
constituencies. A CSIRT can be internal or external [70]. An internal CSIRT has all of its
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members as members of the organization being served, while an external CSIRT is formed
with nonmember staff responsible for incident handling through some form of contractual
relationship. Note that the meaning of “external members” here is different than “external
members” outlined in a CSIRP which refers to external entities, like law enforcement,
media and lawyers that collaborate with the core CSIRT team during the response process.
The categorization of internal and external is based on the relationship of those tasked with
the core CSIR responsibilities within an organization. It is also possible to have a hybrid
team of internal and external staff. However, if this is not properly structured with clear
outlined responsibilities in the CSIRP, it can leads to conflict of interest and non-cohesion
among the team members.
Other methods for classifying CSIRTs can be found in [51].
Organizational Structure
Although CSIRTs can be structured and positioned in an organization in various
ways [2] [1] [70], it can be viewed as a body consisting of a core team, several support
teams, several extended teams and several external teams [66].
Members of the core team are responsible for carrying the core responsibilities of
incident handling, planning and review. The team need to be balanced to reflect technical
expertise and knowledge about the business and administration operations of the
organization.
The support teams are those that will have substantive involvement in the incident
handling process but under the supervision of the core team. These teams normally consist
of members whose main responsibilities in the organization are not related to CSIR. The
support teams can be further divided into technical and logistical teams. Examples of
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technical teams include forensics, help desk, networking, data center and system
administrators. Logistical teams include: administrative assistants, physical security,
transportation, communication …etc. The technical teams can be grouped in one single
team or in multiple teams and the same applies for the logistical team.
The extended teams are those members of the same organization that provide
indirect support or guidance to the core team. Most important among these teams is the
executive and business teams in the organization whom the core team will be regularly
reporting and consulting with during the incident response. Other teams include human
resources, the legal team and the outreach team. These teams are normally outlined as
contacts in the CSIRP to be reached as needed. Finally, the external teams include law
enforcement, national and peer CSIRTs, and technical and legal consultants that could be
reached if assistance is needed.
A chart that depicts the above relationships between the core CSIRT team and other
teams inside and outside the organization is found in Figure 7.

CSIRT Core Team
External Teams
Peer CSIRTs

Extended Teams

CSIRT Support Teams
Logistical
Teams

Technical Teams

Law
Enforcement

Forensics

Networking

Admin
Assistants

Legal
Consultants

Help Desk

Data Center

Communication

Technical
Consultants

System
Admins

Other IT
support

Other
logistics

Figure 7: Organizational Structure of a CSIRT
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Management:

CEO, CFO,
CIO

Business
Team
Human
Resources
Security

It is noted in [51], that the element of trust is an essential aspect of the culture in
which CSIRTs operate. It is a precondition for the numerous collaborations which a CSIRT
establishes. Trust is normally built through necessity, opportunity or through introductions
by trusted parties. The study also notes that there are four principles that were common
about CSIR practitioners interviewed by the study. The four principles are operational
independence, reciprocity, confidentiality and transparency. Operational independence
mean the CSIRT should operate independently from other policy objectives, focusing only
on CSIR objectives. The principle of reciprocity suggest that if a team shares some
information, techniques or warning with a party, then it is expected that the other party will
do the same as the need arise. Both confidentiality and transparency express one of the two
essential professional ethics which CSIR practitioners adhere to.

2.1.4 Computer Security Incident Response Plan (CSIRP)
There are various templates for developing computer security incident response
plans (CSIRPs), sometimes also known as CIRP (Computer Incident Response Plan).
These templates might vary in the outline, structure and presentation methods, but the
minimum requirements of what needs to be included is very similar.
The NIST document [1] lists eight elements that need to be included in any CSIRP.
These elements are: (1) Mission (2) Strategies and Goals (3) Senior Management Approval
(4) Organizational Approach to CSIR (5) Communication between CSIRT and the rest of
organization (6) metrics for measuring CSIR capability and effectiveness (7) Roadmap for
maturing the CSIR capability (8) How the CSIR plan fits into the overall organization. It
is noticed that the above template emphasizes the organizational perspective and the
development roadmap but omits the technical details and the specifics of the IR phases.
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This might be explained by the generic nature of the NIST document which emphasizes
guidelines and policies over technical procedures.
A sample of a CSIRP outline published at the website of the California Department
of Technology is an example of plans that emphasize practicality and documentation
method [71]. The sample outlines 17 actions that need to be taken along with the
documentation requirements of each action which can be customized based on the nature
of the agency preparing the plan. A list of these steps along with a description is provided
in Table 4. The advantage of the above CSIRP outline is its practicality and simplicity
which makes it accessible by various technical and non-technical personnel. The website
lists other forms to be used for performing more technical activities like budget assessment
of response. The disadvantage of such approach to CSIRP preparation is the lack of
information about the rationale of the outlined steps and that links to the organization’s
policies and strategies.
#

Title

Description

1

Emergency
Contact List

A list of names and phone numbers to be contacted if an incident
happens

2

Discovery
Reporting

Procedures of reporting the discovery of an incident if discovered by
a member of the IT department

3

Public
Reporting

Procedures of reporting the discovery of an incident if discovered by
a non-member of the IT department

4

Security Office Logging information if incident reported to the grounds security
Reporting
office

5

Initial
Assessment

Steps taken by the IT department after the reporting in terms of
communication within the department and performing initial
assessment of the severity of the incident

6

CSIRT
assessment

Initial steps by the CSIRT members with regards to incident
assessment and setting a plan for response
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7

Incident
Declaration

Official declaration of an incident under one of the outlined incident
categories

8

Response plan
execution

Execution of outlined steps suitable for the type of response, e.g.
worm response procedure or system abuse procedures

9

Forensics

Application of forensics techniques to extract evidence

10

Immediate
Actions

Outline of immediate actions to be taken based on analysis done in
Steps 8 and 9

11

Management
Approval

Getting management approval to execute the above response
recommendations

12

Restoration

Steps taken to restore the system after containing the incident

13

Documentation Full list of items that need to be documented post-incident

14

Evidence
Preservation

Steps to be taken to preserve collected evidence

15

External
Reporting

Inform external agencies of the incident like law enforcement, media
and lawyers

16

Damage
Assessment

Assess damage and response cost

17

Review

Review response and formulate lessons learnt list
Table 4: Outline of Action-Based CSIRP Sample

More detailed CSIRP outlines can be found in [3] and [66]. In [3], a CSIRP is
structured into eight major sections: (1) Plan Introduction (2) Incident Preparation (3)
Incident Detection, Analysis and Declaration (4) Incident Response Supporting Actions
(5) Incident Containment, Eradication and Recovery (6) Post Incident Activity (7) CIRP
Roles and Responsibilities (8) Plan Maintenance. A summary of the main topics presented
under each of the above sections is presented in Table 5. It is noticed that this outline is
comprehensive and combines both organizational and technical details. Some of the public
CSIRPs like [72], demonstrates much resemblance to the above outline.
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#

Section Title

1

Plan Introduction

Objective, scope, assumptions, plan execution and command
topology, plan ownership, plan structure

2

Incident
Preparation

Compliance framework, sensitive data, third party payments,
third party services, compromise notification protocols

3

Incident Detection,
Analysis and
Declaration

Sources of indicators, incident thresholds, incident analysis
(business and technical impact), incident categories, incident
declaration and declaration

4

Incident Response
Supporting Actions

Plan execution, organization and roles, process and rhythm,
synchronization and decision making, release of public
statements, evidence discovery and retention, liaison with law
enforcement

5

Incident
Containment,
Eradication and
Recovery

The Data compromise team, containment procedures (isolation,
verification of non-affected systems, third party connections,
consequence management), eradication and recovery procedures
(remediation, compensations, disaster recovery and business
continuity)

6

Post Incident
Analysis

Incident Termination (criteria, decision process, evidence
retention, response statistics), lessons learnt

7

CIRP Roles and
Responsibilities

Accounting, human resources, information security forensics, IT
operations center, Investor relations, disaster recovery, internal
communications, legal teams, public affairs, retail operations

8

Plan Maintenance

Regular updates, incorporation of lessons learnt, annual testing
of the plan

Contents

Table 5: Contents of CSIRP as outlined by [3]

Another outline of a CSIRP is provided by [66]. The plan demonstrates similarity
to that of [3] in terms of contents and being comprehensive. However, it follows a different
structure. The plan consists of four major sections: Charter, Business Documents, Incident
Checklist and Appendices. The charter focuses on the authority question and contains
information similar to those presented under “Plan Introduction” of Table 5. The Business
Document section contains the following information: plan revision history, testing
schedule, organization chart, roles and responsibilities, data classification policies,
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compliance regulations, training requirements and business continuity documents and
disaster recovery documents. The third section on “Incident Checklist” contain the specific
sets for various types of incidents like: cyber intrusion, denial of service, malicious code
outbreak and phishing incidents. The final section on “Appendices” contains documents
like: incident classification levels, escalation procedures both internal and external, data
preservation procedures, law enforcement support, war room and communications, call
tree, incident declaration forms and glossary of terms. It is noticed that this outline is
designed such that to facilitate the maintenance and update of the CSIRP.

2.1.5 CSIR Performance Evaluation
This section discusses references made to performance evaluation (PE) in
publications dedicated to the study of computer security incident response. The discussion
starts with the CSIR comprehensive works that address the issue of PE like [25] [1] [73].
Then the discussion extends to CSIR studies such as [61] [22] [41] [74] [75] [76] that
address some aspects relevant to PE, like preparedness and effectiveness of detection
mechanisms.
The 2008 CERT report: “Creating and Managing Computer Security Incident
Handling Teams (CSIRTs)” [60] is probably the first major work in CSIR to make an
explicit reference to performance evaluation. The report calls to: “define methods for
evaluating the performance of the CSIRT”. As the report stresses, this is only possible once
the response workflow is clearly outlined and incident management processes are well
defined. However, the report falls short of providing more information on how to design
these “methods” and how it could be integrated into the process.
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The above CERT report adopts the US CERT model for the IR cycle, depicted in
Figure 5, and hence identifies five main functionalities to be assessed: (1) Prepare (2)
Protect (3) Detect (4) Triage (5) Response. The report mentions performance evaluation
within the context of the fifth phase: “response”. This conservative usage of the term
suggest a limited scope for performance evaluation. According to the report, “response” is
limited to actions taken after the detection and triage, compared to the current usage of the
term which includes the three activities together, i.e. detection, triage and response. Indeed,
some subsequent CERT publications like [41] present a wider scope for performance
evaluation to include all of the phases in the IR cycle, a perspective that is followed in this
project.
The way that [60] presents performance evaluation raises some fundamental issues
relevant to this project. For example, according to the report, the subject of the performance
evaluation is the CSIR team. Although this is a reasonable choice, as shall be presented in
Chapter 3, this might be confining and it would be better to use the plan (CSIRP) instead
of the team (CSIRT) as the main subject of the performance evaluation process. This shall
provide several advantages and acts as a more generalized method. In my view, the
performance of the team is a subcategory of the overall performance evaluation of the
response outlined in the CSIRP. Along the same discussion, the CERT report considers
performance evaluation as a method for measuring the performance of the team over a
period of time that involves several responses. Again, this can be restrictive and it will be
argued that performance evaluation should be generalized such that it could be applied to
a single and multiple incidents.
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The CERT report provided examples of simple performance metrics to be used like
number of reported incidents, response time and amounts of incidents resolved. This
acknowledges the importance of performance metrics within the development process of
the performance evaluation system. Also, the report suggests that the overall performance
of the team should be done in conjunction with the management and the constituency. Both
issues, the role of performance metrics and who should conduct performance evaluation
will be studied in Chapters 3 and 5.
The NIST “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide” [1] published in August
2012, is an important document guiding the operations of the industries in the area of
computer security incident response. The document made two brief but important
references to performance evaluation. The first reference is mentioned in the context of
policy elements that are needed for response plans. The need for developing metrics to
measure the capability and effectiveness of the plan is listed as one of the eight elements
that need to be included when creating incident response plans. The guide later mentions
that this could be done through data collection. The guide neither provides examples of
performance evaluation policies nor describes the type of data that need to be collected,
leaving it to the industry to come up with such policies and identify the relevant data.
The second reference, an important one, is found when discussing post-incident
activities. The guide suggests that one of the nine elements to discuss in a “lessons Learned
meeting” is “How well did staff and management in dealing with incident? Were the
document procedures followed? Were they adequate?” Assisting the industry to better
answer the above questions is one of the issues of interest to this dissertation.
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The guide proposes performing two types of assessments for each incident:
objective and subjective. The objective assessment is based on analyzing the collected
incident data, while the subjective assessment records the team members and resource
owners evaluation of the performance of the response. The guide provides eight examples
of what could be done in objective assessment. One of these examples, which is relevant
to this project, is: “measuring the difference between the initial impact assessment and the
final impact assessment”. One of the goals of the proposed performance framework is to
come up with similar assessment methods, with properly derived metrics, that measure the
performance of the major activities of the incident response. Using the above example,
‘impact’ needs to be defined and metrics will be proposed on how to measure it in the
context of CSIRPs.
The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) community
project [73] provides a framework for describing computer security incidents. The project
developers describe it as: “a set of metrics designed to provide a common language for
describing security incidents in a structured and repeatable manner.” The goal of the project
is to help organizations collect and report incidents in a uniform manner that enables
sharing analysis within the organization and with external entities.
The project identifies five major areas that are needed to construct an incident
narrative: incident tracking, victim demographics, incident description, discovery and
response and impact assessment. A summary of the main descriptors/metrics used to
describe each of these five areas is presented in Table 6.
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The VERIS format is adopted by some major IT service providers, like Verizon, to
report incidents. This makes the VERIS platform synchronous with recent threats and
current industry practices.
#

Category

Descriptors

1

Incident
Tracking

Incident ID, Source ID, Incident confirmation, related incidents,
confidence rating, incident notes

2

Victim ID, Primary Industry, Country of Operation, State,
Victim
Number of Employees, Annual revenue, Locations affected,
Demographics
Notes, Additional Guidance

3

Incident
Description

Threat Actors (External, Internal, Partner), Threat Actions
(Malware, Hacking, Social, Misuse, Physical, Environmental,
Error), Compromised Assets (Variety, Ownership, Management,
Hosting, Accessibility, Cloud, Notes), Security Attributes (CIA)

4

Discovery &
Response

Incident Timeline, Discovery Method, Root Causes, Corrective
Actions, Targeted vs. Opportunistic, Additional Guidance

5

Impact
Assessment

Loss categorization, Loss estimation, Estimation currency, Impact
rating, Notes
Table 6: VERIS Project Incident Narrative Descriptors

Three observations about VERIS could be highlighted which are relevant to this
project. First, When an incident is reported, the project suggests giving a ‘confidence
rating’ to the classification of that incident. This provides a practical solution to the
observation highlighted by NIST [1] that detecting incidents with accuracy is a very
challenging task. The NIST document acknowledges that this high impact on team
performance and cost and suggests undergoing thorough initial assessments before
declaration.

I speculate that if initial assessment procedures are coupled with the

confidence rating metric proposed by VERIS, this could be a very valuable information to
the CSIRT in terms of allocating resources and responding more efficiently.
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Second, the victim demographics descriptors aim to describe the affected
organization by giving information like: industry type, country of operation, number of
employees, annual revenue and locations affected. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
single unique work that attempted to incorporate such information for the purposes of
benchmarking. Although the above information is very basic and it is expected that due to
its lacking of more information about the organization’s CSIR preparedness that it will fall
short of providing meaningful comparisons, the VERIS project is commended for taking
the first step. If several companies pursue the issue of benchmarking more seriously, this
could provide the public with very valuable guidelines of best practices in the area of CSIR.
Third, when performing impact assessment of a security incident the project
suggests classifying impact into direct and indirect. Direct impacts are those targeting the
assets and can be quantified in currency. On the other hand, indirect impacts are those
resulting from a stakeholder’s reaction to an incident, e.g. customer, shareholder ..etc. The
project admits that the indirect impacts are more difficult to quantify, and leaves it as an
open research question. This also imposes challenges to using indirect impacts in
performance analysis. As shall be presented in Section 2.2, some works in the performance
evaluation of freeway emergencies [77] argued for including only direct measurable
impacts in the performance evaluation of IR.
A comprehensive list of “metrics” for measuring the capability of an organization
to perform CSIR functions is provided in [74]. The comprehensive document, which
appears in 200 pages, aims at providing guidelines to CSIRTs in terms of what needs to be
existing in the CSIR capability. The provided metrics are presented in the form of questions

54

to be assessed through scoring. The scoring is mainly in the form of “Yes” or “No”,
depending on satisfying a list of “indicators”.
The study provides a remarkable and rich repository for detailed activities
associated with the preparation of CSIRP. It could be viewed as a comprehensive guide for
measuring the completeness of a CSIRP document, and partially as a tool to measure an
organization’s preparedness for handling security incidents. Sample questions include: “is
there a financial plan for incident management functions?”, “is forensics analysis
performed on constituent systems and networks?”, “do the analytical processes incorporate
methods to determine the risk or threat level of a confirmed incident”, and “is there an
established business resumption plan to support disaster recovery?”.
Comparing [74] with the performance study provided in this project, the following
similarities and differences could be noted:
1- The focus of this project is measuring the effectiveness of a CSIRP and a CSIRT,
while [74] focuses on ensuring the preparedness of a CSIR capability. More
specifically, [74] focuses on completeness, which is only one aspect of
effectiveness as defined in this project.
2- The main evaluation method used in [74] is ensuring the “existence” of an “ability”
to perform an activity relevant to IR. However, this project is interested in assessing
each of these abilities. For instance, [74] provides a list of actions to ensure that an
organization has mechanisms to classify the severity of incidents. On the other
hand, this study is interested in how to measure effectiveness of these mechanisms.
3- Major proportion of [74] is devoted to assessing the security measures in an
organization, an aspect which is out of the scope of this project.
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4- Both works have a similar goal which is to establish a system for assessing CSIR
that leads to enhancement. However, [74] is more targeted towards building a CSIR
while this project is geared towards maintaining it.
Besides CSIRP completeness, another important activity in the preparation phase
of the IR cycle that impacts performance is the preparedness of the CSIRT. It has been
noticed [76] that the majority of computer security professionals spend their time in
ensuring compliance with various standards and organizational requirements. However,
these professionals normally lack the complex technical nature of incident response and
the behavioral skills needed to conduct CSIR. The study also notices that CSIRTs who are
capable of using several general purpose software in combination to the specialized
software performed better in simulated training exercises. This brings forward the
complexity of preparing CSIRTs to effectively perform their duties.
In that direction, a proposal to measure performance through measuring the
preparedness of a CSIRT is found in [61]. The authors presented “A Competency Lifecycle
Roadmap (CLR)” as a model for assessing the preparedness of a CSIRT. The CLR builds
on the argument that workforce effectiveness relies on two critical measures: competence
and readiness. Competence is measured with respect to an individual, i.e. the level of
understanding of a subject matter and the ability to apply a given skill; while readiness is
the ability to apply a set of competencies to fulfill the requirements of a real task. The CLR
is structured as five activities: assess, plan, acquire, validate and test readiness, and is
executed through specific criteria within an environment.
Similar to [60], the performance focus of [61] is the responders. Although the focus
of this project is the CSIRP, it is important to highlight the correlation between the two,
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i.e. the performance of the team and the performance of executing a plan. The readiness
and competency of the CSIRT members influence the performance of any IRP execution
and vice versa. Distinguishing between the two aspects should be observed when
attempting to identify causes of poor performance.
Another distinction between the focus of this dissertation and [61] is that the later
views performance, at least in the context of the publication, as a pre-activity process
targeting managers and trainers. However, I argue for a broader perspective in which
performance is assessed prior to execution, monitored while execution and analyzed postexecution. With that regard, the performance preparedness model presented in [61] could
be integrated within the proposed framework as an element of pre-execution assessment.
A subtle but important reference to performance evaluation is found in [75]. The
study stands out for highlighting the importance of developing performance metrics for
“incident management performance” during the “preparation” phase. The other works limit
discussion of the preparation phase to preparedness, and consider performance evaluation
as a post-activity in the last phase of the IR cycle. The study calls for “collecting metrics
that assess the quality of a process improvement purposes” which is expansion of the
requirement to have a policy for performance evaluation outlined in the NIST. Again, there
were no details about these metrics as the study focuses on formal representation of the
incident response tasks through defining unambiguous relationships, in the context of
incident response management.
A simulation study focusing on CSIRTs effectiveness of assessing threats is found
in [22]. One of the study’s conclusions is that the vast majority of alerts passed to a CSIRT
constitute non-threating incidents, mainly due to IDS false alarms, legitimate user activity
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perceived as threating and other ambiguous network activity. This issue poses as an
obstacle for achieving effectiveness. The study suggests careful classification of incidents
at the early stages to properly define the threat levels. The proposed method for assessing
a threat is to use a simple additive equation of three factors: (1) trajectory of the attack (2)
assets targeted and (3) perpetrator. The detailed levels within each of these factors are
elaborated in Table 7. Although, the use of an additive metric to measure the attack severity
can be misleading, the study is commended for the simplicity of the proposed metric.
Level

[1] Attack Trajectory

[2] Targeted Assets

[3] Perpetrator

1

Targeting no specific
entity

No asset

Careless or unknown
entity

2

Targeting a specific
single entity

A client or set of
client assets

Action associated with
criminal activity

3

Targeting multiple
entities or high-level
entities

An infrastructure
asset

Action associated with an
advanced threat

Table 7: Model for Assessing Threats proposed by [22].

A recent workshop by CERT (January 2015) proposed a model to define and
measure goals for an organization [41] based on the GQIM model proposed in [78].
Although the model is generic, it was designed for the purposes of managing computer
security activities. The GQIM model defines objectives in which goals (G) are derived.
The process then goes into formulating questions (Q), defining indicators (I) and finally
metrics (M). The main contribution of the publication is providing detailed information on
how to define goals in the context of computer security plans in a manner that permits
performance measurement through indicators and metrics. The NIST guide to handling
computer security incidents [1] requires the definition of goals and formulation of metrics
in CSIRPs, and the GQIM model provides an implementation guide to deriving goals.
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The framework proposed in this project borrows from [41] the taxonomical
hierarchy, i.e. objectives are higher than goals and indicators are higher than metrics. Since
the NIST guide neither distinguishes between goals and objectives nor between indicators
and metrics, the above GQIM model does not create incompatibility issues with the guide.
It could be viewed as a more refined method for applying the recommendations stated in
the NIST guide. Furthermore, as [41] has left out elaborating on how to derive indicators
and metrics from goals, the proposed framework aims at filling that gap by providing
guidelines for such derivation and providing applied examples of performance indicators
and metrics that could be used in CSIRPs.
Finally, a recent report on computer security incident response plans at nuclear
facilities was published by the International Atomic Energy Agency [79]. The report
considers “measuring the effectiveness of a CSIRP” as an essential element of the postincident review phase. However, the report does not elaborate on how that could be
achieved.

2.1.6 Performance Evaluation of Computer Security Systems
Occasionally, the issue of performance evaluation arises when studying various
aspects of computer security and IT management. For example, several publications have
studied the performance of intrusion detection systems (IDS) [64] [80] and vulnerability
scoring [62] [81]. As this project seeks to design a framework for measuring the
performance of CSIRTs, the effectiveness of the detection process will arise and such
studies can be used as a resource when deriving performance indicators. However, this
project is more generic and is focused on the design of higher level performance
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measurement techniques which could be applied to a wider range of security incidents
compared to designs that effectively handle specific category of security threats.
On the other end, the performance evaluation focus of this project is more focused
compared to performance measurement of IT incidents presented in studies like [23] and
[82]. For example, an organization’s help desk team manages general IT incidents which
might or might not involve security incidents of interest to CSIRTs. Compared to incidents
handled by CSIRTs, general IT incidents appear in higher frequency, have a relatively
small cost and impose less impact on the operation of the overall organization. Therefore,
the focus of performance measurement of general IT incidents would be on the average
time and cost, while incidents handled by CSIRTs need to focus on both individual and
average performance as the cost and impact of each individual incident might be
magnificent.
In the following paragraphs, a review of some publications in cyber security that
address the issue of performance evaluation will be presented. These papers were selected
based on their relevance, from my viewpoint, to the proposed framework in terms of the
applicability of the presented ideas to the area of CSIRP performance measurement.
The difficulty of studying performance analysis in computer incident management
is highlighted in [82], which states: “The complexity of real-life enterprise-class IT support
organizations make it extremely hard to understand the impact of organizational, structural
and behavioral components on the performance of the currently adopted incident
management strategy, and consequently, which actions could improve it.”. The authors
presented a decision support model, SYMIAN (SYMulation for Incident Analysis), for
improving the performance of incident management which models an organization’s IT
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support as a Markovian open queuing network [63]. The model claims to simulate the effect
of corrective measures before their actual implementation.
The scope of the model presented in [82] is similar to those presented in [23] and
[83] as the three studies focus on the performance of managing several responses to general
IT incidents. These incidents appear in high frequency and have relatively low impact and
cost, in contrast to incidents dealt with in CSIRPs. Nevertheless, the proposed model in
[82] raises attention to two relevant design considerations.
The first consideration relates to the question of how to layout performance
measurement procedures in a CSIRP, especially in the absence of prior measurements. The
authors relied on the what-if-analysis method to predict the impact of changes before
implementation. The technique relies on prediction of system performance based on the
theoretical design and suggested handling procedures under various expected incidents.
Indeed, most CSIRPs perform a similar analysis when laying out potential attacks and
proposing procedures for handling it. Another example of how standard CSIRPs use whatif analysis is compiling a list of secondary contacts, or backup teams, if the primary
contacts and team members are not available. However, under the surveyed published
CSIRPs, issues related to performance, if ever addressed, would be dealt with in an ad hoc
manner by the core team. It is worth considering to use the what-if-analysis for issues
related performance and provide basic documentation about it in the CSIRP.
The second consideration relates to performance evaluation modeling. The paper
treated performance evaluation in two orthogonal dimensions: effectiveness and efficiency.
Effectiveness focuses on the chain process while efficiency focuses on every single support
group. This approach could be adopted when a CSIRT is composed of several technical
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groups like: network, forensics, management …etc. Such approach, which is a common
practice in performance evaluation of quality management of chain processes, helps
measuring the performance of each team, and the overall system performance. It also helps
identifying bottlenecks and aspects of the system that have high impact on performance.
The issue of uncertainty in incident response to intrusions has been addressed in an
early study [64]. In automated intrusion detection systems (IDS), alarm messages are
generated when some suspicious activity is detected and are brought to the attention of the
system administrator. There is a delay between the detection of the activity and the actual
response, which henceforth will be referred to by the term “response delay”. This time
period is normally used by attackers to further exploit the system. An earlier study [84] has
demonstrated through simulation that if attackers get a response delay of ten hours, then
they will be 80% successful; and if given twenty hours of response delay then they will be
95% successful. Although these results are outdated, the observation that response delay
impact the incident response effectiveness remains valid.
The problem that [64] was interested in is: since IDS systems are automated there
is uncertainty whether a flag indicates an actual alarm or a false alarm. The authors identify
three sources of uncertainty: uncertainty in detection, uncertainty in classifying the attack
and uncertainty in preparing a response. The provided technical details of how to measure
the uncertainty is no more applicable, as IDS and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) have
undergone several advancements in the past fifteen years. Nevertheless, the question of
uncertainty is still valid. For example, when an attack stops, this can be due to action taken
by the response team or it could be simply due to factors known to the attackers. It would
have major consequences if the response team falsely falls under the impression of proper
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contamination while in reality the attack was temporarily halted by the attackers. This
scenario and others stress the need for careful design of performance measures that are
sensitive and conscious of the issue of uncertainty present in the response. In summary, the
paper pays attention to the contention between response delay and uncertainty. A team
might successfully reduce the response delay but through actions that might be neglectful
of some uncertainty factors.
One of the main side effects of improper handling of the uncertainty factor is the
stability of the response. A response might escalate or fluctuate throughout the response
cycle, depending on the threat assessment of the incident. Therefore, CSIRTs should rely
on effective assessment methods that are developed in the various computer security
disciplines. One example is assessment of vulnerabilities which is currently standardized
in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [62]. The CVSS model was
developed by the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), and is
currently used integrated into the NIST [9] and CERT handbooks. It is the only open system
and is characterized by its reliance on only quantitative metrics [81].
The CVSS model categorizes metrics in three categories: base, temporal and
environmental. Base metrics focus on the fundamental characterizes of the vulnerability
that are constant across environments. Examples include: Access Vector metric which
measures how a vulnerability is exploited, Access Complexity which measures the
complexity of the attack required to exploit the vulnerability, Authentication metric which
measures how many times an attacker need to authenticate before exploiting a vulnerability
of a target, Confidentiality Impact, Integrity Impact and Availability Impact. Temporal
metrics focus on the variant threat levels of a vulnerability that may change over time. For
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example, the exploitability metric measures the current state of exploit techniques or code
availability. Finally, the environmental metrics measure the impact of a threat on a specific
environment. Example metrics include: collateral damage potential, and target distribution.
Models like the CVSS bring its rewards and drawbacks to the study of CSIR
performance evaluation. The main reward is that such models produce rigorous metrics
which the performance metrics will be derived from. Researchers need not to re-invent the
wheel, and can build on the findings of studies in security metrics. For example, assessing
potential damage of a vulnerability is a complex task, which impacts any measurement of
the effectiveness of the response in reducing harm. However, when a well-research method,
like the collateral damage potential metric in CVSS, is provided then a good proportion of
the task is fulfilled. Researchers can focus on proper derivation of performance metrics
from security metrics compared to full design of metrics. On the other hand, this leaves
performance designers dependable on the reliability and accuracy of the security metrics.
Inaccuracies resulting from poor design of security metrics are likely to propagate to
performance measurements obtained from metrics derived from these security metrics.
Striking a balance between building on findings of security metrics which might not have
been necessarily designed to serve performance measurements, and proposing metrics with
high accuracy would be a challenge.
The previous discussion on the relationship between performance and security
metrics incites visiting the broader works on computer security metrics. The field of
software engineering had undergone extensive study on the development of software
metrics, to assess the quality of each of the development phases of the software cycle . The
ISO 9216 standard, with its series of publications [85] [86] [87] [88] , is a major reference
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that outlines how these metrics are derived and used. The classification method for security
metrics is generic and can be applied to the PE metrics.
Metrics can be classified as: quantitative or qualitative, subjective or objective,
static or dynamic and direct or indirect. A static metric is obtained during the static state of
the software, while a dynamic one is obtained during the execution of the software. A direct
metric is independent of other measures, while an indirect metric is dependent on
measurements of other metrics. This is the most comprehensive method I found for
classifying metrics, which could be borrowed to the field of performance evaluation of
CSIR. More discussion on security metrics will be presented in Section 2.1.7.
Another area to consult in the computer security literature is the performance
evaluation of security systems. Responses to computer security incident normally involve
interaction between human (the team) and non-human (e.g., machines, software) entities,
and an effective response requires effectiveness from both fronts. These systems are used
throughout the response cycle, including the detection, containment and recovery. The
performance of intrusion detection systems, firewalls, forensics tools and backup systems
contribute to the overall performance of the system. Again, this is a huge literature and it
suffices to show an example, besides the example of intrusion detection provided in this
section, of how this literature can be consulted when developing performance systems for
CSIR.
In [89], the authors attempt to develop performance metrics to capture the impact
of attacks on Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). Unlike wired networks, MANETS
have specific characteristics due to its dynamicity, as nodes and routes continually change.
The mobility factor adds more challenges to the reliability of the routes compared to static
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wireless networks. The performance of MANETs is normally measured through packet
delay, packet drop rates and routing effectiveness.
The authors classified attacks on MANETs based on their objective, presenting six
types of attacks: denial of service attacks, black hole attacks, flooding attacks, packet
dropping attacks, route disruption attacks, wormhole attacks. The technical details of these
attack can be found in the following survey of different attacks in MANETs [90]. The
authors suggested then to develop metrics such that they measure the impact on two
aspects: level of denial of service, and manipulation of network and routing topology.
Ten quantitative metrics were presented. Some metrics can only be used to measure
impact on denial of service, like the packet loss ratio metric, and others can be used to
measure the topology and routing manipulation, like route length per packet metric.
Interestingly, some metrics can be used to measure both like the round trip delay metric.
This demonstrates that some performance metrics can be used to measure several aspects
of the system performance, an idea which will be used in the proposed framework. The
various attacks were executed in a simulated environment with varying parameters. The
results showed that some attacks had varying impacts based on number of nodes or number
of attackers while the impact remained constant for some types of attacks. This provides
MANETS operators with mechanisms to interpret various activities, how to classify attacks
and which counter measures to follow in response. This demonstrates that the use of
performance metrics can results in enhancements to the response process, as the above
results were not clear prior to the use of performance metrics.
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2.1.7 Measuring Security in Computer Systems
In this section the notion of ‘how can security be measured?’ will be investigated.
As shall be presented, the feasibility and practicality of quantification of security into
metrics is debatable among researchers despite its wide spread usage. In the current
endeavors about the development of metrics to measure the performance of CSIRTs, the
above debate about security metrics arises. Performance metrics evaluating a CSIRT
depend on how ‘success’ of achieving a specific task is defined, which is normally
expressed through security metrics. Stated in other terms, the calculation of performance
metrics will depend on some measurements of security metrics. The fuzzy definition of
some security metrics and their questionable practical value can influence how much the
outcomes of performance evaluation can be trusted. In the following paragraphs, a survey
the findings of some major works in security metrics will be presented followed by my
viewpoint on how that impacts the proposed framework.
One of the earliest works addressing the issue of security metrics [91] states that
the nature of the field makes security measurement an “operational” process, i.e. it attempts
to measure the ability of a system to resist an attack, or the ability of the system to remain
free of breaches under specific conditions. Nevertheless, the study notices that most
attention is being paid to measuring the safeguards followed during the design and
implementation processes, which does not necessarily reflect the security of the system
when it actually operates. The authors propose to view “security” similar to “reliability”
by contrasting “system failure” with “system breach”. The consequence of adopting such
model is producing metrics that are probabilistic in nature, like the expected number of

67

breaches in a period of time, and the probability of a specific mission to be accomplished
without security breaches.
Reliability is defined as the probability of failure free operation over a period of
time. Such probabilistic definition makes reliability an operational measure compared to
other measures that capture the static properties of the system. Comparing reliability and
security, reliability measures failures which depend on system faults, which is analogous
to security breaches that depend on system vulnerabilities. Another similarity is the high
target of making the system “very secure” which is analogous to target of reliability of
safety-critical systems. However, failures are mainly accidental while security breaches are
normally intentional. Also the notion of ‘time’ is different in both contexts. In reliability,
higher measures are proportional to longer times of fault-free, while on security this is not
necessarily true as breaches vary in their degree and scope and the role of time in
assessment is vague.
The above comparison between reliability and security reveals that uncertainty in
both contexts can be expressed through probability. The author warns that in the context
of security the interpretation of probabilities is more subjective. For example, an attacker
is ‘all-knowing’ of the breach mechanism but does not have certain and complete
information about the system, while a system administrator is (ideally) ‘all-knowing’ of
the system but uncertain how an attack might happen. This means that a probability can be
interpreted differently depending on the viewpoint, in the above example: the attacker or
system administrator.
Reflecting on the above discussion, there are three remarks to record. First, during
the design of performance metrics a distinguish should be made between operational and
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static measures. Measuring the preparedness of a system is an example of a static measure,
while measuring the execution performance of a specific task outlined in a CSIRP is an
example of operational measures. Second, there is a need to deeply understand the notion
of time in performance evaluation. Sometimes, time is a crucial measure as when
measuring the time from detection to starting the response, while in other contexts time
might be misleading as when considering the period of time the responders managed to
secure against higher level attacks. This might be due effective security and response
measures or due to mere coincidence and absence of targeted sophisticated breaches. Third,
as performance evaluation is mainly an operational measure, the use of probabilistic
measures is reasonable. However, it is important to define the ‘viewpoint’ of how these
measurements will be interpreted. A measurement read by a technical system administrator
might be interpreted differently than if read by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or by
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) [92].
An extensive survey, published in 2009, examines the major works in the area of
security metrics in the period of 1981 to 2008 [34]. The title of the work: “Quantifiable
Security is a Weak Hypothesis” reveals the survey’s main conclusion about the hypothesis
of “security can correctly be represented in quantifiable fashion”.
The study identifies five characteristics of operational security that make it difficult
to model and analyze. These characteristics are: (1) the dynamicity of the environment in
which threats and security measures adapt to changes from each other (2) Low stationarity
as systems and software are continually updating (3) Economics: there are various agents
(e.g. attackers and defenders) with conflicting goals and interests (4) Dependence of
various components of the system and users on each other (5) Uncertainty. The study then
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proposes a simple conceptual model to study operational security. Operational security is
viewed as a system comprising of three components: (1) systems: structural components,
security controls and users (2) Threats: active and passive agents capable of violating the
security properties of the system. (3) Vulnerabilities: system properties that allow the
exploitation of the system.
Two main outcomes of the study are of relevance to this project. The first remark
is counterintuitive and comes from analyzing the ‘perspective’ of security metrics.
Perspective here refers to the conceptual viewpoint of what security is which motivates the
quantification of metrics. The study classifies perspectives into four major categories: (1)
Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA): which is the classical viewpoint of security
as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (2) Economics: viewing security as risk and
trade-off analysis (3) Reliability: views security as a stochastic process subject to
probabilistic analysis of the rate of system failures (4) Other techniques derived from
computer science, like viewing security in graph models. The counterintuitive finding is
that the CIA was the least commonly used perspective to derive security metrics. The study
reasons that this is due to the advancement of the other perspectives in quantification
methods as displayed in various disciplines. This made it easier to extend such methods to
computer security than to derive metrics through the CIA model which is native to the
computer security discipline. In my view, this also demonstrates that deriving security
metrics is a challenging task.
The second interesting finding is that the vast majority of works used assumptions
that are inconsistent with the nature of operational security. For example, most models
assume independence and rationality while practically security systems exert very high
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dependence and empirical evidence suggests that a relatively large percentage of attacks
are conducted through ‘irrational’ entities like automated software. The study
acknowledges that assumptions need to be used while modeling, but critiques that these
assumptions are diverge from the nature of operational security, causing validation
problems to the quantification process. Overall, the survey concludes that proposing
security models and metrics was proven to be easy but validating it is proven to be very
challenging if not absent. Also, there is a lack of common experimentation methods that
enable comparisons between various organizations. Finally, there is a chaos in the
taxonomical usage of terms as they are normally borrowed from other fields.
The last point can be re-expressed as the field of security metrics is yet to develop
its own identity. This is manifested in the absence of unified terminology and scarcity of
validation methods. The five characteristics of operational security described in the above
survey stand as obstacles to achieving common taxonomy and sound validation methods.
However, looking at the research conducted after the above survey, the field is gradually
converging into developing its own common language. The VERIS project is an example
of such attempts. In terms of validity, the study is reasonable in its questioning why should
descriptive metrics should be trusted without any validation of their practical relevance.
Still, the study seems to lean more towards rigors and formal validation methods, which I
believe is unnecessary needed when describing security features and threats.
Another extensive survey was published by NIST [93] and appeared at the same
year of [34] . The survey affirms the previous observation that much research had been
done in the area, but only few metrics have been deemed useful in the practical domain.
The authors also note that unlike physics and chemistry which have well formulated
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metrology systems, the area of IT metrology is still emerging. Therefore, the term ‘metrics’
in the area of computer security has been interpreted in various of ways. The survey notes
that security metrics have been used for three main purposes: strategic support (e.g.
planning and resource allocation), quality assurance (e.g. during software development)
and tactical oversight (e.g. compliance of procedures, policies and regulations). It is noticed
that if this classification is to be used, incident response can be classified under the third
category.
The study has two discussions which are significant to bring forward while studying
performance metrics. First, how is the term ‘metric’ being understood and used in the
security metrics literature? The authors found three common usages in the literature. Some
researchers use metrics to refer to quantifiable measurements of some aspect of a system.
Under this approach, qualitative measures are not considered metrics. The essence of this
approach stems from the literal meaning of the term ‘metric’ which is also in alignment of
how the term is being used in physics.
The second approach considers metrics as tools designed to facilitate decision
making to improve performance and accountability. The focus is on the objective of
assessment not the mechanism of assessment, thus quantitative and qualitative would be
the same if they used to achieve the same goal. In addition, the terms ‘metrics’ and
‘measurements’ would be used interchangeably.
The third approach differentiates between measurements, which are single-pointin-time views of specific discrete factors, and metrics which are derived by comparing to
a predetermined baseline two or more measurements taken over time. In other words,
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measurements represent actual counting, while metrics represent analysis of
measurements. Examples of major works that adopt this last definition are found in [94].
For the purposes of this project, the second approach is more fitting to the research
objectives. The objective of developing the PE framework is to enable the CSIRT members
and decision makers to advance improvements in the performance. The difference between
quantifiable or non-quantifiable metrics and the distinction between measurements and
metrics is semantical with no practical implications for the interest of this research.
The second discussion of relevance is the definition of effectiveness. The study
define it as: “assurance that the security-enforcing mechanisms of the system meet the
stated security objectives.” To refine this board definition to incident response plan,
effectiveness can be defined as “assurance that the incident response plan achieves its
stated objectives outlined in the CSIRP”. Yet, it is important to note that the above
definition only relates to one aspect of effectiveness, which is the IRP design. Other aspects
include the IRP execution, the utilization of resources, damage control and cost. In this
regard, the notion of “effectiveness” in the context of CSIR needs further investigation.
A notable recent study [42] builds on the survey findings of [34]. The study
observes that most of the metrics developed in the field reflect security “management”,
compared to security “measurement”. Metrics developed for security management attempt
to assess an organization’s adherence to specific standards. On the other hand, the paper
investigates the possibility of viewing “security” as a computer system property which then
could be subject to measurement in quantifiable fashion similar to physical quantities. A
customized model from control engineering is proposed in which computer threats are
viewed as “disturbances” to the control. In my view, as the model is dependent on accurate
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measurement, which is an aspect that is difficult to achieve, the proposed model will suffer
from practicality issues.
Another bias in the research of security metrics is highlighted in [95]. The authors
noticed that most security metrics focus on preventive and detective measures. However,
an argument is made that there is an equivalent need for metrics that measure survivability
and restoration capabilities when an incident occur. The argument is based on the
acknowledged observation that regardless of how much we attempt to prevent malicious
events, incidents will occur. Therefore, a tradeoff between investment on both aspects of
security need to be made. Metrics for CSIR performance can be grouped under the above
perspective on survivability and restoration metrics.

2.2 Multidisciplinary Literature Review of IR Performance Evaluation
The field of performance evaluation is a well-founded discipline, especially in the
fields of engineering and business management, and its findings are implemented across a
wide spectrum of disciplines and applications. Various areas of incident response have
used performance evaluation to derive its own customized performance frameworks and
metrics. Examples of these fields include:


Medical emergency response, and response to epidemics [96] [97]



Law enforcement and fire departments incident response [98] [99]



Natural and environmental disasters responses [100] [101] [102]



Homeland security incidents [103] [104]



Engineering systems like critical safety systems and transportation systems [23]
[77] [105]



Business administration and management [83] [106]
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Supply Chain Management (SCM) [107] [108]



Incident Management Systems [109] [110] [111]
The following literature review scans through some major works in the above

disciplines. The aim of survey is to investigate how these disciplines tackled the issue of
performance evaluation of incident response within their contexts. Since this work is
looking for insights and lessons to learn, focus will be on studies of generic nature
compared to those that focus on technical implementation, an aspect which differs from
one discipline to another. The proposed survey is neither comprehensive nor extensive, i.e.
not all works in each discipline are surveyed and the surveyed works are not reviewed in
depth.
The selected works for the survey satisfy one of the following two criteria:
1. The study provides an overview of the major works, summary of main findings
or comparison of major tools and methods within that discipline, or is
considered one of the major publications in the discipline.
2. The study demonstrates relevance or provides insights to the objectives of this
project focusing on developing a framework for CSIR performance evaluation
A survey of about fifty works is presented. For each of these works, a critique or a
description of how the work relates to the field of CSIR is presented.

2.2.1 Challenges
The difficulty of measuring the performance of incident response systems is
acknowledged across various disciplines. Some of these challenges are unique to each
discipline, but as this survey demonstrates, there are common challenges associated to the
measurement of performance of the core activities of the IR process. In the following
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paragraphs, a presentation of the major challenges is provided along with a brief discussion
on their applicability to the CSIR discipline.
Challenges of developing performance evaluation systems environmental incident
response are highlighted in [100]. Specifically, the study targeted developing performance
metrics for responses to oil spills. The study highlights that measuring the effectiveness of
responses is “extremely challenging”. The authors discussed several factors behind this
difficulty, from which two factors stands out. The first factor is the complexity of
establishing a baseline context for measuring effectiveness. This is due to the observation
that performance baselines are normally designed on incident-specific strategies, while in
reality responses to oil spills are varied and are normally developed in an ad hoc manner
in the early stages of a crisis. The second factor is the difficulty of measuring the public
perception of successful handling as there are no normative standards of success that are
established between decision makers and the public. Indeed, both parties normally provide
contradicting interpretations of the response performance.
The field of CSIR seem to suffer from both challenges highlighted in the above
study. In terms of the complexity of establishing baseline contexts for measuring
effectiveness, this comes from the reality that the types, scales and scopes of cyber-attacks
are very diverse; perhaps more than the diversity presented when it comes to oil spills.
However, the frequency of oil spills is relatively low compared to the high number of
computer breaches, making a distinction between the two disciplines. It is true that the
element of surprise is always expected while handling incidents; however, a computer
incident is more likely to be similar to a previous incident compared to oil spills incidents.
It could be argued that the difficulty of establishing baseline performance contexts are
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inversely proportional to the frequency of incidents. Based on this argument, it would be
relatively easier to create baselines in CSIR compared to oil spills incidents, but more
difficult in CSIR compared to medical emergencies and other fields with high volume of
incidents. The second factor of contradicting interpretations is also present in CSIR. There
is a wide gap between how technical teams, executives and the public perceive the success
of responding to computer incidents. This comes back to the fact that there are no wellestablished tools, i.e. metrics, to measure the performance of CSIR. Such tools need to be
precise and disambiguate to avoid the variance of interpretation among various
stakeholders.
Differences between measuring performance of manufacturing businesses and
service businesses are highlighted in [106]. The authors observe that measuring
performance in services is more challenging than in manufacturing. In manufacturing,
enhancing performance is achieved through monitoring production processes, monitoring
distribution processes, removing waste and limiting variances. In the manufacturing
domain, this is possible due to the homogenous nature of production and distribution
processes. On the other hand, service businesses operate under high unpredictability
conditions in which the needs of customers vary widely. Such environments push
executives and senior managers to tolerate relatively higher level of inefficiency and higher
costs due to uncontrollable factors. The authors suggest that despite the difficulty of
controlling unpredictability, performance measurement should focus on confining
variances and deducing similarities between various service requests. The authors also
argue that internal benchmarking is more meaningful than external benchmarking between
various companies which vary in size, equipment, service level agreements and budget.
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From the above description, the field of CSIR is closer to service businesses than
to manufacturing businesses. It is very common to face new threats and advanced
compromise strategies with high unpredictability. In addition, the current nature of the IT
industry in which thousands of equipment, solutions and software that are regularly poured
into the market, makes it very difficult to capture everything in the CSIR plan. However,
similar to how the authors have argued in the above study, focusing on main threat trends
and common attack techniques can help design more efficient CSIRPs. Again, the volume
of incidents in service industries are dramatically larger than those handled by CSIRTs.
Consequently, the proposed strategy of limiting variance becomes more challenging in
CSIR compared to general services.
Another study that draws comparisons between incident response teams in different
disciplines [97] highlights that the environment in which responders operate is very
challenging. The authors describe the environment as complex, high in information load,
wide information diversity, high uncertainty, continuous flow of data and quick change of
information. The authors then suggest that understanding the collaborations between team
members is crucial for improving the effectiveness of the response team.
The above study, among others, highlights the role of the human factor in the
incident response process which could be overshadowed by emphasis on tools and
techniques. The response process normally involves a high level of interaction between
various technical and non-technical members, both internally and externally. In the
contexts of CSIR, the core CSIRT needs to internally interact with IT personnel, engineers,
managers/executives, public relations and human resources. At the same time, it interacts
with external entities like legal advisors, law enforcement and the media. Therefore, I
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second the observation made by the above study, and suggest that the field of CSIR needs
to conduct thorough studies to understand the collaborations during the response process.
The study of [99] provides a comprehensive survey of the disciplines concerned
with emergency response. The study investigates operational research in emergency
response over the scope of fifty years in the domains of fire suppression, law enforcement
and ambulance response. The study states that “performance metrics in emergency
response remain underdeveloped, particularly in the context of large-scale emergencies”.
The study puts the blame mainly on the complexities arising from multiple stakeholders in
the public sectors which have various, if not contradicting, objectives. The study also
observes that within emergency response, the planning and implementation of solutions is
inseparable, as incidents develop in a unique and semi-structured matter.
There are three points that could be highlighted from my reading of the above
survey. First, despite the long legacy and maturity of the field of medical and fire response,
performance metrics in these fields remain underdeveloped. This brings a warning to those
of us interested in studying the performance of computer incident response. It asserts that
the issue of performance evaluation, especially with large-scale incidents, is very
challenging and cautions against any claim that a single model or a group of developed
metrics would be able to capture the performance of the response system.
Second, the issue of contradicting objectives of stakeholders is no stranger to the
field of cybersecurity. The tension between safety and privacy is a classic example. Hence,
in order to make sense of any performance evaluation the audience should be clearly
identified. This might also require conducting performance evaluation under several
contexts.
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Third, as the nature of the response bring planning and implementation hand by
hand, it is important to carefully reflect on the expectations of the planning process. It
would be more realistic to view a response plan as a guiding document more than an
instruction manual. At the same time, since responders’ time is very valuable during the
execution of a response, careful prior planning is crucial. Based on this, a response plan
need to be both comprehensive and flexible which is not trivial.
Another unique but relevant challenge brought forward by [98], from the domain
of law, is the difficulty of assessing harm. The study aims at developing metrics for
cybercrimes, like scale and harm, and comparing them to metrics used in traditional crimes.
The author argues that the overall form of crime did not change due to the advent of
cybercrimes. The classical classification of crime as (1) crimes against persons (2) crimes
against property (3) crimes against state (4) crimes against morality; are the same online
and offline. The only difference is the method used; i.e. use of automation in online crimes.
However, unlike traditional crimes which are by default one-to-one, online crimes are by
default one-to-many which raises interesting challenges. Two challenges were recorded,
the ability of law enforcement to apprehend the offenders and the ability to properly
measure the scale of harm that may be inflicted. Not only the scale of harm is different but
also the degree of harm by a single incident is of great contrast. For example, the average
amount lost by a bank robbery in the US is $800, while a single online attack normally
results of millions of dollars.
While the legal domain functions quite differently than the technical domain of
computer security response, there is much to learn from the legal experience. An analogy
can be drawn between a CSIRT working on containing an incident and a law enforcement
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team engaging in apprehending some offenders. Also, assessment of damage that CSIRTs
perform at the early stages of an incident and in post-incident activities is analogous to
assessment of harm inflected by crimes which is conducted jointly by law enforcement and
the justice system.
I consider the model proposed in the above article for assessing and measuring harm
of potential interest to researchers in the area of incident response. The article classifies
harm under three types: individual harm (like assault), systematic harm (aggregate
individual harm or generalized individual harm, e.g. mass shooting) and inchoate harm (i.e.
potential harm, e.g. conspiracy). The main task of prosecutors is to properly classify an
incident/crime under a specific category, and then work on assessing harm within that
category. The article provides long analysis of a hypothetical scenario involving a crime
of stealing a password, which is a common computer incident. The article then concludes
with the note that coming up with cybercrime metrics is very essential, but it involves a
lengthy and complex process.
Unlike the field of law in which harm is normally assessed post-incident, those who
work in the field of CSIR normally assess potential harm in the early stages of the incident.
The main outcome of such assessment is the categorization of the incident and
consequently declaring a response suitable for the severity scale of the incident. Currently,
there are two common models for categorizing incidents in CSIRPs. The first model is
based on the CIA security model and the second inspects the compromise techniques. The
CIA model, which stands for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, describes the
security aspect of the system that an attack attempts to compromise, regardless of the
technique used. The second method, on the other hand, focuses on the attack mechanism

81

regardless of the targeted security aspect. For example, a network worm attack and a
compromise resulting from lack of software batch would be classified differently under the
second method even if they both result in leak of confidential customer data.
At this current stage of the CSIR’s development, it is not clear if using the “harmmodel”, similar to the one presented in [98], in CSIRPs would outperform the other two
methods. However, I foresee that using a hybrid model of the above three models during
threat assessment would be helpful for efficient performance of the CSIRT. Also, the harm
assessment model presented in the above study can potentially lead to development of more
precise harm assessment methods which CSIRTs normally perform at the end of the IR
cycle.
Although there are other works that highlight challenges of conducting PE in IR,
the above discussion is sufficient for the purposes of this dissertation. The challenges which
were not mentioned could be mapped to one of the challenges highlighted above. As shall
be highlighted, the challenges of studying the performance of IR can be abstracted in two
general challenges: complexity and unpredictability. The high load of information,
contradicting objectives, interaction with large groups, difficulty of designing baselines
and lack of comprehensive performance metrics are all aspects of complexity. On the other
frond, the diversity of incidents, the quick escalation, the instability of the environment,
and the evolvement of planning along with implementation are elements that contribute to
unpredictability. Hence, any performance evaluation system for the field of CSIR need to
address both issues: complexity and unpredictability. Strategies for overcoming these two
challenges will be proposed in Chapter Five.
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2.2.2 Methods and Practices
It is argued in [13] that the theory of performance improvement originates from
three types of theories. The first is economic theories, which are the primary survival and
driver for the success of organizations. The second is psychological theories, which view
humans as the main source of productivity and trigger enhancements through behavioral
and cultural changes. The third is systems theories, which recognizes processes, resources
and subsystems that upgrade or degrade performance.
Despite the theoretical nature of the above classification, it reflects practical
realities applicable to the field of incident response. For example, CSIR performance
analysis heavily involves economic factors that focus on financial gain and loss due to
incident handling. However, the performance of the responders themselves is inspected
through reviewing relationship, team structure, communication and training. Also, the
procedures and policies of the response capabilities are introspected to identify areas
impacting performance. Therefore, the above work inspires studying performance through
three dimensions: the system, economy and behavior.
A framework for incident response management for the petroleum industry, is
presented in [105]. The study was triggered by the status quo of performance evaluation in
the industry which is reactive in nature and limits the focus to technical measurements. The
authors called for a more proactive socio-technical approach to performance evaluation.
The incident response model which the study analyzes is simple and involves three
phases: (1) Prepare (2) Detect and recover (3) Learn. The prepare phase which exhausts
most of the team’s time consists of conducting risk assessment, proposing plans and
defining roles, raising awareness in the organization, and finally monitoring and adjusting
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to external dynamics. The second phase involves detecting unusual behavior, analyzing
alerts, conducting initial assessment, executing a response, handling escalation and
reporting. The final learning phase compromises of identifying sequences of events, stating
root causes, proposing recommendations for security improvements and evaluating the
overall incident handling process.
It is noticed that the overall structure of the response model is similar to the one
used in CSIR. This similarity supports one of the motivations of this project, which is to
make inquiry into performance evaluation through the multi-disciplinary approach. It is
interesting to find that in the above study the authors called for using performance
indicators throughout the response cycle, but did not provide details on how to achieve
that. This academic gap seems to be present in several disciplines, and the field of CSIR is
among them as highlighted in Chapter One.
In the domain of homeland security, the work of [103] provides in-depth analysis
of how to measure the preparedness of an emergency system. The study borrows its
analysis methods from the field of reliability engineering and risk analysis, and offers a
detailed study case on emergency response to chlorine release. The study was mainly
interested in answering the following question: is it possible to predict the performance of
an emergency response system for future events? In the context of this research, this could
be mapped to the question of how to predict the performance of an incident response plan
(CSIRP) before its execution. Proper understanding of the above question can enhance
responders’ ability to resolve a common dilemma: what caused poor performance: poor
planning or poor execution of the plan?
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The study is remarked with its genuineness. Previous methods for measuring
preparedness can be categorized under two main models. The first model focuses on
measuring the capacity of the response system like how many responders are available and
how much equipment will be deployed. The study criticizes this model as providing
measurement to the inputs of the system not the system itself. The second model focuses
on examining the performance of the system through actual utilization of the capabilities
to produce response outcomes. Exercises and simulations are used as methods of
evaluation. Again, the focus here is on the outcomes of the system, not the system itself.
The study provides another approach to measuring preparedness through what the
authors called: “response reliability”. This metric questions how much confidence do
responders have in the response system by measuring the likelihood that the response
system performs well. Stated in other terms: what is the likelihood that events that prevent
the system from performing well will not occur?
The study offers a four step model to measure response reliability (1) define and
map the system (2) identify failure modes (3) assess probability of occurrence (4) assess
effects and severity. Events are classified based on scale, scope and complexity, then the
system is tested to determine the level in which the response plan may perform well in it
but may not perform as expected above it.
The details of how chlorine release could be effectively handled and the statistical
techniques used to test the equipment are not directly relevant to CSIRT. However, the
study does offer an important insight which is to study the preparedness through the system
inputs, outputs and system reliability. The current best practices in CSIR advises
responders to suggest Plan B for what might not work well during the response. For
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example, a CSIRP should have list of secondary contacts to be reached if primary contacts
were unreachable [12]. If the reliability dimension is added to the analysis of the response
system, the system capability would be better captured and performance could be projected
accordingly.
Managing critical incident responses on the national level in domains of natural
disasters and terrorism were studied in [104]. The authors properly observe the need for
distinguishing the management of a single incident from the management of several
simultaneous incidents. To the best of my knowledge, this distinction is never made in the
published works in the area of computer incident response (CIR), as the focus is on single
incidents and the situation of multiple simultaneous incidents is not addressed. As the scale
and complexity of breaches is on the rise, this issue deserves more attention, not only in
the context of government agencies, but also in the corporate domain. A comprehensive
study on protecting national infrastructure from cyber-attacks [112] properly notes that: “it
is unlikely that a large organization would not have simultaneous attack scenario to face”.
The authors also decry the fact that “the notion of managing simultaneous response cases
is largely unexplored in conventional computer security”.
Another point raised by [104] is the call for the use of performance monitoring such
that performance evaluation is viewed as a continuous management task that lasts
throughout the life cycle of the incident response. The basic practice in CSIR views
performance evaluation as a post-response activity. Although it is not necessary to provide
continuous monitoring of CSIRT’s performance during a response, it is valid to consider
observing performance at different stages of the response. However, this should be applied
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cautiously as the overhead of continuous performance monitoring could hinder the core
duties of the CSIRT.
Since one of the factors that impact the performance of a CSIRT’s performance is
the ability of the team members to interact with each other, enhancing performance through
investigating team dynamics was presented in a recent study (July 2015) [97]. The study
observes that there are three fields in which the responders act very similar to CSIRTs. The
three fields are: emergency medical systems (EMS), military response (MR) and nuclear
power plant operating (NPPO) teams. The authors investigated these fields to develop a
model for boosting the performance of CSIRTs through enhancing the team dynamics.
The above study proposed a five-factor model for improving IR teams
effectiveness. The five factors are: (1) adaptation (2) collective problem solving (3) trust
(4) communication (5) shared knowledge of expertise.
The adaptation refers to the team’s ability to efficiently perform under unexpected
situations. The study suggests adopting two adaptation modules from the military domain:
perturbation training and stress exposure training (SET). In perturbation training, trainees
are put in simulated scenarios which are similar to real-life scenarios. The simulation is
then repeated several times, in which the trainers disable one of the relied upon resources
(e.g. access to phones or internet) to investigate how the team adapt to this unexpected
event. Studies have shown teams exposed to this training outperform other teams by 13%.
The second training module, the SET protocol in the military, aims at providing individuals
with cognitive and behavior skills that help team members maintain effective performance
under stressful conditions. The authors also suggested two other training modules from the
EMS and MR fields to enhance the coordination of team members to solve problems
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together. I expect the above training modules to be excellent resources for CSIRTs,
especially those operating in the national level or within very large companies. To avoid
high costs associated with such training, it is necessary for the organization and the CSIRT
team to identify sources of weak of performance and provide backed evidence from
previous responses on the need to enhance team effectiveness through such training
modules.
The issue of enhancing team communication is nevertheless an important aspect of
team dynamics that is less costly but can reflect on tangible enhancements of team
performance. The above study highlights that effective communication demands sending
messages that are accurate, relevant and timely. To achieve that the study suggests three
main methods. The first is to conduct a brief strategy meeting before starting a response.
In the military, a 10-minute before start meeting enhanced team communication by 33%.
The second method is to use uniform and brief sheets to communicate information when
doing hand-offs, i.e. transferring a task from one person to another and from one team to
another. In EMS, the use of mnemonics during handoffs decreased errors by 65%. The
third method is using regular briefings during the response, similar to the one-to-four
minutes briefings conducted in EMS. In these meetings nurses, surgeons, trainees and
anesthesiologists communicate updates to an operation using checklists and very brief
messages. This has shown to reduce communication failures by 64%. These simple and
costless techniques can be adopted by CSIRT for better collaborative execution of CSIRPs.
Another recent doctoral dissertation (August, 2016) [102] investigated the role of
volunteers in enhancing the performance of the response of emergency teams to complex
incidents. The research focused on responses to earthquakes by analyzing online groups
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formed during the Haiti (2010) and Japan (2011) earthquakes and then testing the proposed
findings during the Nepal earthquake (2015). The study found that communications
resulting from volunteer-based online participatory groups were essential in enhancing
effectiveness of the responses.
An in-depth theoretical and empirical study of the relationship between the formal
organization response and the response conducted by online volunteers was presented. The
study also highlighted that validating the credibility of information disseminated through
online groups remains a challenge. The study ends with an important remark about the need
to view incident response in the networked and digital era in different lens that transcends
the current confined method to organizational response. From that perspective, it would be
an interesting research work to investigate the role that online groups can play in CSIR. It
is a double-edge sword. From one aspect, insights from bloggers and posts from security
experts can bring important clues on responding to critical incidents. However, it is also
possible that these posts are also read by the breaches themselves which can complicate
the on-going breach.

2.2.3 Performance Indicators and Metrics
Watts Humphrey, a pioneer in software engineering said [113]: “quality
management is impossible without quality measures and quality data.”. In the performance
evaluation literature, the tools developed for measuring the quality of management and
data are referred to as performance indicators and performance metrics. There is a variety
of uses for the terms: “indicator” and “metric” across the disciplines and within each
discipline. For example, the two terms can be distinguished by the methods used, e.g.
qualitative and quantitative, where indicators are qualitative measures and metrics are
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quantitative, or vice versa. The terms also appear in various taxonomical order, sometimes
indicators higher than metrics and sometimes the reverse order is used. Several works also
use the terms interchangeably. However, despite the nuances both terms are used to reflect
some form of measurement of a quality property. To avoid confusion, and within the
context of this section, the two terms are left to their usage within each surveyed article,
which might not necessarily conform to the definition outlined in Section 1.4.2.
There are numerous works that explore how to model and develop performance
indicators and performance metrics for incident response systems. Focus will be on studies
that provide methods for derivation and classification of performance indicators and
metrics. In addition, some works that propose performance metrics that could be relevant
to the area of CSIR will be surveyed.
The US Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) conducted a five year study to propose a comprehensive list of
performance indicators that measure the performance of Emergency Medical Service
(EMS) [96]. Performance indicators were classified into seven categories: (1) system
design and structure (2) human resources (3) clinical care outcome (4) response (5)
finance/funding (6) quality management (7) community demographics. Each performance
indicator (PI) is derived from a “Question” that captures some aspect of EMS, and each PI
is mapped to one of three measurement types: structure, process and outcome. The type of
dispatch system is an example of structure, percentage of patients receiving a specific
treatment is an example of process, and the difference of first and last pain scale values is
an example of outcome metric.
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Question

A question in which an answer provides an aspect of the EMS.

PI Name

Name of performance indicator

Process Path

Which process and sub-process does the PI reflect

Patient Need

What patient need does PI reflect

Type

Measurement Type Structure, process or outcome

Objective

Why is this PI useful

Formula

The equation for the calculation of the PI

Sampling

Is sampling used? If yes, what is the sampling process

# data points

Minimum number of data points needed to calculate the PI

Format

Reporting format: Numerical or graphical

Testing

Formal structured evaluation of the PI (e.g. reliability, validity,
difficulty of data collection)

Contributors

List of persons and organizations used in development of the PI

Current
Status

Current development status: Amount of work completed to date
relative to the final implementation of the PI
Table 8: Format for describing performance indicators in the field of EMS

The study captures EMS performance through 18 questions and 35 indicators. The
study also develops a comprehensive method for describing performance indicators in a
format that contains 24 “agreed upon” fields. A brief description of the main fields is
presented in Table 8.
Another method for classifying performance indicators, which is used in several
incident response systems [93] [23] [114], is borrowed from the field of economics [115].
Performance indicators are classified into three categories: leading, coincident and lagging
indicators. A leading indicator measures the inputs, coincident indicators measure the
system while running, and lagging indicators measure the outputs of the system
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performance. In [93], the study observed that most metrics currently used in the field of
computer security can be classified as lagging indicators.
It is noticed that the difference between the above classification method and the one
presented in [96] is only in terminology. Leading indicators are similar to PIs that measure
the “structure”, coincident PIs are similar to PIs that measure the “process” and lagging PIs
are similar to PIs that measure the output.
The classification of indicators into leading, lagging and coincident is more
common in the performance evaluation literature. Nevertheless, classifying PIs based on
their scope: structure, process and output is simpler and less technical. This might be
appealing to the field of CSIR, as there are several non-technical stakeholders expected to
interpret the performance evaluation findings.
Another study classifies performance measurements based on their subjects [116].
Measurements can relate to three different types of subjects: physical, ideal and social. The
physical entities are the most common objects subject to measurement and they are
confined by time and space. Ideal objects are theoretical objects that transcend time and
space. Social objects are found within social constructions and are bound by time and
space, like customer satisfaction. Using this classification, CSIR performance metrics
would be mainly theoretical (security, impact) or social (team performance).
A survey conducted by [117] studied the performance measurements used in the
transportation and emergency services fields across the US. The survey found that
“response time” was the main tool used by both fields, although there was wide variance
in how various agencies interpreted and defined “response time”. It was also found that
performance measurements was used for different purposes. In the transportation field,
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performance measurements aimed at measuring the effectiveness of the overall incident
management system, while in emergency services it was used as a resource management
tool for allocating staff and equipment.
There are three relevant findings of the above survey worth highlighting. First, the
survey found that all agencies did not create a separate cost budget for planning, monitoring
and analyzing performance. All agencies treated performance evaluation as an integrated
activity in the incident management system. Second, it was found that only one eighth of
the agencies produced periodic performance reports. The rest stored the performance
results in a database for access as needed. Finally, the study concluded that attempting to
build “one-size-fits-all” approach to performance measurement is not feasible.
This last finding is relevant to this project. The transportation incidents demonstrate
high similarity between incidents compared to the wide variance displayed in computer
security incidents. If it is infeasible to build a unified PE model for systems like
transportation, this would be extended to the discipline of CSIR.
A categorization of metrics for service level agreements (SLA) is provided in [83].
An SLA is a legal contract document that governs the relationship between a service
provider with a customer. The document outlines the characteristics of the Quality of
service (QoS) that the service provider is committed to deliver [118], along with remedial
actions and penalties when the provider fails to keep up to the promised QoS.
In [83], performance metrics are viewed in, what the study calls, a multidimensional manner. Three dimensions were defined: service objects, ITIL processes and
measurability. With regards to the first dimension of service objects, the study identifies
five basic IT object classes: Hardware, Software, Network, Storage and Help Desk. A list
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of metrics for each object class, with a total of 45 metrics were given. Example metrics
include: failure frequency, maximum down-time, availability, failure categorization degree
and total service time.
The second dimension uses performance metrics for the eleven ITIL components.
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) [119] is an industry standard for
IT service management focusing on utilizing resources and enhancing services. The eleven
levels, derived from ITIL v2 are: (1) service desk (2) incident management (3) problem
management (4) configuration management (5) change management (6) service level
management (7) service level management (8) capacity management (9) availability
management (10) IT Service Continuity management (11) financial management. The third
dimension, measurability, refers to the ability to automate the metric measurements. Three
levels were defined: measurable, limited measurability and no measurability.
Studying metrics within in the SLA domain is relevant to CSIR. Indeed, CSIR can
be viewed as a special type of service between the CSIRT and the organization, or as a
special management process within the ITIL framework. Since the field of IT management
is very mature and has gone through several standardizations, the experience of developing
metrics offers a good source for CSIR performance metric development. In the above
study, the issue of automating metric measurements stands out as relevant. This
classification goes beyond the simple categorization of qualitative and quantitative metrics,
to questioning the ability to automate the measurement and the analysis of results. Since
CSIRTs work under stressful environments, the automation of collecting and measuring
performance metrics would allow the team to focus on their main duties with little overhead
for performance evaluation. Other than that, the concept of multi-dimension presented
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above is another fancy method of defining the attributes of performance metrics. The three
dimensions can be mapped to the scope, objective and measurement method of the metric.
Two articles in the area of petroleum engineering [23] [105] addressed the issue of
incident response in the domain of information security. In [23], the authors provided a list
of performance indicators for incident response management. The paper derived the
indicators from studies on safety management and from interviews with leaders of the
Norwegian Oil and gas industry. The focus of the study was on the performance of
management, i.e. the performance of the incident response system over a period of time in
which several incidents took place.
The contribution of the above study of relevance to the proposed project is the
discussion on how to evaluate performance indicators, i.e. how to know if the developed
PIs are “good”? The study suggests five “metrics” to achieve that:
(1) being observable and quantifiable
(2) offers valid measurements
(3) sensitive to change
(4) compatible with other indicators
(5) simplicity
As the CSIR field works for developing its own performance evaluation
frameworks, it is essential to ensure that the process of the design and derivation of
performance indicators and metrics is sound. Metrics can be viewed as strong weapons that
will be used to influence executive and financial decisions. If these metrics are not well
designed and correctly used, it could lead to counter impacts on the organization. To avoid
ambiguity, “metrics” used to evaluate the soundness of PIs and PE metrics will be called:
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“meta-metrics”, a terminology adopted by several studies in software engineering [120]
[121] and in computer security [122] [123] .
A study in the area of natural disasters [101] provided a list of metrics for describing
incidents and assessing potential responses. Three metrics were proposed for describing a
natural disaster and eight metrics to measure the effectiveness of the response. These
metrics were designed to be used in computer simulation scenarios, but partially could be
applied to real world scenarios.
One metric which stands out as relevant to this project is stability. In the context of
natural disasters, stability measures the percentage of causalities per injury type whose
condition worsens after being identified by the response team. It also records the
percentage of causalities that were not identified by the response team. In the CSIR domain,
the above measurement can be viewed through number of “breached” resources instead of
causalities. In an ideal scenario, once a CSIRT identifies an incident, the process of
containment should start and the incident should not cause further damage. This means that
both the identification and containment processes should be perfect, which is practically
very difficult to achieve. Since escalations are possible, if not common, the stability metric
offers insights on its magnitudes and potential reasons for its occurrence. One simple
method to achieve this is to record stability through recording the escalation or deescalation of attack severity throughout the response process. This could be easily
incorporated in CSIRPs as there have clear guidelines on how to define various categories
of severity levels.
An article that investigates issues relevant to response to terrorist attacks [124],
highlights three aspects that can significantly impact the effectiveness of the response. The
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first is “just in time logistics”, which refers to the ability of responders to arrive at the scene
precisely when needed. The second is “situational awareness” which could be provided to
responders through data collected from early warnings. The third is: “enhanced situational
awareness” which provides responders with better decision making capabilities.
A study in the field of transportation engineering [77] investigates the performance
of response teams to traffic incidents in the Portland (Washington State, USA) metro area.
The study aims at studying how much the implementation of the current Portland freeway
IR system contribute to the reduction of cost resulting from traffic delays and congestions
caused by traffic incidents. Jumping over the technical details which are specific to
freeway traffic, highlighting the mapping between cost reduction and the performance
evaluation of the response teams is noteworthy. The authors noted that it is very difficult
to create a dollar value to benefits of implementing performance evaluation.
It is estimated that 50% of the US highway congestion is caused by accidents.
Through “faster” incident response, several benefits could be achieved like: reduced delay,
reduced fuel consumption, improved flow of commerce, reduced harm to wildlife and
water quality and improved public relations and good will. It is obvious that not all of these
could be quantifiable in terms of cost, and hence the focus of the performance of the
response team is on reducing the response time. The current cost of the response program
is $750,000 and the cost of the performance monitoring system is $75,000. The authors
argue that the success of a performance evaluation system is based on cost, i.e. does cost
reduction exceeds the implementation cost of the system. For example, it was noted that
faster response times resulted in cost reduction of annual vehicle hour delay by 13,000
hours which is mapped to cost savings of nearly $200,000.
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In the field of CSIR, determining how performance evaluation could be mapped to
cost reduction remains an open question. Although it is intuitive that faster response times
to cybersecurity incidents lead to several benefits, there are no current studies that map the
response time to cost reduction. It also poses as a more complex question compared to road
traffic. For example, it is relatively simple to map the response time of a denial of service
attack on an online store through calculating the average cost of purchases per minute.
However, this is more challenging when an attack involves having access to customer
private data, e.g. social security numbers and credit card numbers. It is very complex to
map how a unit time in incident response would map to cost reduction. Therefore, it would
be more suitable to use other factors besides cost. For instance, number of affected
customers and the importance of the breached data should be used.
It is beyond the scope of this project to provide an empirical correlation between
response performance and cost reduction. Nevertheless, the proposed PE framework can
be viewed as an important milestone in the path of conducting more rigorous studies on
that front.

2.3 Discussion and Lessons Learnt
2.3.1 State of the Art of PE in CSIR
Main Advancements of CSIR
The field of CSIR has undergone several important advancements in the past two
decades. Three of these advancements are worth mentioning. The first is overcoming the
obstacle of getting the community support to engage in the development and
implementation of CSIR. Today, the vast majority of governments and corporates have
well-formed CSIRTs and outlined CSIRPs. Although the preparedness of these CSIRTs
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vary from one place to another, there is a common acknowledgement of the importance of
CSIRT and that the cost of functioning without one exceeds the costs allocated to having
CSIR capability. It took much efforts from various experts in the field to convince
executives and government policy makers to adopt organized CSIR processes, but also the
damage caused by various cyber-attacks provided unopposed reality that signaled to
managers that they cannot remain unprepared.
The second advancement is the development of several standards and industry
documentations for the structuring and operation of CSIRTs. These documents not only
facilitate implementation, but also engage the academic and professional communities in
important discussions about issues of importance to the development of CSIR.
The third advancement is yet to ripe, but seems to be going in the right direction. It
is the collaboration and sharing of information between various CSIRTs. The reality of the
interconnected complex internet, in which cyber threats spread and impact all, mandates
that all parties interested in security should have strong collaborations and timely robust
exchange of information. With the current structure and activities of FIRST, the field is
heading towards the right direction. However, investigating the bureaucracy and lack of
effective communication between various government bodies is only one example of the
amount of work that needs to be done before celebrating this advancement.
Focus on Preparation and Planning
In the past decade, discussion about the quality of CSIR performance started to
appear. Prior to that, the field was immersed in laying out the main structures, procedures
and processes needed for establishing CSIR capabilities. As of now, the field has passed
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debating about the benefits of integrating PE in the CSIR process. Many publications now
consider PE as an embedded element of the CSIR process [1] [22] [73][25] [61] [41] [74].
Nevertheless, the field seems to focus on the preparation and performance
readiness, which is a pre-activity that aims at enhancing performance through better
planning. Examples of efforts in that direction include reviewing CSIRPs for completeness
and offering training to CSIRT members for better coordination and team work. Indeed,
that direction of research is of high value to the development of the field and offers several
operational recommendations for CSIRTs.
What seems to be lacking is discussing post-activity performance evaluation. For
instance, the need for developing performance metrics is acknowledged, but discussion
about what these metrics are, how they could be used and the analysis methods to be used
is scarce.
This emphasis on pre-incident compared to post-incident performance evaluation
can be due to four factors. First, the CSIR field has developed the culture that successful
response is a product of extensive planning. Therefore, it is natural that discussion about
performance is done in the planning stage. Indeed, most responders spend most of their
time in preparation compared to actual response, so evaluation is directed towards where
most resources are devoted [7]. Second, it is possible that many organizations have
integrated CSIRPE into their existing quality management system and which has a
repository of performance measurement techniques. Third, it is possible that many CSIRTs
have developed their PE analysis performs and pools of performance metrics. However,
due to the security nature of the field, little has been shared with the public. Finally, it might
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be due to the natural evolution of the field, in which the need for performance evaluation
tools became meaningful only when completing the planning and structuring processes.
The Challenge of Developing Security Metrics
As the development of performance metrics of CSIR highly depend on security
metrics, the literature of security metrics needs to be studied thoroughly. The challenges
highlighted by [34], were acknowledged along with additional challenges by several later
studies like [125] and [126]. It is noticed that some of these challenges are intrinsic to the
nature of studying security, like the element of uncertainty. I believe that such challenges
will always be present, regardless of the advancements to be made. Such challenges can be
termed as static challenges. In order to address static challenges, the research community
would need to establish balanced protocols for developing, analyzing and later
benchmarking data resulting from security metrics. Perhaps, the aspect to be given more
attention should be the trade-offs between validity and practicality. By analyzing the CSIR
literature, I endorse the current practice that grants precedence to practicality over
validation because being operational is a resilient characteristic of computer security.
However, there should be some minimum criteria for validation of metrics and data
generated from them. This could be achieved by enforcing a meta-metric that specifies the
confidence or the trust-level of the measurements obtained through these metrics. The
model presented in [42] is an example of such research direction.
The other aspect of these challenges is dynamic and could be tackled with further
advancements in the field. For example, the complexity of intermixed perspectives to
analyze security metrics could be managed with careful design of multi-dimensional
analysis platforms that are built on various perspectives. The same could be applied to the
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challenge of having conflicting objectives based on the requirements of various
constituencies. Although the field is slowly consulting other fields for solutions like quality
management, game theory and process management in industrial engineering, it is a matter
of time until the field develops its own customized platforms of analysis. However,
investigating the security metrics literatures makes the author to agree the following remark
put forward by [42], which states: “It is anticipated that refining and adjusting the concepts
of computer security assessment may take decades and in fact is a challenge for the entire
generation”.

2.3.2 Lessons Learnt from Other Fields
Absence of generic methodologies
It is noticed that the various disciplines developed their own solutions to the
challenges they faced when developing and conducting IRPE. These solutions are normally
customized to the needs of the discipline in the form of models that suit the nature of the
problem. This explains why the field of performance of incident response does not have
generic models that are applied across the spectrum of various disciplines.
The lack of generic methods and models put the area of Incident Response
Performance Evaluation (IRPE) in contrast to other areas of PE which develop and produce
generic methods. For example, in computer networking, measuring the performance of a
network is measured in tools like throughput, link utilization and packet delay. Scheduling
mechanisms and queuing models are developed to enhance performance. Most of these
models are generic and are used across various disciplines within and outside of computer
science. This creates much interaction between these disciplines in terms of sharing ideas
and borrowing solutions. This is different than the current state of art in IRPE in which
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each discipline seems to be operating in its own world with minimum interaction with the
other disciplines.
Two questions arise: why does IRPE lack generic methods despite the extensive
work done in various disciplines? And can such generic methods be developed. A possible
explanation of the point raised by the first question is that the various IR disciplines have
different objectives. For example, the main objective of medical IR is to minimize death
and human pain, which is different than environmental IR which is to minimize
environmental destruction. Both of medical and environmental IR are also different from
help desk incident response which aims at increasing average customer satisfaction. Such
unique objectives might have created a perception that the addressed problems are distinct
and implicitly pushed against collaboration between these disciplines.
This leads us to the second question, in which I would answer by leaning towards
the possibility of developing common models. It is true that the field of IR is very diverse
which impacts how PE solutions are developed, but this does not eliminate the fact that
there are various similarities that could be deduced from analyzing these disciplines. For
example, all incident responders, regardless of their discipline, are interested in achieving
faster response time. This does not conflict with the fact that each field has its own
definition of response time that fits its context. I believe that some generic models could
be developed to enhance team formation, incident declaration and management of major
activities in the response cycle. The same could be said about enhancing the
communications between responders during an incident and effective assessment of harm
in a manner that transcends variance in team dynamics and types of harm.
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To the best of my knowledge there is no generic work that discusses the main
features and general solutions to performance evaluation in the context of IR. Also, as
interest is rising with regards to conducting multidisciplinary research in the area of IR,
this should be encouraged and pursued more seriously. It can be expected that findings
from such research direction would be rewarding to all of these disciplines.
The Challenge of Complexity
It is observed, as stated in Section 2.2.1, that the two major umbrellas for challenges
in the discipline of IRPE are complexity and unpredictability. Both of these challenges also
pose as serious challenges to the field of CSIR. Complexity here refers to the presence of
numerous contentious factors in the IR process which a CSIRT need to address at the same
time, while none of these factors can be eliminated during the IR process.
There are several factors that contribute to complexity. For example, as the storage
space of machines is on the increase and as networks are on high speeds, the amount of
data present for analysis is gigantic. A responder can neither ignore gigabytes of log files
nor neglect the scanning of a significantly large volumes of disk space for remnants of a
breach. In that regard, scanning for a software bug in code with tens of thousands of lines
is a relatively simpler task than the task of a CSIRT. Another analogy that demonstrates
the complexity of a CSIRT operation, is to think of a medical doctor examining a patient
suffering from a virus. Doctors normally need to examine the symptoms and recommend
medications to counter these symptoms. Imagine if the doctor need to investigate how the
patient came in contact with the virus before prescribing medications. There are thousands
of possibilities and the prescription of medications become a complex process compared
to focusing on confining the virus and treating the symptoms, regardless of its source. Most
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CSIRTs need to properly assess the source of the incident and propose solutions at the same
time, which is a non-trivial task.
The Challenge of Unpredictability
The element of unpredictability refers to the observation that regardless of how
much preparation is being made, the element of surprise is always present. In the field of
CSIR, examples of factors that contribute to unpredictability include the fast-paced
development of new attack trends and compromise strategies, the difficult of distinguishing
between false alarms and actual threat indicators, and the scaling power of cyber-attacks
which lead to incident escalation.
The survey found that solutions developed by various disciplines to the challenge
of uncertainty can be mapped to the following five main categories of solutions:
1- Designing probabilistic schemes that rely on measuring system reliability [91]
and predicting response reliability [103]
2- Using confidence ratings to various decisions taken by the responders [42] [73]
3- Analyzing common threat trends and mechanisms and developing measures to
confine variances and deduce similarities [106]
4- Producing response plans that demonstrates completeness [74]
5- Ensuring that responders are trained and demonstrate competency to carry
response duties [76] [61]
The above five solutions can be further summarized into two main categories:
preparedness and decision making capabilities in nondeterministic environments. These
two strategies would be the basis of a framework to address the issue of unpredictability in
CSIR which will be presented in Section 5.5.
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Note that the term ‘nondeterministic’ is used here differently from how the term is
used in computer algorithms [127], in which a nondeterministic algorithm is one that may
produces different outputs for the same input, or that produces different outputs based on
the enumeration of the set of inputs.
In addition, I argue that CSIR unpredictability is broader than systems that can be
modeled through Markovian and stochastic processes. In Markov modeling [128], the
system is modeled through states, and transition to the next state is made by probabilistic
distributions based on the current available information. On the other hand, IR
unpredictability exhibit different inputs that may lead to unknown new states, and
consequently the output states may not be outlined through probabilistic distributions.
Therefore, nondeterministic models can be as assisting analytical tools not as system
models.
It is probably the field of decision making in economics and management that may
provide viable recommendations to CSIR. The field discusses nondeterministic scenarios
which managers might be faced with and provide analytical tools that can guide future
decisions [129]. These tools normally rely on associating risks in the form of probabilities
with possible decisions, but may also use other non-probabilistic approaches [130].
Approaches that use such techniques will be referred to as Non-Deterministic Decision
Making (NDDM) models.
Is it possible to fully capture the performance of an IR system?
Before conducting the survey, it was anticipated to find a well formulated list of
performance metrics that fully capture the incident response performance, especially in the
fields like medical emergency which have long practical legacy. However, this proved to
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be an over simplification of the nature of incident response. It is noticed from the surveyed
studies in various disciplines that there was no single study that claimed to provide an
exhaustive list of performance metrics that fully assess the effectiveness of the response.
Instead, the surveyed studies followed one of two approaches to performance design. In
the first approach, an incident response system is analyzed to deduce the main duties and
then design performance metrics focusing on these major activities. The other approach is
to isolate a specific activity or mode of interaction within the incident response system and
subject it to extensive review for proper performance measurement. In both approaches,
there are aspects of the system which are not subject to performance measurement.
There is something to learn from the above experiences. Instead of attempting to
provide precise and complete performance evaluation systems for CSIR, the focus should
be shifted towards proper identification of aspects in the response system which need to be
subjected to performance analysis for potential improvement. Expecting precise and
complete performance evaluation is both expensive and impractical. Thus, the field should
ask the following two questions: “what aspects of CSIR should be subjected to performance
evaluation?” and “how precise the measurements should be?”.
Simple Factors with High Impact
The literature review of both the CSIR and IRPE suggests that there are some
factors that need to be thoroughly examined by those interested in developing PE models
for CSIR. These factors can be easily confused to be simple and easy to handle, but
practically they are complex to measure and analyze. For example, estimating financial
loss due to an incident is a very difficult task contrary to how it appears. For example,
estimating financial loss due to a vehicle accident is not only limited to damages to vehicles
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involved in the accident. The financial assessment needs to include estimations of financial
loss due to traffic delays which is not a simple task. The same extends to CSIR as estimation
financial loss should take account of non-trivial factors like customer trust, privacy
violation and public perception.
In Table 9, four issues are identified. These issues are highlighted to be non-trivial
tasks of IR as discussed by various disciplines. It is expected that these four challenges will
also be non-trivial to the field of CSIR.
Issue

Description

Threat
Assessment

How can the actual threat of reported events be precisely
assessed? Under which threat level should the incident be
classified?

Harm
Estimation

At the end of the IR process, how can the actual caused damage
be measured?

Communication
Effectiveness

As any IR involves high volume of communication between
internal and external members, how can the communication
effectiveness be measured?

Overall
Performance

Since no single performance metric can be used to measure the
effectiveness of an IR, how can the results obtained from various
metrics be used to provide an overall assessment?
Table 9: Summary of Factors with high impact on CSIR performance evaluation
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CHAPTER THREE
FRAMEWORK DESIGN

This chapter presents the theoretical aspects associated with developing
frameworks and models for evaluating the performance of a computer security incident
response (CSIR) capability. The design considerations and possible development and
functional models are discussed. The chapter can be viewed as a design guide that an
organization can use to develop its own performance evaluation framework, from the early
stages of planning to the actual integration of the framework into the CSIRP. It also can be
viewed as a research map of the issues pertaining to CSIRPE that deserve the attention of
researchers in the field.
The framework design presented in this chapter is not an extension of a specific
work or model. It is a result of the synthesis of the large volume of works surveyed in
Chapter 2, both within the field of CSIR and in the other disciplines. It is also guided by
the feedback received from professionals in the field about the current practices in the
industry. Whenever possible, references will be provided in support of the selected design
choices or when further extensions of the discussion are required. However, because the
chapter addresses plentiful of issues more emphasis is put on the presentation of the
framework components compared to expansion of various possibilities.
The chapter is composed of six sections. The first section provides an overview of
the main components used for describing and constructing a CSIR performance evaluation
framework. It also highlights the relationships existing between these components
providing a holistic perspective to the development process. The second section presents
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the conceptual assumptions of how CSIR is understood for the purposes of this project.
The following four sections provide details for each of the four development phases, where
section three addresses the first phase about designing the CSIRPE framework through
setting parameters and layout strategies and policies; section four describes how to
formally define a CSIRPE model through defining PE goals, PE aspects and performance
indicators; section five tackles the issue of measuring performance by discussing
performance metrics, analysis methods and validation methods; and the sixth and final
section discusses implementation considerations.

3.1 Framework Overview
3.1.1 Framework Components
In order for an organization to develop a computer security incident response
performance evaluation (CSIRPE) framework, the organization needs to go through
several planning and implementation stages. These stages can be captured in eleven main
steps, grouped under four major development phases, as depicted in Figure 8. Each of these
steps are referred to as a CSIRPE framework component, or as a PE development step.
Below is a brief description for these eleven components:
1. Design Parameters: Generic parameters which values significantly impact the
environment in which PE will be introduced. These parameters can be
perceived as factors that can produce various types of PE frameworks.
2. Strategies & Policies: Approaches to address the issue of PE within the context

of CSIR, which are not delimited by simple values. This include paradigms of
understanding PE, strategies for addressing CSIRPE and generic policies that
are necessary for any successful PE design.
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Phase I

CSIRPE Framework Design
[1] Design
Parameters

[2] Strategies
& Policies

Phase II

CSIRPE Model Definition
[3] PE
Goals

[4] PE
Aspects

[5] Performance
Indicators

Phase III

CSIRPE Measurement
[6] Performance
Metrics

[7] Analysis
Models

[8] Validation
Models

Phase IV

CSIRPE Implementation
[9] Functional
Models

[10] Roles &
Responsibilitie
s

[11] CSIRP
Integration

Figure 8: CSIR Performance evaluation framework Components

3. Performance Evaluation (PE) Goals: The process of defining the performance
evaluation goals in terms of what ideally should be achieved and the
performance needs of the CSIRT
4. Performance Evaluation (PE) Aspects: Identifying parts of the CSIR system
that need to be subjected to performance measurement
5. Performance Indicators (PIs): Identifying the desired performance qualities of
the system, and factors that determine the quality of the response
6. Performance Metrics (PMs): The process of deriving and defining
measurement tools for assessing various performance indicators
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7. Performance Evaluation Analysis Models: The selection of analysis
methodologies for how performance evaluation metrics results need to be
interpreted to reflect the performance of the response.
8. Performance Validation Models: The process of ensuring that the performance
measurements are valid and that it will result in correctional activities that
enhance performance.
9. PE Functional Models: Models that determine how performance evaluation
activities will be integrated into the incident response life cycle.
10. Roles and Responsibilities: The process of outlining tasks and assigning
performance evaluation responsibilities among the response teams
11. CSIRP Integration: The process of integrating the designed performance
evaluation model into the response plan, i.e. CSIRP.

3.1.2 Framework Development Process
The eleven framework components can be conceptualized as a product life-cycle
process starting from a generic performance evaluation framework to a final output of a
performance evaluation model implemented in a specific environment. A depiction of this
development process is presented in Figure 9. A description of the inputs and outputs of
the various development stages is presented below:
Below is a description of the inputs and outputs for the seven components:


CSIR Capability: A computer security incident response capability adopted by
an organization, that appears in the form of a CSIRT and an approved CSIRP,
which lacks mechanisms and tools for measuring the performance effectiveness
of incident handling.
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CSIRPE Framework: A performance evaluation framework customized
through specific values of the design parameters and governed by formulated
strategies and policies to suit the nature and needs of a specific environment.
Phase II:
Model Definition

Phase I:
Framework Design
[1] Set
Design
Parameters

[3] Define
PE Goals
CSIRPE
Framework

CSIR
Capability
[2] Outline
Strategies &
Policies

[4] Identify
PE Aspects

Phase III: Performance Measurement
PE
Metrics
List

Abstract
CSIRPE
Model

[6] Derive
Performance
Metrics

Operational
CSIRPE
Model

[8] Design
Validation
Model

[7] Design
Analysis
Model

[5] Define
Performance
Indicators

Phase IV:
Implementation
[9] Define
Functional
Model

CSIRP

CSIRPE
Model

[11] Integrate into
response plan

[10] Assign Roles
& Responsibilities

Figure 9: Performance Evaluation Framework Components Relationships



Abstract CSIRPE Model: A theoretical model derived from a predefined
framework, that outlines why and what needs to be evaluated within a specific
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environment. The model is abstract as practical tools that specify how the
evaluation will be carried are absent.


PE Metrics List: A list of performance metrics, i.e. performance measurement
tools, produced to be integrated into a predefined Abstract PE Model.



Operational CSIRPE Model: a practical model for performance measurement
that have defined objectives and operational mechanisms for how these
objectives will be achieved in a specific environment



Performance Evaluation Model: The final product of the performance
evaluation design process which appears in the form of a model equipped with
clear objectives, measurement tools and implementation guidelines.

The following four sections will examine each step of the development process. To
enable accessible referencing to various aspects of each framework component, the codes
introduced in Table 10 will be used for the rest of this dissertation.
Code

Category

Code

Category

A._

Assumption

M._

Metric Design Parameter

D._

Design Parameter

N._

Analysis Model

F._

Functional Model

S._

Strategy

PI._

Performance Indicator

V._

Validation Model

Table 10: Framework Components Codes

3.2 Assumptions
Since there are various understandings about the nature of CSIR and the tasks
assigned to CSIRTs, the basic assumptions about how CSIR and the environment in which
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CSIRTs operate as understood in this project are outlined in this section. These
assumptions are referred to as CSIR assumptions, and are summarized in Table 11.
#

Name

Description

A1.1

Civilian
Environment

The CSIRT operates in a non-cyberwar environment in
which responses are limited to defense compared to a
defense-counterattack model

A1.2

Team
Structure

The CSIRT is composed of at least two members, compared
to an individual tasked with handling IR responsibilities

A1.3

Incident
Complexity

Incidents demonstrate some complexity and impact beyond
simple security incidents

A1.4

Incident
Handling
Services

The CSIRT responsibilities are focused on incident
handling response and only indirectly tasked with system
security

A1.5

Computer
Security
Incidents

The CSIRT is responsible for handling incidents with some
security element compared to regular computer incidents

A1.6

CSIR
Capability

The organization either has an established process for
handling computer security incidents or acknowledges the
importance of CSIR and allocates reasonable financial and
human resources.

A1.7

Secure
Environment

The CSIRT operates an environment that at least have
minimum measures for securing the environment
Table 11: Global CSIR Assumptions

The main objective of presenting these assumptions is to alleviate any ambiguity
on how CSIR is understood compared to the several understandings available in the
literature. The assumptions can also be viewed analogous to environment assumptions that
are normally presented before network models in the computer science literature.
Below is a description of the seven assumptions.
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A1.1. Civilian Environment
It was argued in Section 2.1.1 that with Stuxnet, the field of CSIR is challenged
with a serious level of sophistication. The issue of cyberwar, regardless of how it is defined,
is extensively being discussed in the media, among security professionals and government
officials. I anticipate that the field of CSIR will be distinctly split into civilian and military
like domains, a reality which might have already taken place. The main distinction between
the two domains is not limited to the scope level, i.e. major vs. minor incidents, but also
extends to the operative method. Traditional CSIR works in defensive mode, while in
cyberwar environments the mode of operation is defensive-offensive. For the scope of this
project, it is assumed that the CSIR operates in a non-cyberwar environment.
A1.2. Team Structure
Although in some organizations, especially those of small size, CSIR handling can
be delegated to a single individual, the reality of security threats mandate the involvement
of a team in the incident handling. The field of CSIR acknowledges this fact by giving the
term: CSIRT (CSIR Team) to responders to emphasize the collective and cooperative
nature of the response. The NIST standard [9] highlights this aspect through the definition
of a CSIRT which starts with: “A group of individuals”.
Investigating the performance evaluation in a team context is more comprehensive
than evaluating the performance of individuals. Perhaps, individual performance
evaluation can be viewed as a sub-category of team performance evaluation.
Estimations on the minimum needed number of team members vary. For example,
the SANS publication of [131] considers the basic structure of a team to be of two dedicated
CSIR members reporting to the CIO, and four support individuals are needed during the
incident: network engineer, public relations, legal and human resources. A similar
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argument is made by [26] for three full time members or 5+ part timers. In order to avoid
being restrictive, the most stringent requirement for the number of responders put forward
by some works like [67], which is two members, will be used. One of the members should
have knowledge of the business and management structure of the organization, and the
other of the IT and network infrastructure. Another way to view the two individuals as a
team leader and a team member.
Therefore, it is assumed that whenever the term CSIRT is used, the team consists
of at least two members.
A1.3. Incident Complexity
This assumption is presented here to emphasize the adopted definition of an
incident as outlined in Section 1.4.1. An incident is assumed to demonstrate either a need
for sophisticated and coordinated response or significant potential harm to the operations
or the data of the organization.
A1.4. Incident Handling Services
There is a wide range of services that a CSIRT can offer to an organization. The
CERT document [2] classifies CSIRT services into three main categories: reactive,
proactive and quality management; see Table 12. For the purposes of this project, the focus
is on the performance quality of the reactive services of a CSIRT. This is consistent with
the NIST document [1], page 23, which states: “It is outside the scope of this document to
provide specific advice on securing networks, systems, and applications. Although incident
response teams are generally not responsible for securing resources they can be advocates
of sound security practices.”
It is assumed that whenever performance evaluation is mentioned then it refers to
the evaluation of services that are of reactive nature and directly relate to incident handling.
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Proactive and quality management services are not considered part of the scope of the
study. The evaluation of these services can be done through various existing performance
evaluation tools, which are independent of the technical aspects of CSIR.

Reactive Services

Proactive Services

Security Quality
Management Services

Incident Handling

Announcements & Technology Risk Analysis
Incident analysis, IR on Watch
Business Continuity &
site, IR support, IR
Security related information
Disaster Recovery
coordination)
dissemination
Planning
Vulnerability Handling
(analysis, response, IR
coordination)

Security Audit & assessment

Awareness building
Education & Training

Alerts & Warnings

Development of security tools

Security consulting

Artifact Handling
(analysis, response,
coordination)

Configuration & maintenance
of security infrastructure &
tools

Product evaluation or
certification

Table 12: Summary of CSIRT services outlined in the CERT document

A1.5. Computer Security Incidents
This assumption is put forward to support the definition of a computer incident
provided in Section 1.4.1, which limits the scope to incidents of security nature. It also
relieves ambiguity arising from other definitions of computer incidents that include general
computer incidents or even non-computing incidents, like the definition used by the SANS
publication of [132].
A1.6. CSIR Capability
The development of CSIRPE assumes the pre-existence of a CSIR capability
within an organization. If an organization lacks such capability, it is infeasible to discuss
quality management and performance evaluation methodologies. However, the
presentation of CSIRPE in this work would be of interest to an organization that lacks such
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capability but is interested in developing one to be equipped with quality measures and PE
capabilities. This would need to be reflected in allocation of sufficient funds, gaining
management support, and the technical teams acknowledging the importance of
incorporating PE as an element to the planning process.
A1.7. Secure Environment
This assumption complements A1.6 by stressing the need for a pre-existing
security measures within an organization that is interested in developing a CSIRPE. Having
valid and enforceable security policies is a pre-condition for any effective implementation
of any CSIRT [26] . The term “secure environment” is used loosely here to refer to the
existence of some security measures in the environment that would enable CSIRTs to
respond, like logs, IDS, malware detection tools …etc. With the absence of such measures,
a CSIRT would be focusing on “securing” the system more than handling an incident,
which is contention with A1.4.

3.3 Phase I: Designing a CSIRPE Framework
3.3.1 Setting Design Parameters
At the early phase of constructing a performance evaluation framework for any
given environment, there are important decisions to be made which shall shape how the
whole framework is structured and developed. These decisions are formulated in this
section in the form of design parameters to be presented to the CSIRT members engaging
in the planning process. The way how these parameters is set will significantly impact the
rest of the design process.
The design parameters were selected such that the values of each parameter could
possibly produce a different PE framework. For example, a PE framework that evaluates
the performance of a centralized CSIRT demonstrates significant differences than a PE
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framework for a distributed CSIRT. Similarly, a framework that evaluates incident
handling of concurrent incidents has major considerations different than one that evaluates
single incidents.
#

D.1

Parameter

CSIRT Type

Description

Values

Will CSIRPE be applied to a
Centralized
centralized, distributed or a
Distributed
customized organizational CSIRT Customized
model?

Evaluator
Type

Who is evaluating the CSIRT? Is
it the CSIRT performing selfassessment, an internal team
within the organization, or an
external auditor?

CSIRT
Internal
External

D.3

Number of
Incidents

Does the PE model evaluates
individual incidents, several
incidents over a period of time, or
both?

Single-incident
Multiple-incident
Adjustable-window

D.4

Incident
Concurrency

Is the PE model applicable to
single, simultaneous incidents, or
both?

Sequential
Concurrent
Elastic

D.2

D.5

When will the CSIRPE be
Analysis Time conducted and translated into
corrective actions?

Post-incident
Continuous
Incremental

D.6

Will the performance evaluation
results be used for benchmarking
Benchmarking
with results from other
departments or institutions?

Standalone
Internal-Benchmarking
External-Benchmarking

D.7

Measurement
Type

Will the performance model use
quantitative, qualitative
performance metrics or both?

Quantitative
Qualitative
Both

D.8

CSIRP Scope

Does the PE framework evaluates
the effectiveness of the plan
design, plan execution or both?

Design
Execution
Both

Table 13: Framework Component 1: Design Parameters
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A list of eight design parameters along with brief description is collected in Table
13. Each design parameters is presented with several values, which can be viewed as
performance design decisions to be made by the CSIRT.
D.1. CSIRT Type
The way how a CSIRT is structured has an impact on how it would be evaluated.
Therefore, the three structural models: centralized, distributed or coordinated will be
mapped to three possibilities for performance frameworks. These frameworks will mainly
differ in the selection of performance indicators, functional models and how analysis is
conducted.
Practically, the two distinct performance frameworks are the centralized and the
distributed. The coordinated model can be viewed as a customized model that derives its
features from the two frameworks. To be more generic, the third value has been designated
as: “customized” instead of “coordinated” to include other structural models that have
features from both the centralized and distributed models.
Compared to centralized framework, the distributed framework is expected to
display the following distinctions:
1. Coordination Effectiveness: Major part of the performance measurement would
focus on measuring the effectiveness of the coordination channels between various
parties. For a distributed execution, the coordination is sometimes as important as
the actual actions taken by the CSIRT members.
2. Communications Effectiveness: Instead of assessing the effectiveness of a
centralized command flow, the communication messages need to be examined for
potential redundancies and undue overhead. Unlike coordination effectiveness
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which inspects the ability of various members to work together, communication
effectiveness inspects the contents of the messages and how they are exchanged.
3. Distributed Analysis: Each “distributed” entity needs to have its dedicated
performance evaluation. Next, the whole response system need to be assessed. The
analysis need to identify if performance deficiencies are due to unit or system
issues.
4. Multi-context analysis: In the distributed model, the evaluation should consider that
various parties have different levels of access to information. Therefore, the
analysis need to consider multiple contexts. Also, the protocols for establishing
trust and confidentiality among various parties would need careful assessment.
Only recently few publications started to examine distributed CSIRTs [133] [17].
This explains the focus of this project on centralized CSIRTs, as specified in assumption
A2.3. Awaiting further publications in that area, assessing the PE of the distributed mode
of operation can be an extension of this work in a future project.
D.2. Evaluator Type
The entity providing performance evaluation of the CSIR capability can be the
CSIRT itself, an internal body in the organization other than the CSIRT, like the quality
unit, or an external body. Each choice comes with advantages and disadvantages, and will
also impact how the CSIRPE is designed and implemented. A comparison between the
three methods is provided in Table 14.
It is noteworthy to mention that this design parameter should be inspected while
discussing options for S.1 (CSIR Quality Assurance) and S2 (CSIRPE Quality Control).
The three design considerations are interconnected, but each demonstrates slightly
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different concentration. The CSIR quality assurance focuses on the constituencies’
perspective, the CSIRPE quality control on the organization’s perspective, while D.2
focuses on the CSIR itself. In addition, S.1 and S.2 are mainly pre-incident activities, while
D.2 focuses on the activities during and post to incident handling.
CSIRT

Internal Unit

External Body

Low

Low

High

Duration

Relatively short as
responders are
acquainted with
incident details

Depends on the quality
management system of
the organization

External auditing
is a long process

Neutrality

Can be subjective due
to “gaming of
numbers” [134]

Can be subjective due
to emphasizing
organizational aspects
over technical

Objective

Analysis
Focus

Technical and selflearning

Organizational,
financial and
procedural

Depends on
auditor emphasis

Planning
Overhead

High, endured by the
CSIRT

High but collaborative
between various
departments

Minimum or none

Ownership

Fully owned by a
CSIRT. Ownership of
PE enhances positive
change [135]

Ownership by quality
unit can be misinterpreted as “finding
someone to blame”

No ownership by
CSIRT. Can be
seen as imposing
irrelevant factors

Cost

Table 14: Comparison between evaluator types design options

Finally, the “evaluator type” has been presented as a design parameter, compared
to a strategic aspect, to highlight that it is an essential decision to be made at the planning
stage. It is applicable independent of the absence or presence of quality assurance and
quality control capabilities at the organization.
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D.3. Number of Incidents
A performance evaluation framework can be designed to evaluate single incidents,
i.e. without analyzing the CSIRT’s performance over multiple incidents. It could also be
designed to evaluates performance over a period of time that constitutes incident handling
of several incidents. A more desirable but more complex option is to design a framework
that is capable of evaluating single and multiple incidents.
The first option of standalone evaluation platforms is suitable for several contexts.
For example, it is appealing to “CSIRT Providers” [136] that need to report their
performance to their clients after concerning each incident handling. In such scenarios, the
client is interested in seeing metrics that reflect that the delivered CSIRT services met the
expected quality of service requirements. The client is not concerned about how the CSIRT
performed with regards to other customer’s, unless it is presented in a context of
comparison confirming that the delivered service is on the same level to that delivered to
other clients.
Another potential application for single-incident platforms is special taskforce
CSIRTs or ad hoc CSIRTs that are formed to handle a special incident. In such context,
there is little interest in how responders perform outside the assigned mission. The same is
applied to a CSIRT responding to a unique incident that is rare to happen and require
substantive allocation of resources. Here, due to the infrequency of such incidents, analysis
over multiple incidents or over specific period of time is infeasible.
There are two main challenges in designing single-incident platforms. The first is
the absence of data from other incidents in which the current PE results could be compared
to. Therefore, performance metrics need to be designed such that to reflect achievement of
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pre-defined goals or the fulfilment of specific quality of services requirements outlined in
a contract.
The second challenge is the potential of conducting non-objective analysis. The
analysis would normally involve analyzing outputs of numerous descriptive metrics. There
is nothing to guarantee that how selected or excluded readings from analysis would impact
the validity of results. In addition, it is difficult to argue that specific achievements are due
to good performance or due to external factors that are distinct to the incident being
handled.
The second approach is to design performance platforms that analyze the team’s
performance over multiple incidents. This seems to be the approach used in the CERT’s
publication of [60] which implies that PE is measured over multiple incidents over a period
of time. This is also the method commonly used for evaluating help-desk teams and IT
services that are provided in high frequencies [23] [82] [83].
In multiple-incident platforms, performance metrics would normally exhibit some
statistical nature. Performance metrics can be averages, means, medians, variances and
frequencies. In such metrics, it is important to define the contexts in which the statistics
would provide meaningful results.
For example, does an average response time demonstrates performance if measured
over three incidents? Does it provide meaningful reading if not read along with minimum,
maximum and the variance values? If the measurement context is not pre-defined, the
analysis can also fall short to the non-objectivity drawback.
Examples of contexts that are suitable for multiple-incident platforms include
CSIRTs that need to report their performance in the form of annual reports or over a
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specific number of years. Another example is performance reports that are prepared for
strategic planning and budgeting which focus on the overall performance more than results
of specific incidents.
A comparison of the advantages and challenges of both approaches is provided in
Table 15.
Issue

Single-Incident Framework
Special CSIRT taskforce

PE of unique and rare incidents
requiring unusual amount of
Suitable for
resources

Type of
PMs

Objectivity

Multiple-Incident Framework
CSIRTs with high number of
incident handling
CSIRTs that need to report in
periodic number of years

CSIRT Providers reporting to
each customer

PE reports needed for strategic
and budget planning

Non-statistical metrics

Statistical metrics like averages
and variances

Measures PE through
achievement of pre-defined
goals and quality of service
requirements

Measures collective PE that
encompasses all incidents. PE is
measured under similar
environment conditions

A response PE can display
achievement & quality of
Subjectivity
service but is poor when
compared to other responses

Results of PMs might fail to report
poor performance in several areas
if average readings are acceptable

Table 15: Comparison between single and multiple-incident PE frameworks

An adjustable-window framework is one that is designed to provide performance
evaluation for single incidents and also time-analysis for several incidents. In an ideal
situation (CSIR-UPEF), the window could be focused into a single incident or expanded
to include as many past incidents as needed. This approach combines the advantages of
both of the two methods, but would require more resources for the planning and
measurement collection.
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Some practical guidelines concerning the design of an adjustable-window
framework are provided in Table 46 in Appendix A.
D.4. Incident Concurrency
The response techniques of handling incidents that appear simultaneously is
different than response techniques to that handle incidents one at a time [104]. This requires
that a PE framework that allows for evaluating concurrent handling be supported with
different performance measurement mechanisms than a PE framework that is confined to
single incidents.
As noted in [112], the current CSIR literature lacks research in the direction of
simultaneous handling of incidents. But it is expected that the research community will
soon respond to the government and industry needs. For example, the National Response
Framework (NRF) requires that planning should assumes: “multiple catastrophic incidents
or attacks that will occur with little or no warning” [110].
To contribute towards building the taxonomy, a PE framework that focuses on
evaluating responses to incidents that appear exclusively will be called a sequential PE
Framework. A framework that inspects the PE of handling concurrent models will be called
a concurrent PE Framework. A model that is flexible to handle both types will be referred
to as the elastic PE Framework.
Unlike single incidents, concurrent incidents require responses with efficient
resource allocation, multi-incident management, priority scheduling, and higher
coordination mechanisms. A summary of how this will impact PE design is demonstrated
in Table 16.
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Issue

Sequential PE Model

Concurrent PE Model

Utilization

The utilization of resources
is measured against the
maximum potential

The utilization of resources is
measured against maximizing
overall performance

Scheduling

Not Applicable

The effectiveness of scheduling
mechanisms need to be evaluated

Prioritization

Contextual
Analysis

Basic evaluation of the
CSIRT’s ability to manage
several tasks sharing same
goals

Multi-layer evaluation of the
CSIRT’s ability to perform tasks
pertaining to contending goals, i.e.
evaluation of priority classification
and scheduling

The context of PE analysis
will focus on the available
resources

The context of PE analysis will
include available resources and
presence of the other incidents

Table 16: Comparison between sequential and concurrent PE models

D.5. Analysis Time
This design parameter outlines the time period, in reference to incident handling
life cycle, in which the performance evaluation will be conducted. This will directly impact
the functional performance model and consequently the analysis techniques.
The most commonly used design approach is to limit performance activities during
incident handling to collecting measurements and defer the extensive analysis to the postincident period. The second approach is to provide continuous analysis during incident
handling, which is known as performance monitoring. A third approach, the incremental
model, performs partial analysis at specific milestones of incident handling and completes
the analysis post-incident. The details and implications of adopting each of these three
choices is deferred to Section 3.6.1 when discussing functional models.
D.6. Benchmarking
Benchmarking is one of the most common management tools for measuring
performance. It provides performance analysis through comparing the performance of an
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organization to the best practices of the industry or to is competitors [137]. Such approach
is proven to encourage competition which leads to performance enhancement [134]. As
there are no public CSIR benchmarks; the term ‘benchmarking’ is used broadly to refer to
the collection of activities of comparing a CSIRT’s performance to that of other similar
teams, internal or external.
A PE framework that uses benchmarking methodologies is expected to be different
than one that does not. When benchmarking is used, an organization will frame its PE
methods and metrics around those used in the benchmark. Although this would be
restrictive design aspect, the main advantage is the value of the results which are viewed
with more validity. On the other hand, a framework that does not use benchmarking would
be more flexible and adaptable but would be challenged with a more complex process to
provide objective analysis.
A benchmark can be internal or external. It is argued in [106] that internal
benchmarking is more beneficial than external benchmarking, a point of view that I support
considering the current state of the field. Three main arguments are in support of this view.
First, benchmarking analysis is sensitive to numerous parameters of the incident’s
environment which are difficult to normalize across diverse environments. Second, several
aspects of performance are suppressed when using public benchmarks due to
confidentiality and privacy considerations. Third, public benchmarks, especially those
designed by commercial entities, tend to give more weight to market demands and
investment issues over technical issues. If these three challenges are addressed, then
external benchmarking would be a viable option, probably with greater benefits.
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Finally, it should be highlighted that this design parameter and D.3: number of
incidents are mutually exclusive. A single-incident PE framework could be designed with
or without benchmarking. For instance, a single incident can be evaluated against a
benchmark, and multiple incidents can be analyzed independently without comparison to
that of other entities. The same argument is applicable to multiple-incident PE frameworks
which can be designed with or without benchmarking.
D.7. Measurement Type
One of the most common classification methods for performance measurements is
to group measurements into two categories: quantitative and qualitative [85]. Several
disciplines like scientific measurement and financial analysis rely solely on quantitative
measures, while other disciplines like sociology and politics extensively use qualitative
measures in the form of surveys and polls. The performance measurement disciplines use
a mixture of both methods but with slight preference towards quantitative measures.
A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative
measures [138] [139] is provided in Table 17.
In the field of CSIR, the main design decision would be whether to include
qualitative measurements or not. Meaning, a CSIRPE would either be fully quantitative or
be equipped with measurements methods from both types. It is unlikely that an effective
PE platform would be designed using only qualitative measures. Therefore, the question is
narrowed down to: is it better to design a fully quantitative framework, or should qualitative
measures be used?
Answering the above question exposes the polarized viewpoints on a greater debate
which the CSIR field inherits, which was highlighted in Chapter 2. Practically, most of the
metrics used in the field of computer security are quantitative; however, serious concerns
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have been raised about forcing quantifiability into the notion of security [34] [42]. Another
survey demonstrated that schism exists in the research community concerning the benefits
and shortcomings of introducing or excluding qualitative measures [139]. The survey
studied the value of IT in organizational performance, a topic of similarity to this project.
Qualitative

Quantitative

Output form

Text

Numbers

Usage

Understanding, exploring
possibilities, analyzing
behavior, focused analysis

Fact documentation, measuring
outputs, observations, patterns,
generalizations

Examples

Satisfaction, trust,
transparency, communication,
coordination, consistency,
traceability (documentation)

Response time, cost, frequencies,
counting (e.g. occurrences,
infected records), utilization,
availability.

Verifiability

Relatively more difficult to Generally easy to verify
verify

Complexity

Normally, simple design but Normally, complex design but
complex analysis
simple analysis

Objectivity

Viewed to be more subjective

Viewed to be more objective

Measurement flexible and may vary from Well defined and uniform
process
instance to instance
Automation

More difficult to automate

Relatively easier to automate

Table 17: Comparison between qualitative and quantitative measures

The NIST document [1] sided this debate by dividing assessment methods into
subjective and objective measures, without mentioning qualitative and quantitative
measures. However, this implicitly acknowledges the need for both, as qualitative
measures are normally subjective, and vice versa.
Following the above spirit, I second that both types of metrics should be used as
needed. If there is an issue that is naturally easier to understand and analyze through
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qualitative measures, or if the quantification process results in a complex solution, then use
of qualitative measures should not be discouraged. An example of this is metrics that aim
at measuring team dynamics like trust, cohesion and collaboration. These aspects are
normally easier to measure through qualitative measures.
Nevertheless, whenever quantification is possible, I lean towards the use of
quantitative measurements for the following four reasons:
1- Quantitative measures provide more objective and verifiable performance
results. The lack of validity for performance results has been highlighted as
one of the issues that field of security metrics suffers from, and it is desirable
to avoid it.
2- Quantitative measures have the advantage of being easier to automate, an aspect
which might be stressing in the field of CSIR that experiences high overhead.
3- It was argued earlier in this project that the field of CSIR is an operational
discipline. This sets naturally preference to quantitative measures.
4- Use of quantitative measures facilitates building benchmarks, which is a
potential effective method for analyzing the results of CSIRPE.
There are other factors that might influence a CSIRT’s decision to use qualitative
or quantitative measures. For example, if the organization has its own quality system with
clear performance measures, then a CSIRT need to align by the system and use similar type
of measures. The same will apply if a CSIRT decides to use benchmarking as the main
analysis method, as the choice of the benchmark will strongly influence the type of
measurement. Also, many organizations use incident management software systems which
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might influence the selection of measurements based on their compatibility with the
software.
D.8. CSIR Scope
A performance framework can be designed to assess the effectiveness of a CSIRP
design or to assess the effectiveness of a CSIRT’s incident handling. In an ideal
environment (UPEF), a performance model should be capable of conducting both.
However, there are several practical and design considerations that can shift emphasis to
one aspect over the other. Examples of these considerations include:
1- CSIR Maturity: When is performance evaluation introduced to the CSIRT? A newly
formed CSIR capability tends to put more focus on planning and design compared
to a well-established CSIRT that is interested in identifying areas of improvement
2- Pro-activeness: Is there an organizational culture that promotes advanced planning
and implementing proactive measures (CSIRP effectiveness) compared to
responding to immediate needs and risks. For large organizations, long-term
planning is essential; but for starters, small companies focusing on operational
needs might be the norm.
3- Development Model: Many organizations start with a small CSIRT and slowly
grow based on the feedback from deployment. In this approach, operational
feedback plays crucial role in the quality enhancement (CSIRT effectiveness).
4- Analysis Reference Point: This a higher level question related what is static and
dynamic in the underlying environment, the CSIRP or the CSIRT? See S.6:
Reference Analysis Point.
The above considerations demonstrate that CSIRT and CSIRP effectiveness are not
mutually exclusive. They both go hand by hand. However, there are some factors related
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to the environment and to the management approach that make a performance framework
focus on one aspect over the other.
The main implication of this design parameter is how performance indicators and
metrics are selected.

When focusing on CSIRP design, performance indicators like

reliability, preparedness, capacity, completeness, and competency will take precedence in
the performance analysis. And when focusing on CSIRT execution indicators like:
response time, detection accuracy, containment effectiveness and harm reduction will
receive more attention.

3.3.2 Framework Assumptions
Without loss of generality, another set of assumptions are introduced here based on
the above design parameters for presentation purposes. These assumptions are referred to
as Framework Assumptions, and are summarized in Table 18. Without the introduction of
this set of assumptions, the framework presentation will contain redundancies and
unnecessary lengthy discussions that do not map to actual contributions.
#
A2.1

Name

Description

CSIR Model

The CSIR uses the Hybrid Model

A2.2

Member Dedication

Members of the core CSIRT are tasked with only
responsibilities of incident handling without other
overlapping responsibilities within the organization

A2.3

Central CSIRT

The CSIRT follows the Central model of
organization

A2.4

Internal CSIRT

All of the CSIRT core members are internal and
serve as members of the organization being served

A2.5

Sequential Handling

A CSIRT handles one incident at a time, i.e. does
not handle incidents concurrently

Table 18: Global Framework Assumptions
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A2.1. CSIR Model
As argued in Section 2.1.2, the hybrid model has the features of having reasonable
number of phases, being currently used in the industry and focuses on actions compared
relationships. Confining discussion to a specific CSIR model is used for presentation
consistency and does not impact the major themes discussed in the PE framework design.
A2.2. Member Dedication
In practice, most CSIRT members hold responsibilities within the organization
besides CSIR handling. Examples of these roles include: IT managers, Information
Security officers, Network Managers and accountants. For simplicity, it is assumed that
members of the core CSIRT do not hold other roles within the organization. For instance,
when it is referred that a CSIRT communicates with a network manager or a help desk
officer, it is assumed that the members are exclusive, while in reality they could be the
same individual. This assumption is consistent with CERT [2] which conceptualize a
CSIRT in manner that displays very small overlap with the larger security team of the
organization.
A2.3. Central CSIRT
Out of the three models for structuring a CSIR outlined in [1], the centralized
model is selected in this project for presentation purposes. The central model is currently
the most commonly used CSIRT structure model in the industry. Theoretically, in terms of
CSIR functions, the other two models, i.e. distributed and coordinated, are similar to the
centralized model as the operational difference is in terms of executive power and role
assignment, not the CSIR phases or main functions.
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A2.4. Internal CSIRT
For simplicity, it is assumed that all members of the CSIRT are also members of
the same organization. This assumption ensures that the responders have access to all
information relevant to the incident; which is not the case if the CSIRT is external. With
external teams, there needs to be disclosure procedures and policies for sharing the
information to avoid privacy issues and giving responders access to information which
might be sensitive to the organization [140]. Inaccessibility to all relevant information
would have an impact on the decision making of the CSIRT and hence its effectiveness.
For the scope of this project, this factor is eliminated for presentation purposes but the issue
can be of interest to an extension work.
A2.5. Sequential Handling
Although it is reasonable to expect computer security incidents to appear
concurrently, there are no published works that discuss how CSIRT should operate under
concurrent incidents [112]. Therefore,, it is premature at the current stage to design PE
platforms that support concurrent responses. Nevertheless, incident concurrency has been
highlighted as a design parameter (D.4) for PE frameworks for completeness purposes.

3.3.3 Laying Out Strategies and Policies
By selecting the proper values for the design parameters, a CSIRT would have
taken the first step towards defining its own performance evaluation framework. However,
the available framework would have been defined only through parameters which are
descriptive of the environment. Another step is needed to refine the framework through
how the organization’s leadership and the CSIRT envision the role of PE in CSIR.
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In this step, which comes after or along with the specification of design parameters,
the CSIRT leadership attempts to project its generic plan to address the main issues
associated with CSIRPE design.
A strategy is: “a plan to achieve long term or overall objective” and a policy is:
“intentions and direction of an organization as formally expressed by top management”
(ISO 9000 [43]). Through this understanding, this step aims at outlining the general
guidelines of how the PE development should be steered to achieve its forecasted
objectives. This is reflected in the form of strategies from which policies are generated or
by defining a set of policies that reflect a common strategy.
#

Issue

S.1

CSIR Quality
Assurance

S.2

CSIRPE
Quality Control

S.3

CSIRPE
Complexity

S.4

Descriptions

Strategies

How can the organization be assured that Simulation
the designed CSIRP is expected to External Audit
provide the expected IR performance?
Compliance
Who should oversee the enforcement and
CSIRT
implementation of the policies pertaining
Quality Unit
to CSIRPE within an organization?
What are the strategies to tackle the Approximation
challenge of CSIRPE being very Simplification
complex?
Aggregation

What are the strategies for CSIRT to Preparedness
CSIR
perform
effectively
amid
the NDDM
Unpredictability
unpredictability nature of CSIR?

S.5

CSIRPE
Overhead

S.6

Reference
Analysis Point

U-Shaped Dev.
How can PE be introduced to CSIR
Automation
without high overhead?
Comm. Efficiency
What is the main reference point of CSIRP
analysis, is it the team or the plan?
CSIRT
Table 19: CSIRPE Issues that require strategic design
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In other terms, the CSIRT will endeavor here to agree on some approaches, not
actual steps, of how it would develop its CSIRPE framework. A list of the issues that
require some strategic planning or policy making is presented in Table 19.
After outlining the assumptions, defining the design parameters and sketching the
strategies and policies the CSIRT would have finalized the definition of its own
performance evaluation framework. The produced framework is suitable for a specific
environment and reflects the vision of a specific CSIRT. The following three development
stages will evolve in the boundary of this CSIRPE framework. .
S.1. CSIR Quality Assurance
The term quality assurance is used here in reference to methods used to verify that
the CSIR capability within a specific environment is what it claims to be. Although several
publications use the term loosely or interchangeably with “quality control”, the above
definition is adapted from the ISO: 8402-1994 standard [141]. In other words, how would
it be known that a specific CSIRT is expected to offer a specific level of quality of service
during incident handling? Answering this question is of interest both internally, to the
higher management, and externally to customers and constituencies.
With absence of direct works that address quality assurance in the context of CSIR,
a demonstration that members of the CSIRT had undergone training seem to be common
practice, at least from the perspective of the available publications. However, staff training
is a method for preparation, perhaps a strong one, but not necessarily a guarantee of the
expected delivery of service.
Recently, some works discussed the use of simulation [142] [22] [97]. Simulation
can be viewed as a more advanced method of training, and if the outcomes are assessed
properly it can provide a satisfactory expectation of quality of service. However, it has
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been noticed that only very few CSIRTs, mainly military, had undergone simulation
training. Also, these simulations only involve the core CSIRT members without simulated
interaction with other support teams like the legal, HR and police personnel [14].
Therefore, developing exercises that simulate real-environment remains lagging.
Also, it is noted in [140] that, in the industry, reviewing CSIR processes is
becoming a subject of interest for external audit. It is expected that issues like privacy and
data security will arise as soon as external auditing gets acceptance in the industry.
Compliance to industry standards is another way to demonstrate quality assurance.
Although, the NIST document [1] can be considered a good compliance platform, it is not
a standardized system in the formal sense. Therefore, demonstrating compliance with [1]
should be treated with caution if it is the only method used for quality assurance.
In summary, it is important for the CSIRT during its early stages of PE development
to think about its strategy for quality assurance. Training, simulation, compliance and
auditing are the current available options.
S.2. CSIRPE Quality Control
It is a common industry practice to establish a dedicated management unit to
oversee the quality management aspects across an organization. This unit is sometimes
referred to as “quality office” or “quality unit”. The ISO 9000 standard uses the term:
“Quality Management” as the broadest term in which all activities relevant to quality are
included, such as: quality planning, quality assurance, quality control and quality
improvement [43]. Therefore, some or all activities of performance evaluation of the CSIR
capability could be classified under quality management, which is supervised by the quality
unit.
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It is a strategic decision to be made by the CSIRT about who will oversee the quality
control of the CSIRPE. Quality control here refers to activities associated with the
enforcement of the quality requirements [43]. The decision will be influenced by the
defined PE goals and the existing organizational structure of the CSIRT. This could be
fully owned and managed by the CSIRT itself, or by the organization’s quality office.
Although, managers naturally prefer the centralized management through a single unit in
the organization to ensure consistency and facilitates strategic planning, it is noted in [51]
that CSIR practitioners prefer to operate independently. They feel that external influences
by organizational policy mandates normally contends with the objectives set by CSIRTs
which focus on fulfilling CSIR goals.
Practically, the quality management and control tasks will get shared between the
CSIRT and the quality unit, but the weight given to each party will vary. In all cases, it is
important for the CSIRT to think early about this issue to avoid any undesired
consequences. For instance, a CSIRT who have self-administered its CSIRPE might be
forced to re-design it in order to meet the requirements set by the management through the
quality office.
An important factor that will determine who will evaluate is the intersection level
between the various quality components of the organization with CSIR [7]. Several
evaluation activities pertaining to CSIR intersect with other IT and organizational
activities. Examples include: security resiliency, vulnerability assessment, disaster
recovery planning, business continuity planning and risk assessment.
A comparison that demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages of making the
quality unit or the CSIRT to administer quality control is presented in Table 20.
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Entity overseeing Quality Control
Issue
CSIRT

Quality Unit

Flexibility

The CSIRT will have high CSIRT will inherit the flexibility or
flexibility in terms of planning, rigidity of the practices adopted by
design and quality control
the quality unit

Overhead

The CSIRT will undergo higher The CSIRT overhead will be
overhead to administer all relatively low and confined to
aspects of quality control [15]
reporting to the quality unit

Ownership

Empowers CSIRT members and CSIRT members might view PE as
advocates viewing PE as an an external or imposed activity
integral activity of CSIR

The CSIRT will focus on The CSIRT will be accountable for
Accountability outcomes of interest to the its overall PE including inputs,
management
outcomes and processes
Blind-Spots

Might neglect developing PMs Might neglect developing PMs that
that are important to the are of technical importance
organization
Table 20: Comparison between methods of CSIRPE quality control

S.3. CSIRPE Complexity
One of the main findings of the survey presented in Chapter Two is that the main
two challenges to IR performance evaluation across disciplines is complexity and
unpredictability. Since complexity is a sophisticated issue that requires collaborative
efforts from researchers and practitioners to produce effective models of analysis and a list
of best industry practices, it is beyond the scope of this project to formally model CSIR
complexity or provide a rigorous assessment for it.
Nevertheless, a simple model is presented in Section 0 to guide CSIRTs on how to
address the issue of complexity in practical terms. The suggested model is referred to as
“SAC Complexity Model” referring to the three strategies that are used in deriving the
model. The three strategies are :simplification, approximation and cascading.
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The SAC complexity model is proposed as one of the various ways that a CSIRT
can overcome the challenge of complexity. Whether a CSIRT adopts this model or uses its
own solution to the CSIR complexity challenge, there needs to be enough effort exerted
during the planning phase to tackle the issue. Ignoring this step might result in producing
a CSIRPE that is also complex to implement and analyze, or producing a CSIRPE that fails
to capture the actual performance properties of the CSIR capability due to its
impracticality.
S.4. CSIR Unpredictability
As highlighted in the second chapter, unpredictability or uncertainty poses a major
challenge to incident response disciplines, including the CSIR. It is beyond the scope of
this project to provide modeling for CSIR unpredictability, which requires different
analysis techniques than the ones used here. Nevertheless, a platform that focuses on policy
and operational guidelines is presented to assist responders in handling this challenge.
A platform for understanding and analyzing CSIR unpredictability is proposed. The
framework can be used as a tool to help CSIRTs develop strategies and policies to handle
the issue of unpredictability. It also can be used to assist developing performance indicators
and metrics that are sensitive to the fact that CSIRTs operate in an environment with high
number of uncertain conditions.
The platform is called “The NFP Unpredictability platform”. The acronym NFP
stands for the three principles that are used in the platform, namely: Non-deterministic
decision making, flexibility and preparedness, see Table 21.
The three principles are derived from the survey results of chapter two, and are
aligned to the requirements set by the NIMS and NRF. The National Incident Management
System (NIMS) [109] and its derived National Response Framework (NRF) [110], provide
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the main principles and strategies that need to exist for management of emergency
incidents, including cyber incidents. The two documents are designed to manage incidents
of various magnitudes and complexity. The details of the NFP unpredictability platform
are provided in Section 5.5.
#

Principle

Description

1

NDDP

The CSIR capability should be equipped with decision making
tools suitable for nondeterministic environments

2

Flexibility

The CSIRP should be flexible to allow CSIRT members to adjust
to the needs arising from unpredictable factors

3

Preparation

The CSIRT should be prepared in terms of planning and
competency to address unpredictability
Table 21: The three principles of the NFP Unpredictability Platform

S.5. CSIRPE Overhead
Adding a performance evaluation component to an existing CSIR system is
expected to bring several advantages but will also be accompanied by some undesirable
side effects. Overhead is one of these unwelcomed consequences. During incident
handling, every minute of the CSIRT’s time is valuable. Therefore, introducing the PE
module should be sensitive enough not to hinder the core functionalities of the CSIRT.
Since overhead cannot be completely eliminated, focus should be paid to
minimizing it as much as possible. It is one of the duties of the CSIRPE planning staff to
ensure that the proposed modules do not involve unreasonable overhead, which is a
subjective matter depending on the underlying environment.
There are several strategies to minimize the overhead effect, three of them are
briefly described hereafter.
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1- U-Shaped Development Model: This model suggests that most of the time should
be spent at the beginning and at the end, and very little is done at the middle. The
term ‘u-shaped’ is used in similar ways in several works [143] [144]. In CSIRPE,
this translates to spending most of the time during the preparation and analysis time
and aiming for minimizing work-time during the incident handling.
2- Automation: The objective is to minimize performance evaluation tasks through
use of automated tools, which are mainly software tools [83]. The following five
advantages have been highlighted by [145] with regards to computer security
incident response: (1) timely and efficient detection of incidents (2) multi-factor
risk assessment (3) efficient notification (4) trend analysis and reporting (5)
compliance with privacy laws. In CSIRPE, focus should be on automating the
collection of performance metrics readings and performing basic analysis. This has
been highlighted as an important aspect to increase effectiveness [146]. However,
involvement of automation in planning and during final analysis should be
minimized.
3- Efficient Communication Models: The impact of efficient of communication on
team performance is highlighted in [147]. The objective here is to minimize
communication overhead as much as possible. The existing models suggest,
coupling communication with needs, periodical short updates, changing from
explicit to implicit communication through the shared mental model, involving the
whole team in the derivation of mission and goals, and careful structuring of the
team.
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S.6. Reference Analysis Point
When analyzing the PE of an organization, there are two methods to frame the
analysis context. The first method focuses on the CSIRT and the analysis is framed around
the question of: “does the CSIRT’s performance achieve the desired PE goals?”. By
making the reference point of analysis to be the CSIRT, the CSIRP is viewed as an outcome
of the CSIRT’s performance during the preparation phase.
When using CSIRT as the reference point, the preparedness of the CSIRT through
training and planning, the expertise and qualifications of the CSIRT members, the harmony
and cooperation between the team members, the decision making capabilities, the tools
selected during the incident handling are factors that strongly influence good and poor
performance. Issues like effectiveness of security policies, efficiency of handling
procedures and robustness of the preventive methods are secondary and can be blind-spots
to CSIR performance analysis. This method of analysis is intuitive and is practically used
in various disciplines [60] [61].
The second method adopts the CSIRP as the analysis point of reference and the PE
question is framed as: “does the implementation of the current CSIRP achieves the desired
PE goals?”. Here, the performance of the CSIRT is inspected within the boundaries of the
CSIRP. It is expected that if a CSIRT implements the procedures outlined in a CSIRP then
that should lead to some degree of good performance, presuming that the CSIRP is well
prepared. The main analysis blind-spots here would be the volatility of decision making
when needing to go out of script and identifying performance issues arising from poor
CSIRP design.
It is clear that there is a high correlation between the CSIRT performance and the
CSIRP effectiveness. For instance, poor performance can be due to poor design, poor
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implementation or both [9]. Therefore, when selecting an analysis reference point, it should
be considered as the primary perspective, and the second should be treated secondary;
instead of being ignored.
Issue
Scope

CSIRT

CSIRP

CSIRPE can be used in various
locations in which the CSIRT
operates using various CSIRPs

CSIPRE can be used in all locations
in which the CSIRP is enforced
through various CSIRTs

Update
Frequency

Whenever there is a major update Whenever there is a major update
to the CSIRT size or membership, to the contents of a CSIRP, the
the CSIRPE needs to be updated
CSIRPE needs to be updated

Analysis
Outcomes

Poor performance can be directly
mapped to CSIRT preparedness
and execution effectiveness
compared to policies and CSIRP
design effectiveness

Poor performance can be directly
mapped to policies and handling
procedures compared to CSIRT
execution effectiveness

External
CSIRTs

If an external CSIRT is invited
for assistance, the CSIRPE is
used for execution effectiveness
not for prevention effectiveness

If an external CSIRT is invited, the
CSIRPE is used

System
Security

System security and team
performance are disjoint entities

The system security and team
performance is treated as one entity

Cost of training all staff, or
replacing a team member is
relatively high

High costs at the planning stage.
Cost of updating CSIRP is
relatively low.

Cost

Table 22: CSIRT vs. CSIRP Analysis Reference Points

Regardless of the selected reference analysis point, an organization should be able
to identify the sources of good or poor performance and map them back to the CSIRP or
the CSIRT. However, it is simpler to conceptualize CSIRPE using one of the two reference
points which will impact how the CSIRP is documented and how performance metrics are
derived. Mixing both methods can result in incoherent planning and analysis and possibly
contradicting conclusions. Probably, if an organization seeks intensive PE analysis it is
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possible to conduct the PE analysis in two phases using a different point of reference for
each phase.
Although adopting a reference analysis point can be a matter of design preference,
there are several factors that can make one method preferred to the other within a specific
environment. Examples of these factors include: company size, CSIR budget, staff
retention and CSIRT being internal or external.
A comparison between the two perspectives is presented in Table 22, and a simple
guide for which method to select is provided in Section A.3.
A simple questionnaire to guide the CSIRT leadership in selecting the proper
reference point is provided in Table 47. If an organization is not certain which reference
point to use, I recommend using the CSIRP method [92] [7]. This speculation is based on
my observance of the evolution of the field (See for example the note put by the New
Zealand CSIRT that consistency, reliability and resilience are established through a CSIRP
not the CSIRT [31]). At the early stages of the field development, an organization is likely
to have a good IR capability if they hired a well-trained security professional; which is not
necessarily true anymore. Much efforts and financial resources are being invested in the
preparation of CSIRPs which provide more robust and stable CSIR environment compared
to hiring professional experts with low retention probability. Also, the CSIR process is
viewed more comprehensively through the lens of the CSIRP which captures the overall
IR capability compared to the CSIRT perspective which is sensitive to the qualifications
of the CSIRT members.
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3.4 Phase II: Defining a CSIRPE Model
3.4.1 Overview
As a CSIRT gets into this second phase of development, it would have achieved
two main things from the previous phase. First, setting the design parameters eliminates
issues that are not of concern to the team. Second, the team would have inspected issues
pertaining to the organization and envisioned a list of strategies and policies which the PE
model to be developed need to abide by.

[1] Define PE
Goals

[1] Define PE
Aspects

[1] Define PE
Aspects

Strategies & Policies

Design Parameters

From
Phase I

CSIRPE Framework

To
Phase III

PE Goals

Performance Indicators

Strategies & Policies

Abstract PE Model

PE Aspects

Design Parameters

CSIRPE Framework

Figure 10: Phase II: Defining Performance Evaluation Model

Through this second phase, a CSIRT would define its own PE model by setting its
goals, specifying what needs to be measured and outlining the desired features of the
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performance. This is depicted in Figure 10, which also shows the inputs and outputs of this
development phase.
This phase is composed of three components. The first component, Defining
Performance Goals, aims at defining performance goals which explain why CSIRPE is
introduced to the CSIR capability and how it is expected to enhance it. The second
component, Identifying PE Aspects, analyzes the CSIR system and identifies areas that
would be evaluated. The third component, Defining Performance Indicators, pinpoints
factors that determine good and bad performance based on the outlined goals and aspects.
The following sections provides the details for the three components.

3.4.2 Defining Performance Goals
There are two perspectives to answering the question of why is PE needed for CSIR.
The first perspective is generic and can be applied to any CSIR environment while the
second is contextual and can vary depending on the operating environment. The two
perspectives can also be treated as a two-stage process of defining goals, starting from
general goals to more specific ones attuning to the organizational needs.
Using the model presented in the CERT publication of [41], objectives are treated
as higher than goals. Therefore, the generic goals of CSIR will be called PE objectives,
and the organizational goals will be called PE goals. Using the terminology of the field of
management, PE objectives correspond to official goals while PE goals correspond to
operative goals [148].
The main output of this development step is a concise list of goals capable of
guiding the derivation of measurement tools and the remaining steps of the development
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process. An organization may choose to generate two lists, one for objectives and for goals,
or simply one maintain one list that is directional and operative.
Defining PE Objectives:
The definition of PE objectives is concerned with the general themes and
motivations for introducing a performance evaluation module to a CSIR capability. Since
these objectives are context free, they could be collaboratively generated by researchers
and practitioners. It is recommended that these objectives be publically shared which will
contribute towards building best industry practices.
Surveying the current publications and documentations about preparing a CSIRP
and comparing how other performance disciplines define their objectives, it can be noticed
that CSIR PE objectives revolve around the following three themes (see [19] [7]):
1- Business Continuity & Growth: by implementing a PE model an organization will
have a system for quality assurance, quality management and continuous
enhancement to its CSIR. Deploying such system is expected to contribute to the
overall business operations. Without CSIRPE capability, an organization will not
be able to maintain its CSIR capability, assure that its delivering a quality service,
or be able to recommend effective enhancements.
2- Effective Resource Allocation: by implementing a PE model an organization will
be able to gain effective allocation of its fiscal and human resources for CSIR. This
leads to more cost-effective and better coordinated responses.
3- Disaster Prevention and Management: by implementing a PE model an
organization will be able to have accurate tools to identify risk factors and operating
obstacles during and before a disaster due to cyber incidents. More specifically, the
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organization is interested in having tools to identify, measure and minimize
associated harm due to cyber incidents.

How much do you rate the impact of introducing CSIRPE in helping
the organization progress in each of the following three areas?
Business Continuity
& Growth

Resource Allocation
Effectiveness

Disaster Prevention
and Management

Impact Scale
0 = None or negligible

1 = Minor or partial

2 = Major & Substantial

Adder

Score 0 or 1
Introducing CSIRPE
was redundant with
negligible impact

Score 2 , 3 or 4
Introducing CSIRPE
had partial positive
impact

Score 5 or 6
Introducing CSIRPE
was rewarding and
have substantial
impact

Current PE system is
redundant and needs
major re-design

Current PE system
needs more
planning, dedication
and revision

Maintain current PE
system and continue
enhancement

Figure 11: Example of CSIRPE Usefulness Test

A CSIRT can treat the above three themes as the starting place from which the PE
objectives are derived from. The three themes can also assist in constructing an evaluation
test for assessing the benefits of introducing PE into CSIR. The test could be called: The
CSIRPE Usefulness Test, as it attempts to answer the question: “Did the integration of a
CSIRPE module help the organization progress in all or some of the three main goals of
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CISRPE: contintuity & growth, resource allocation effectiveness and disaster prevention
and management”.
The test is generic and qualitaitive and is meant to help redirecting or refining the
definition of PE goals, and the higher-level issues of the design. More rigours and
quantitative approaches for essessing the effectiveness of introducing CSIRPE can be done
in the eighth componenet of this framework on validation models.
Performance Evaluation Goals:
Building on the previous step, a CSIRT needs to contextualize its PE objectives
into a list of goals that serves the needs of the organization. These goals need to be relevant
and provide operational guidance.
In order for any performance measurement system to be effective, the PE goals
need to be derived from or aligned by the organizational goals [149]. In the context of
CSIR, there are two main sources in which PE goals need to be derived from and aligned
with. The first is the CSIR goals/objectives, which are normally defined at one of the early
sections of CSIRP. The second is the mission statement and overall organizational
objectives. A CSIRPE that is based on shallow understanding of the CSIR and
organizational goals is expected to be ineffective.
Providing an example for deriving from the organizational mission, if a mission
statement reflects emphasis on customer satisfaction, then it should be expected that a
CSIRPE module will have some contributions towards that. A possible PE goal would be
to: “to develop tools to measure customer satisfaction to the organization’s response to
computer security incidents”. Another example for a PE goal derived from CSIR
objectives, if CSIRP considers one of its goals “to protect infrastructures X and Y during
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a compromise”; then a PE goal would be to “develop mechanisms for measuring the
effectiveness of a CSIRT in protecting critical infrastructures X and Y during an incident
handling”.
Refining Goals:
Since goals play a crucial role in directing the development phase, distinct attention
should be paid to its design and approval process. The stressing question here is “how does
a CSIRT know that it has defined the correct goals for its PE module”? I have found that
the most commonly used method in performance systems [150] is the SMART model
[151]. The name of the model stands for: specific, measurable, actionable (i.e. achievable),
relevant (i.e. result-based and realistic) and time bounded. In [41], the model was modified
to SMARTER by adding (E) evaluated and (R) reviewed. In my view, this is unnecessary
as the amended features reflect the design process more than the goals themselves.
The SMART model is generic and is originally designed for evaluating goals and
objectives in the contexts of organizations and projects, not necessarily in the area of
computer security or CSIR. Therefore, a customized interpretation of the model is needed
for the CSIR context. This is provided in Table 23.
Finally, it should be noted that the definition of goals is a collaborative process
between the CSIRT and the management. When a CSIRT defines its own performance
goals, it helps integrating the performance activities into the response activities as the
developers of the goals are the same individuals that are executing them. It also ensures
that the goals are realistic and reflect the operational needs of incident handling. The
involvement of the management works as a validation method and assurance that the define
goals serve the overall performance of the organization.
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SMART Term

Interpretation in CSIR Context


S

Specific






M

Measurable





A

R

T

Achievable

Relevant

Timely



The PE goal targets a specific performance aspect of CSIR
(Section 3.4.3)
The PE goal is written in a simple language that could be
unambiguously interpreted by the CSIRT and management
The list of PE goals is concise, preferably less than
The PE goal focuses on outcomes not actual actions
The PE goal can be expressed through CSIR performance
indicators
The PE goal can be represented by several PIs. If not, consider
expanding or merging with another goal.
The PE goal is expressed in a manner that encompasses several
contexts of measurability
The PE goal is feasible to achieve the PE goal given the CSIRT’s
competency and available resources
The PE goal is expressed in action-verbs and provides
operational guidance





The PE goal is derived from the CSIR objectives
The PE goal is aligned with the organization’s mission and goals
The PE goal does not demonstrate conflict with the policies and
procedures outlined in the CSIRP or enforced by the quality unit



The PE goal implies a time-frame, or permits the definition of a
time-frame, to achieve the goal.
The PE goal is recognized as short-term or long-term



Table 23: SMART Model for Defining CSIRPE Goals

3.4.3 Identifying PE Aspects
After defining the PE goals, a CSIRT needs to attempt identifying aspects of the IR
system that will be subject to performance evaluation. Both goals and aspects will be used
to define performance indicators in the consequent step of the CSIRPE development.
The term aspect is used here to refer to the collection of actions performed during
the CSIR cycle that will be treated as one block in performance evaluation. Examples of
aspects include: designing a CSIRP, containing an incident, collaborations with external
consultants and CSIRT’s reporting to management. Each of the aforementioned examples
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refer to a group of actions, not a single one, and are normally considered valuable to the
CSIRT or consume much of its efforts prior, during or post to an incident response.
There are various methods for identifying CSIR aspects. Five different
methodologies are presented in Table 24. The first and third methodologies can be viewed
as CSIRT centric, the second and fourth can be viewed as CSIRP centric, while the
organizational model is a hybrid one. These methodologies are inferred from the
requirements set by the NIST and CERT documents, while the organizational model is
borrowed from classical works in the field of performance evaluation [152].
#

Methodology

Description

1

The CSIR life cycle is viewed as a time line starting from the
CSIRP preparation to the end of post-incident analysis. The
Time Analysis timeline is divided into time clusters each representing the time
period in which a group of activities is performed. Each time
cluster is defined as a performance aspect.

2

Phase-Based
Analysis

Each phase of the IR life cycle phases defined in a CSIRP is
defined as a distinct performance aspect

3

Value
Analysis

The main activities of a CSIRT are analyzed and categorized
into major and minor based on their importance to the incident
handling. Each major activity is defined as a performance
aspect, and every group of correlated minor activities are
aggregated into a performance aspect.

4

CSIRP Based

The performance aspects are defined in reference to a CSIRP.
The two major activities are: CSIRP design and CSIRP
Execution. It could be further divided, e.g. escalation protocols.

5

The whole IR process is conceptualized as a combination of five
Organizational elements: inputs, processes, products, outputs and outcomes.
Model
Each of these can be customized into a single or multiple
performance aspects.
Table 24: Methodologies for Identifying PE Aspects

Examples of how each of the above methodologies can be used in identifying
aspects is presented in Table 25.
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There are advantages and disadvantages for using each of the above methodologies.
For example, the time-based analysis is suitable for identifying the major time clusters of
incident handling, which can correspond to areas in which the response resources are
highly used. It is reasonable to subject these lengthy time clusters into PE evaluation in
order to shorten the time period which will consequently lead to better resource allocation.
However, the methodology falls short of identifying the moments which are critical to the
incident handling but do not necessarily consume long time periods. An example of this is
the initial assessment performed during a very short time period at the early stages of the
IR life cycle, but have magnificent impact on the effectiveness of the response. It could be
noticed that in all of the above methodologies, the overall system is broken down into
several aspects which each will be subject to a separate performance evaluation. Such
approach would be insufficient unless it is coupled with an evaluation of these aspects
when analyzed as a whole. Therefore, regardless of the selected methodology, there should
be another aspect defined which is “overall system performance”. This aspect is normally
evaluated after the evaluation of the other aspects.
Based on the above note, it would be more effective to use a combination of
methodologies to derive the PE aspects. More precisely, it is better to use at least two
methods which are of different emphasis, i.e. CSIRT vs. CSIRP. For example, consider an
external CSIRT invited to handle an incident which is beyond the capability of an internal
team. In such scenario, the CSIRP based model is of less interest because the effectiveness
of the CSIRT is focused on the execution not the design of the CSIRP. Therefore, the
phased-based methodology could be coupled with the value-based methodology. Using the
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examples presented in Table 25, a depiction of how the aspects could be merged using the
two methodologies is presented in Figure 12.
#

1

2

3

Methodology

Example

Time Analysis

Divide the IR timeline into four time clusters:
[1] preparation & training
[2] incident identification and assessment
[3] incident containment
[4] incident eradication and system recovery
[5] Overall system performance

Phase-Based
Analysis

Assuming the SANS model is used:
[1] preparation
[2] identification
[3] Containment
[4] eradication
[5] recovery
[6] lessons learnt
[7] overall system performance
A CSIRT operating in major municipality might define the
following three major aspects:
[1] Isolation of critical assets after incident identification
[2] Immediate partial system recovery
[3] Identification of perpetuators
[4] Overall system performance.

Value
Analysis

Other minor activities are classified into two aspects:
[5] Public and media interaction
[6] CSIRT collaboration with support teams
[1] CSIRP design
[2] Policies defined in a CSIRP
[3] CSIRP Execution of containment and recovery procedures
[4] Escalation protocols defined in a CSIRP
[5] overall system performance

4

CSIRP Based

5

[1] inputs: preparedness
[2] processes: identification, containment, recovery
Organizational [3] products: incident classification (from identification phase)
Model
[4] outputs: response Time, response cost
[5] outcomes: Damage assessment
In addition to: [6] overall system performance
Table 25: Examples for the Methodologies for Identifying PE Aspects

Note how the first phase, the preparation, is ignored because the external CSIRT
was not involved in the preparation of the CSIRP. Also, the public and media interaction
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are not of direct responsibility to the external CSIRT; thus it is changed to reporting to the
organization management which shall communicates with its customers and the relevant
media. Further, the identification, containment and lessons learnt phases are broken into
two aspects, which could not have happened if only the phase-based methodology was
used.

Value-Based Methodology
Major

Phased-Based Methodology

Minor

[1] Isolation of
critical Assets
[2] partial system
recovery
[3] Attacker
Identification

[1] Preparation

[4] Eradication

[2]
Identification

[5] Recovery

[3] Containment

[6] Lessons
Learnt

[4] Public &
media
interaction
[5] Interaction
with support
teams

[7] Overall System Performance

[7] Overall System Performance

Phased-Based + Value-Based
Preparation Phase

Not used

Identification Phase

[1] Isolation of critical Assets

[2] Declaration & Assessment

Containment Phase

[3] Partial System Recovery
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Figure 12: Example of Combining two methodologies to define PE Aspects

In Table 48, (see Appendix A), a list of practical recommendations for the
identification of performance evaluation aspects is presented.
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3.4.4 Defining Performance Indicators
The main philosophy behind the use of performance indicators and metrics is the
renowned principle: “What’s measured can be managed” [106]. The principle is sometimes
phrased as: “one cannot improve what one cannot measure” [11] or “if you cannot measure
it, you cannot improve it [153]”. Therefore, Performance Indicators (PIs) are factors that
determine the quality of an incident response (See Section 4.3). In this proposed CSIRPE
framework, performance indicators are considered the interface between the performance
goals/aspects and the actual measurement tools, i.e. performance metrics.

[1] Analyze
PE Goals

[2] Analyze
PE Aspects

[5] Align with
Goals & Aspects

[3] Analyze
overall system

[4] Assess
Measurability

[6] Identify
KPIs

[7] Provide
Formal Definition

Figure 13: Defining Performance Indicators Process

Using the proposed CSIRPE framework, the two main sources in which PIs will be
derived from are the goals and aspects. Performance indicators can be viewed as adverbs
for the PE goals, adjectives for the PE aspects or descriptors for the states of response
system. Examples include readiness, reliability, stability and length of response time.
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It is expected that each goal and aspect will be mapped to at least one PI. It is a
common practice to consider PIs with high impact on the performance as key performance
indicators (PKIs). Each PI should have at least one performance metric (PM) as a tool to
provide quantifiable measurements.
The process of developing performance indicators can be abstracted in seven steps,
see Table 26. These seven steps can be grouped under three main stages. In the first stage,
the goals and aspects are analyzed to identify the performance factors. The result is a list
of desired features about the quality of the response activities and the achievement of goals.
Since each goal and performance aspect need to be analyzed separately, the whole response
system is then analyzed as one unit for determining the higher level performance factors.
The output of the analysis is a list of performance factors, called PIs.
In the second stage, each PI is inspected individually to assess its measurability and
its alignment to the goals and aspects. Non-measurable PIs need to be discarded or
redefined. The mapping between the PIs and the goals and aspects need to be verified. If a
goal or aspect has no mapping to the pool of PIs, then either one PI need to be generated,
or the goal need to be re-defined.
The final stage includes the classification and formal definition for each PI. The
classification can be based on priority, i.e. KPI and regular PI, or based on factors suitable
for the operating environment. A sample template for how formal definition of a PI could
be achieved is presented in Table 49 (See Appendix A). Each PI will be properly defined,
outlined with the goals/aspects and later with the developed performance metrics. When
mapping to several goals/aspects, the formal definition should elaborate the context of
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interpreting the PI under each goal/aspect, if necessary. More details about the seven steps
in the above process are provided in Table 26.
#

1

2

3

Step

Description

Goal
Analysis

Analyze each PE goal to derive factors that determine the
achievement of the goal. This could be done by inspecting the
action verbs used in the goal statement and searching for an
adverb that describe a good implementation of the action verb,
or a noun that describes the state of the system after achieving
the goal

Aspect
Analysis

Analyze each PE aspect to derive factors that determine the
quality of the outputs resulting from implementing the aspect’s
sequence of actions. This could be done by inspecting the nouns
used in the aspect statement and searching for an adjective that
describes good output, or a noun that describes the state of the
system if the actions within a PE aspect were successfully
implemented.

System
Analysis

Examine the overall IR system and think of factors that
determine the success of incident handling. This could be done
by inspecting the PE objectives, the overall system performance
aspect and thinking of the state of the system if multiple PI’s
(derived from step 1 and 2) were positive.

4

Examine the feasibility of using tools to measure the factors
obtained from Steps 1 to 3. Focus on tools that are represented
Measurability in numbers or provide objective assessment. Good PIs need to
have two or more measuring tools. Re-examine or discard
indicators that are non-measurable

5

Examine how each factor relate to the goals and aspects. Each
factor should be mapped to at least one goal or aspect. If a factor
relates to three or more goals and/or aspects, then it should be
mapped to the overall system performance aspect

6

Mapping

Distinguish between indicators that are mapped to the overall
system performance aspect and those mapped to individual
Classification goals and aspects. Also, assign priority levels to these
indicators. A simple scheme is to use key performance
indicators (KPI) and regular indicators (PI)
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7

Formal
Definition

For each PI, assign a name, provide description, define scope
and priority, outline relationship to goals and aspects and
possible performance metrics.

Table 26: Description of the Steps for Defining Performance Indicators

Note that the second stage of the above development process can be considered a
validation phase. The two factors that determine that the selection of performance
indicators are valid is the measurability and alignment to the PE goals. These two factors
are assessed during the development process and also later when validating the whole
CSIRPE model (Component 8). Furthermore, as PIs are interface between goals and
performance metrics, the validation of both indirectly contribute to the validation of the
PIs.
Finally, in Chapter 4, a compilation of performance indicators is presented. Each
performance indicator is defined, and supported with interpretation guidelines and sample
performance metrics.

3.5 Phase III: Measuring CSIR Performance
After completing the second development phase, the main characterization of the
CSIRPE framework would be the list of PIs. Each PI represents a desirable performance
feature of the response system, and the full list of PIs is supposed to capture the overall
performance of the system. The next phase is to design performance analysis and
measurement tools. This can be broken into three main steps: deriving performance
metrics, defining performance analysis techniques and defining validation techniques, see
Figure 14. The details of these three steps are provided in this section.
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PE Goals

Strategies & Policies

PE Goals

Strategies & Policies

Performance Indicators

PE Aspects

Phase
II

Design Parameters

Abstract PE Model

Performance Indicators

PE Aspects

Phase
III

Design Parameters

Operational PE Model

Performance Metrics
Analysis Models
Validation Models

Figure 14: Transition from Phase II to Phase III: Measuring CSIR Performance

3.5.1 PE Metrics Derivation Process
At the end of the response life cycle, the CSIRT will need to prepare a report
demonstrating its success based on these outlined PIs. In order to do that, a CSIRT needs
to think about the tools that it will use to measure its success in each of the PIs. These tools
are called performance metrics.
The IRPE literature, as presented in Section 2.2.3, does not discuss models for
deriving performance metrics, as there is no standardized way for achieving this and it is
highlight dependent on the system design. Instead, discussion is concentrated on the
desirable features and design considerations for performance metrics. A similar discussion
in the context of CSIR is provided here.

163

#

Design
Parameter

Values

Description

Metric Type

Performance
Descriptor

Is the metric used for actual performance
measurement or as a descriptor, i.e. input, for
other performance metrics?

M.2

Scope

Generic
Specific

Can this metric be used across all security
incidents, or is it applicable to a set of
incident categories?

M.3

Quantifiability

Quantitative
Qualitative

Does this metric provide qualitative or
quantitative measurement

[Type]

What is the type of qualitative or quantitative
assessment tool used. If the metric is
quantifiable does the numbers represent
actual measurement, calculation output,
binary values, scale level, …etc.

M.5

Performance
Indicators

List of PIs

Is this performance metric used in the
analysis of a single or multiple performance
indicators?

M.6

Dependence

Direct
Indirect

Does this metric depend on measurements
obtained by other descriptor or performance
metrics?

M.7

Accuracy

Actual
Estimation

Does this metric use actual readings or does
it involve an estimation or assessment by one
of the CSIRT members?

M.8

[Conditions]

[List]

In order to provide meaningful measurement,
are there conditions that need to be satisfied
before collecting the readings of the PM?

[List]

Does the metric have attributes which may
have impact on the reading, like instrument
or software name, time stamp, estimation
method, ..etc

M.1

M.4

M.9

Measurement
Tool

[Attributes]

M.10 Interpretation

How should the outputs be interpreted?
When does it indicate good or poor
[Description]
performance? Are there contextual issues
that need to be taken into consideration?
Table 27: Design Parameters for Performance Metrics
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Starting with performance metrics design considerations that are relevant to CSIR,
a list of ten design considerations is presented in Table 27. Each design issue poses a
question to the designers that targets how the metric will be used or analyzed. The list can
be treated as a guideline for deriving performance metrics from each PI.
Using a formal definition template that is consistent with the template used for
defining PIs, performance metrics can be formally defined through the template in Table
50 (See Appendix A).
Once performance metrics are derived, a CSIRT needs to verify the correctness and
usefulness of these metrics. Tools used for this verification are called PE meta-metrics.
Several works in other IR disciplines addressed PE meta-metrics [23] [120] [121] [122]
[123]. However, only selective list of these meta-metrics are relevant to CSIR. The
applicable metrics to CSIR can be classified under three main meta-metrics: relevance,
comparability and simplicity, which can be abbreviated as (RCS). A description of these
three meta-metrics is provided in Table 28.
Feature

Description

(R) Relevance

 Aligned with a KPI, or several PIs
 Compatible with the CSIR capability
 Expected to provide results that could enhance performance

(C) Comparable

 Uses objective assessment methods
 Provides actual or well-defined estimation range
 Demonstrates invariance to some system factors

(S) Simplicity

 Simple to read and analyze
 Uses minimum resources and endures little overhead
 Unambiguous to interpret by both technical and non-technical
members of the organization
Table 28: Features of good CSIR performance metrics
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M.1. Metric Type
There are two types of metrics that can be used in PE: descriptive and performance
metrics. It is important to distinguish between each type as descriptive metrics can be easily
confused as performance metrics which can produce inaccurate PE results.
Descriptive metrics are those used in measuring a specific property of the CSIR
system that does not necessarily reflect performance. For instance, the size of the response
team and number of infected machines in an incident are examples of descriptive metrics
that do not reflect a performance quality in themselves. Descriptive metrics normally
provide actual readings and are simple to collect. They are mainly used as inputs for the
calculation of performance metrics. On the other hand, performance metrics are directly
aligned with the pool of performance indicators through providing measurement
mechanisms.
It is desirable for an organization to have a good pool of descriptive metrics which
can be recorded by the responders or through automated tools. These descriptive metrics
can be used in calculating several performance metrics. It is also important to detect any
inaccuracy or inconsistency in descriptive metrics, as that can propagate to the validity and
accuracy of performance metrics.
M.2. Performance Metric Scope
Some performance metrics are generic and could be used across all types of
incidents. Examples include, incident response time, incident classification accuracy and
customer satisfaction. Others are specific to certain category of incidents or under specific
conditions. For instance, a server down time or unavailability is a metric that is relevant to
incidents involving denial of service attacks. Another example is average response time
from external agencies, which can be mapped to the partnership effectiveness PI. This
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metric is only applicable if the incident handling involved some contact with pre-defined
external agencies like law enforcement or peer CSIRTs.
Generic PMs’ analysis need always to be conducted in performance reports as they
provide some holistic analysis of the response performance. They are also the most
commonly used tools in benchmarking. Furthermore, they can be used to identify
performance bottlenecks relevant to the management of the incident. On the hand, specific
PMs provide more focused performance analysis. They are also used to identify
performance issues pertaining to the technical aspects of the system.
M.3. Quantifiability
The advantages and disadvantages of using quantitative and qualitative
performance measurement tools were discussed in the design parameter D.7. However, the
discussion was focused on the higher level decision of whether to incorporate qualitative
measures or not into a CSIRPE framework. In this step, a CSIRT would need to decide for
each PI whether a qualitative or quantitative measure needs to be developed, assuming that
a framework supports both.
The following considerations need to be taken into account when making the
decision:
1- Representativeness: Which tool provides better capturing (realistic and
holistic) of the performance as defined by the PI?
2- Simplicity: Which tool provides a simpler method for collecting and analyzing
the PI?
3- Cost: Which tool would consumes less of the CSIRT’s time and resources?
4- Sustainability: Which tool is more sustainable in the long run?
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5- Objectivity: Which tool strikes better balance between objectivity and
representativeness?
As a general design strategy, it is preferred to support a PI that has several
quantitative measures with a qualitative measure, and vice versa. This will ensure that the
PI is assessed more comprehensively, and is deemed by some practitioners to provide more
effective performance analysis [154].
Finally, several performance evaluation studies suggest that qualitative metrics can
acquire the benefits of quantitative metrics if designed through fuzzy logic. Fuzzy models
have the feature of being quantified but over a qualitative scale, which provides a
reasonable performance reporting. Example fuzzy performance metrics include [155] for
measuring flexibility, [156] for measuring individual performance, [157] integration of
fuzzy metrics in the balanced score card (BSC) model, and [158] for measuring agility.
M.4. Measurement Tool
When a decision is made that a specific PI is to be measured through a qualitative
or quantitative metric, the next decision would be which measurement tool should be used.
For example, qualitative metric could be a checklist, survey or a rating on a scale or rubric
assessed by specific individuals. Likewise, a quantitative measure can be additive,
multiplicative, average, variance or simple counting. Each of these “measurement
instruments” have advantages and some shortcomings, and it is a design decision by the
CSIRT to define each PM by an appropriate instrument. Although this step might seem
simple, it should be noted that subtle changes in the measurement tools can have significant
impacts on the performance analysis.
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M.5. Performance Indicators
Using the framework proposed in this project, a performance metric needs to
originate from some performance indicator. Occasionally, there might be a performance
metric discussed in academia or among practitioners that a CSIRT would consider
deploying. In that case, there needs to be clear alignments between the PM and the pool of
PIs. A “celebrated” PM that cannot be aligned with the outlined PIs is of no practical
benefits.
Each performance metric can be mapped to a single or multiple PIs. If a team uses
a small number of PMs, then the team should target selecting PMs that either measure a
KPI, or multiple PIs.
Whenever a PM maps to multiple PIs there needs to be clear outline of how the PM
results should be interpreted in the lens of each PI. For instance, if the network injected
with a virus/worm and a large number of machines in various subnets are infected. Let the
virus targets transmitting “private” or “secure” data from each machine to an external
source. Assume the team uses a metric called: “rate of secured machines” which measures
number of machines inspected and successfully cleaned per hour. Also assume that this
metric is aligned with two PIs: “eradication effectiveness” and “confidentiality”. Under the
first PI, a higher rate of secured machines indicate might indicate better eradication
effectiveness. The same could be argued about “confidentiality” as the more secure
machines the higher confidentiality is maintained. However, if machines have different
weights in terms of the “security level” of the stored data, then using the above PM is
incorrect. The rate should be calculated using machines with the same level of “security
level data”.
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M.6. Dependence
One of the methods that the ISO 9216 [85] classifies metrics is through the
relationship to other metrics. A metric that is independent from other metric measurements
is called direct metric, otherwise it is called indirect metric.
Although it would be desirable for simplification purposes to have all metrics as
direct, the majority of practically used metrics are indirect. Additive and multiplicative
metrics, and the majority of metrics with statistical properties are examples of indirect
metrics.
When deploying indirect metrics, the designers need to insure that all inputs are
normalized and variances are minimized. This is a necessary condition for producing
correct results, and should be outlined in the definition of the metric. For instance, total
response time is an additive metric that uses several time measurements, each pertaining
to an elapsed period during the incident handling cycle. If these time periods are collected
from several sources, then all of these sources need to share the same definition and
understanding of how the incident timeline is divided. This specific simple observation is
documented to be one of the issues that caused inconsistencies in performance
measurements [117].
M.7. Accuracy
The concepts of accuracy and precision are essential to the theory of measurement.
But, as noted by [116] performance measurements operate on the tradeoffs between quality
and available resources compared to accuracy and precision. In the real world, it is more
meaningful to report to a manager that the unavailability of a resource is between 0.3 and
0.4 compared to an exact value like 0.3435 [159] [160].
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To be more specific, it could be argued that most CSIRPE PMs do not require high
accuracy to provide meaningful interpretation. However, the CSIRPE system require some
metrics to be accurate. This is normally applicable to descriptive metrics like timestamps
and counting metrics, e.g. number of compromised records.
When defining PMs for a CSIRPE the following issues need to be considered with
regards to accuracy:
1- Does the metric require accurate measurements? Metrics that require exact
values should be distinguished from those that do not
2- Whenever accuracy is not mandated, a tolerance gap should be defined. This
can appear in the form of a margin of error [78], variance [161] or confidence
rating [73].
3- When estimations are used, factors used in the estimation should be recorded
4- Whenever estimation is made, there needs to be a mechanism to identify the
practitioner that made the estimation.
5- Does an estimation require a validation? The simplest method is to make
multiple estimation by several practitioners and record the variance.
M.8. Conditions
Conditions refer the description of the setting that is needed to collect a meaningful
reading for the PM. For example, some performance metrics concerning the team
performance would require that the number of team members be above a specific number.
Also, volatile data collected during live forensics might require specific processes or
network traffic be switched off or temporary disabled while collecting a measurement. The
same would be applied to a statistical metrics which might require the domain size be above
a specific value in order to make a meaningful reading.
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Specifying the conditions is not required for all metrics. However, neglecting
specifying the conditions of measurement collection may result in inaccuracies in
measurement or interpretation.
M.9. Attributes
The definition of some metrics require the specification of attributes. Unlike the
conditions which focus on collection, attributes impact how metric readings are interpreted.
For example, the form type and number of surveyed individuals do impact how a survey
results are interpreted. Also, in some settings the type of software used in measurement or
analysis impact how results are interpreted. Other factors include, who conducted the PM
reading analysis, environment context and incident context.
M.10. Interpretation
Each PM needs guidelines on how it should be interpreted in reference of
performance. For instance, does a high value indicate good or poor performance? Does the
PM reading demonstrates actual measure or a trending measure? Does the variance in the
metric reading reflect performance levels or not? Does the metric reading need coupling
with other PM readings?

3.5.2 PE Analysis Models
When the structure of the PE framework is designed and it is equipped with
measurement tools, it is desirable for the CSIRT to foresee how results produced from
deploying the PE framework will be analyzed. Doing this provides more objective
assessment that endures less overhead compared to a situation when analysis methods are
outlined after the completion of incident handling.
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A list of performance analysis methods were extracted from the performance
analysis literature, see Table 29. These methods are examined for adaptation to the CSIR
field. The list is also used in developing the Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IAV)
proposed in Section 5.2.

#

Analysis
Model

Description

N.1

Gap Analysis

Difference between optimal / desired
performance and actual performance

N.2

N.3

Compare incident performance against
Benchmarking industry best practices and competitors’ (Comparative)
performance
Component
Analysis
Perform thorough analysis of a specific
Targeted
aspect of incident handling or confine
Analysis
analysis to a restricted focus to identify
potential enhancement venues
Bottleneck
Analysis

Analyzes the PE results to spot performance
bottlenecks, i.e. those that have high impact
on poor performance

N.5

Root-cause
Analysis

Asks why poor performance happened.

N.6

Goal
Achievement

Evaluates the success of achieving the PE
goals

N.7

Trend
Analysis

Analyzes performance over a period of team
seeking the identification of recurring
performance issues

N.8

Stakeholder
Analysis

Conducts PE analysis from the perspective of
various stakeholders

N.9

Predictive
Analysis

Evaluates the system performance under
several hypothetical situations

N.4

Category

Table 29: PE Analysis Methods
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Deficiency
Analysis

Holistic
(System)
Analysis

Predictive
Analysis

The above nine analysis techniques provide different perspectives to performance
analysis. The techniques also vary in the validity degree of the performance results, as some
techniques could be applied informally. The main tradeoff of these techniques is objectivity
and operationalization, i.e. producing validated results vs. producing results that reflect the
operational nature of CSIR and result in actionable plans.
The above techniques can be grouped based on objectivity or based on the analysis
subject. The NIST document uses a binary classification for assessment methods in the
form of subjective and objective methods. Through this classification, the analysis
techniques of N1,N2 and N7 demonstrate a higher level of objectivity due to their reliance
on quantified metrics. The remainder of the techniques can be subjective or objective
depending on the selected method of analysis.
In terms of analysis subject, the techniques can be categorized into four main
categories: component analysis techniques, deficiency analysis techniques, holistic or
system analysis techniques and predictive analysis techniques.
Component analysis techniques focus on analyzing separate parts of the system
independent from the remaining parts. This allows for more focuses analysis and better
identification of technical and/or performance issues. On the other hand, holistic or system
analysis techniques view the system as a whole, and analyzes performance through the
combined interaction of various system components. The DHS document [162] uses the
terms component metrics and enterprise level metrics (ELMs). This is analogous to the
usage of component analysis and holistic analysis.
Deficiency analysis targets unfolding performance bottlenecks and factors that
impact performance. Deficiency analysis can be applied on the component level or on the
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holistic level. Finally, predictive techniques are advanced methods that involve comparing
actual performance to hypothetical scenarios of what could have been done.
A CSIRT is not required to apply all of the above techniques. Instead, each team
should select methods that are suitable for the operating environment in a manner that
provides objectivity to the analysis. A list of recommendations of how to select analysis
techniques is presented in Table 51 (Appendix A).
N.1. Gap Analysis
Gap Analysis is one of the most common techniques for analyzing performance
[163] [164] [165]. The technique measures the difference between the desired performance
and actual performance. The results should recognize the aspects of the response that are
lacking in terms of performance or the extent of the performance problem [135] .
In the context of CSIR, the first question that arises is what is the optimal
performance? The theoretical answer can be found in the Universal PE Framework
(UPEF), see Section 5.1, in which optimal can be mapped to the idealistic values. However,
in many situations achieved performance can be too far from this optimal reference, due to
practical considerations. Therefore, the optimal performance can be defined in operational
terms as maximum potential performance. This has been highlighted by [166] as a more
realistic method for applying gap analysis. The author referred to maximum potential as:
“reasonable” performance.
Yet,

the

above

does

not

solve

the

issue,

as

defining

“reasonable

or “maximum potential” performance in absolute terms is nontrivial. Potential
performance is sensitive to factors related to the operating environment and advancement
of technology, which makes the definition relativistic.
The above discussion suggests that the a CSIRT can either:
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1- Perform gap analysis over the ideal values and maximum potential values and
report both results
2- Perform gap analysis over the maximum potential values, associated with a
justification of how these values were calculated and considering some margin
of error.
The second issue arises from reading the following example of objective
assessment in the NIST document [1]: “measuring the difference between the initial impact
assessment and the final impact assessment”. Indeed, this applies gap analysis but from a
different angle, which is the difference between perceived values and actual values, or
estimated values and actual values. The objective of such analysis is to measure the
effectiveness of the estimation techniques of the CSIRT, or the ability of the team to make
decisions under unpredictable conditions. Specifically, it could be used in models like the
NFP unpredictability platform presented in Section 5.5.
Based on the above, the term ‘gap analysis’ can be refined in the context of CSIR
to mean: “difference between optimal and actual performance, or between perceived and
actual values for parameters in the incident response”.
N.2. Benchmarking
See Section D.6: Benchmarking.
N.3. Targeted Analysis
Targeted analysis is a generic term used here for any analysis motivated by a
specific objective normally targeting a system component or a performance aspect. It is
noted in [163] that targeted analysis comes as a third step after gap analysis and root-cause
analysis. Thus, targeted analysis is geared towards more precise identification of the causes
or towards finding solutions.
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N.4. Bottleneck Analysis
Performance bottlenecks are factors that render performance. This can happen
through causing system failure or causing the system to operate under poor performance
conditions. The removal of these factors normally cause a significant boosting to the
system performance. Bottleneck analysis is the method of finding these factors. This
process is normally done after gap analysis if it establishes that a specific incident response
reflects negative performance characteristics [167]
Bottleneck analysis is normally conducted through analyzing a large pool of postincident data. However, it could also be performed during the preparation phase when
specific tests are performed, like scalability testing [168]. Furthermore, trend analysis data
could be essential to the identification of bottlenecks.
Causes of performance bottlenecks could be due to system capacity, response
delays or incompetency. The following list of bottleneck causes were reported by several
CSIR practitioners to be common [169] [170] [171]:
1- Reliance on tools which might be ineffective or outdated .
2- White noise, i.e. large number of false alarms and redundant alerts
3- Failure to adequately set priorities
4- Lack of competency from responders
There is no standardized method for conducting bottleneck analysis. It has been
even argued that it is more of an art than a science [172]. However, the general approach
is to conduct analysis over incident data, and especially trend analysis results. The analysis
could focus on processes (i.e. series of actions) or on actors (e.g. CSIRT members,
software/tools). Identified bottlenecks are analyzed for correlations with various factors
which are later validated through a process of elimination.
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N.5. Root-Cause Analysis
While gap analysis wants to find if a problem exist, root-cause analysis focuses on
what caused it [163]. Although there are attempts to propose formalized models for
conducting root-cause analysis that involve digital evidence [173], most organizations use
informal or semi-formal root-cause analysis techniques mainly conducted by the technical
teams [174]. One of the objectives of the current CSIRT Metrics Special Interest Group is
to develop models for root-cause analysis of operational benefit [52]
Three example methods of how root-cause analysis could be applied to the field of
CSIR had been suggested by [29]. These methods are: the five-whys approach, whybecause analysis (WBA) and cause-and-effect (fishbone) diagrams.
The five-whys approach is borrowed from the Six Sigma DMAIC methodology
(Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control) [175]. The approach is simple and can be
applied to a wide range of scenarios. It starts by writing down a problem, e.g. performance
issue, and then asking why it happened. A tentative answer is provided which is treated as
another problem statement and the why question is asked again. In each iteration, the
problem is broken down further hopefully up to the root-cause of the issue. In each
iteration, the team needs to reach an agreement on the cause or revisit the previous iteration
for enhancing the problem statement.
The why-because analysis (WBA) [176] is another iterative approach that seeks
causality for accidents. The approach builds a why-because graph (WBG) that analyzes the
accident and produces a chart that connects causes to effects. The intermediate connecting
items are called factors, i.e. their occurrence contributed to the occurrence of the incident.
These factors are categorized and analyzed to construct a list of countermeasures that could
prevent the incident from re-occurring.
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The fishbone cause-effect diagram is another cause-root analysis tool that is used
in Six Sigma, proposed by the Japanese quality scholar, Ishikawa [177]. The analysis
method is visual and is used during brainstorming sessions for unfolding the causes of an
incident. This method is effective in determining the root-cause if it is a product of several
causes.

Potential

factors

are

grouped

under

categories

like:

rules/policies,

equipment/software, environment, people …etc. The output of the analysis is a chain of
causes in the form of a process that led to the incident.
N.6. Goal Achievement
Goal Achievement analysis, along with trend analysis and stakeholder analysis are
types of holistic system analysis techniques. This category of analysis focuses on
investigating the CSIR system as a whole, compared to reporting performance on
segregated components of the system.. Using the structure of PE framework presented in
this project, holistic analysis techniques should be used whenever a CSIRT selects “overall
performance” as one of its performance aspect.
Features of using holistic analysis techniques include:
1- Ensure that performance analysis does not fall into the fox paradox [137]. The
paradox suggests that good performance in partial aspects of the system might
not necessarily reflect good overall performance.
2- Be able to spot performance issues arising from the interaction between various
system components [107].
3- Focus on use of sustainable performance measurements compared to
component analysis that might use performance metrics volatile to incident
circumstances and used technologies [178].
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Assessing goal achievement is a common practice in organizations and businesses,
both at the scope of long-term strategic goals and at the short-term project-based objectives
[151] [19] [78]. The CSIRPE framework presented in this project is goal-oriented as
definition of goals is considered the highest system level definition from which
performance aspects, indicators and metrics are derived.
The following approaches could be used to evaluate the achievement of goals:
1- A simple Yes/No assessment of whether each goal has been achieved. This is
relevant when goals are defined through well-specified targets. Therefore, it is
more likely to be used for evaluating strategic sub-goals, or goals set for a
specific unit or group of PE activities. An example of CSIRPE goal evaluated
through this approach is when a CSIRT sets a threshold time given for the
CSIRT from the moment an incident (on a specific severity scale) is detected to
the moment of the first CSIRT meeting concerning that incident.
2- A calculation of the percentage of achievement. This could be achieved in two
ways: action-oriented or process-oriented analysis. In the action-oriented
approach, achieving a goal is mapped to performing a group of activities or subtargets, regardless of these activities being correlated or exclusive. Level of
achievement at each activity is measured, and the total goal achievement is
calculated bottom-up. The process-oriented is suitable when achieving a goal is
defined through a plan that outlines a process or roadmap towards fully
achieving the goal. The percentage of achievement would be a measure of the
amount achieved through the process line towards the end-goal.
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3- A qualitative achievement analysis. This approach addresses the issue that not
all goals can be measured in quantifiable fashion. In such scenarios, qualitative
measures could be used to assess how the CSIR achieved the set goals. For
instances, goals involving terms like flexibility, adaptability, team cohesion and
trust are more likely to be measured through qualitative methods.
N.7. Trend Analysis
Trend analysis conducts performance analysis over a period of time or over a group
of incidents. There are two major benefits coming from using trend analysis in performance
measurement. First, the analysis transcends good and poor performance due to the unusual
circumstances which provides more realistic representation of the system performance.
Second, trend analysis captures the effectiveness of the enhancement processes and lessons
learnt analysis through demonstrating whether the system performance is improving or
deteriorating after the implementation of recommendations.
Although trend analysis is independent of individual incident analysis, it is a good
practice to apply performance measurements on both fronts [135]. For instance, after
recording response time for a specific incident, the average response time could be
inspected for increase or decrease [23].
The benefits of conducting trend analysis in the context of CSIR are summarized
by [29] and [74]:
1- Identify patterns of cyber security incidents
2- Detect any increase or change in the number and type of vulnerabilities
3- Identify common factors that influence the occurrence of incidents and proper
incident handling
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4- Determine the effectiveness of security controls
5- Identify targeted areas of the organization
6- Understand costs and impacts associated with cyber incidents
In addition, note that trend analysis could be performed jointly by multiple
organizations that have established information sharing agreements. Such trend analysis
can be helpful in determining attack trends and mechanisms, and consequently which
countermeasures were effective.
N.8. Stakeholder Analysis
This category of analysis techniques suggest that performance should be
evaluated from various perspectives, each corresponding to the perspective of a group of
stakeholders. It has been shown that applying financial metrics into non-financial aspects
is problematic [134]. A brief discussion is provided below about three common
techniques that fall under this category: balanced scorecards, the performance prism and
triple bottom line performance system.
The Balanced scorecards performance measurement model [134] is considered one
of the early mechanisms triggering multi-perspective performance analysis. The model was
originally designed to reform the traditional practice of institutions that rely only on
financial performance metrics like return on investment. The model analyzes performance
against four perspectives: financial perspective, customer perspective, internal perspective
and innovation and learning perspective. The model is widely used by major international
corporations. It is also used to derive some information security performance systems
[179]. However, the model was criticized for its bias towards the economic aspect of
performance [178], along with other practical challenges [180].
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The prism performance model [181] attempts to expand the focus on financial
stakeholders to include other organizational perspectives. The model analyzes performance
through five perspectives: stakeholder satisfaction, strategies, processes, capabilities and
stakeholder contribution.
The triple bottom line model [182] expands further to include stakeholders that
have no transactional interests with the organization, like local government and human
services. The model analyzes performance from three main perspectives: economic, social
and environmental. In other words, the model goes beyond business and organizational
aspects to include external and indirect stakeholders. It has been argued in [178] that this
wide approach creates more sustainable performance systems.
N.9. Predictive Analysis
Predictive analysis techniques are more advanced methods that not only include
collected performance data for analysis but also consider hypothetical scenarios of what
could have been done. Such methods are used across disciplines for purposes of evaluating
performance [82] [155] and for evaluating the reliability [103] and robustness [155] of
response systems.
Predictive analysis is bidirectional, i.e. it inspects the past and the future. When
analyzing past actions, the focus is on what could have been done better, or what could
have been the output if an alternative course of actions were implemented. The future
inspection attempts to foresee the impacts of the implementation of some control measures
or security policies. The simplest method of inspecting both directions is through the whatif analysis approach. Below are some examples of how this approach could be used in the
context of CSIR performance evaluation:
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1- What-if specific performance metrics were deployed and measured [41].
2- How specific incident activities and their countermeasures impact infrastructure
[52]
3- Conducting cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or break-even Analysis for the cost
effectiveness of incident handling procedures [183].
4- Expected rewards of implementing preventive measures [31] over the system
security and CSIRT performance.
5- Forecasting future performance issues, e.g. failures or bottlenecks, before they
arise based on current system states [181]

3.5.3 PE Validation Models
The last step in the framework development is investigating the validity of the
performance models. Prior to this discussion, an understanding of what ‘validity’ means in
the context of CSIRPE is presented.
In simple terms, measurement validity is ensuring that numbers and scores actually
represent what they claim to be [184] [23]. Expressed in other terms, to ensure that users
cannot circumvent the results of the performance metrics [135]. Translating this to CSIR
terms, validity means ensuring that the performance results correspond to actual incident
handling performance.
However, validation has another dimension pertaining to design, which is to ensure
that the designed performance system actually captures the expected needs. This is
sometimes distinguished by the term ‘verification’. This usage is compatible with the widespread

Six-Sigma model that is used for measuring performance in business and

manufacturing environments. The Six-Sigma considers validation of performance models
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as part of its DFSS (Design for Six Sigma) process which is structured in five phases:
define, measure, analyze, design and validate [175].
In this project, the term validation is used generically to include the above two
aspects of validation. In addition, the above usage of the term should not be confused with
other common usages of validity in the field of computer security which revolve around
the concept of data integrity.
As it was documented in the literature survey, several works like [34] have
documented that the field of computer security is poor in validation methods. However,
this remark was criticized by its narrow definition of validation which correspond to formal
methods.
Analyzing works concerning performance validation, the used methodologies
could be classified into four types:
1- Formal Methods: Use rigorous mathematical models for data validation and
logical arguments for reached conclusions
2- Heuristic Methods: Instead of performing complete validation, a probability
could be assigned to how much confidence should be put on the results.
3- Development methods: argue that if the design and process of collecting and
analyzing data is valid, then the results are ought to be valid.
4- Operational methods: disregard theoretical analysis and view the experience
of the practitioners as the main validator for what works and what does not
work.
It was argued earlier in this project that focusing on formal methods is of little
benefits to CSIR practitioners, due to the complexity of the process and the operational
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nature of the discipline. The later three methodologies will be discussed by giving one or
two examples, and highlighting advantages and disadvantages. Four methodologies are
presented in Table 30.

#

Validation
Model

V.1

Feedback
Systems

V.2

Compliance

V.3 Bootstrapping

V.4

Confidence
Rating

Description

Category

Validate design through getting operational
feedback of what worked and what did not

Operational
Validation
Method

Review policies, procedures and processes for
compliance with industry standards

Development
Validation
Method

Achieve validation through involvement of
management in the development process

Development
Validation
Method

Assigning a confidence rating to various
aspects of the design and analysis

Heuristic
Validation

Table 30: Validation Models for CSIRPE Frameworks

V.1. Operational Validation (Feedback Systems)
Validation through operational experience is the main practiced method for
enhancing CSIR, which is also extendible to CSIRPE. Team members engage in postincident analysis to discuss the positive and negative aspects of incident handling.
Consequently, positive factors are maintained and negative factors are countered through
correcting measures. The process is iterative as it is repeated after each incident handling.
For a list of actions performed during post-incident analysis see [26] [59] [1].
The main arguments for using the operational model go back to three factors. First,
computer security and so CSIR are operational disciplines. Thus, operational models and
techniques resonate more naturally with CSIR practitioners. Second, research in the area
of security metrics suggests that validation is difficult and impractical. Since CSIRPE relies
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on security metrics, this challenge is passed on. Third, since computer technologies and
cyber threats are on continuous change, it is easier to develop operational measures instead
of long-term planning which might not be applicable when technologies or threat tactics
change. In other words, the overhead of keeping robust validation methods is too high
taking in consideration the ever-evolving nature of the discipline.
On the other side, relying on operational findings which suffer from subjectivity
and are sensitive to short-term factors can be counterproductive. Some classical works in
military training asserted that relying on experience for learning does not improve people
[185] [13]. Therefore, unless operational feedback processes are evidence-based and are
governed by objective procedures, operational feedback outputs cannot be trusted as a
validation method [15].
V.2. Development Validation (Compliance)
Validation through compliance is a method to ensure that a developed model is
consistent with the industry requirements and best practices. When a CSIRT develops a
process or model, e.g. performance model, establishing compliance suggests basic
validation that the proposed model is good.
Since standards are developed through careful and collaborative efforts of industry
and research experts, it provides a sufficient indicator to an organization that its
implemented system is sufficiently good. This brings the advantage that an organization
will grow through the growth of the industry as a whole, and it suggests that the
organization need not to devote resources to developing better solutions, unless it is
necessary.
The disadvantage of relying on compliance as a validation scheme is that standards
are normally higher-level and do not necessary address details that might be crucial to the
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success of the model. This is true about the NIST and CERT documents which only provide
very basic information with regards to performance evaluation.
V.3. Development Validation (Bootstrapping)
Unlike compliance which ensures that a developed model meets industry
expectations, bootstrapping ensures that a developed model meets the organization
expectations. The term bootstrapping refers to a development method in which the
developers regularly validate the design with the management and constituents throughout
the development stages [129]. The term can also be used to refer to the validation
investigation results, through iterative validation with various teams about the findings of
each investigation steps [186].
The main advantages of bootstrapping is its simplicity and its assurance that the
designed model is aligned with the organizational mission and objectives. However,
caution should be observed as relying solely on organizational needs without considering
best industry practices may produce ineffective models.
An example of how bootstrapping could be used to enhance CSIR performance
system can be found in [161]. The study targeted developing and enhancing system
trustworthiness through constructive system design and paying attention to requirements.
Trust is defined here as a higher measure composed of security, reliability survivability
and other sub-system measurement tools.
Another example applicable to the CSIRPE framework presented in this project, is
the validation of performance metrics design. After designing and formulating a list of
performance metrics, it is a good practice to review the list and perform a quick review.
This review needs to be done by several individuals, other than the developers, to ensure
that the list meets the expectations. This review, which is a form of bootstrapping
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validation, can be done in iterations: first by the technical teams, then by the quality staff
and finally by the management and the CSIRPO.
V.4. Heuristic Validation (Confidence Rating)
Heuristic validation methods use techniques that rely on probability instead of
clear-cut metrics. It could be argued that since security can never be guaranteed, then so
validation of security systems cannot be certain. Using heuristic approaches, systems are
validated through expressing how much confidence is being exemplified. Heuristic
approaches are used in computer security metrics [162]. For instance, password strength is
determined by heuristic approaches to a predefine thermometer.
Using the above understanding, heuristic approaches could be used to validate
performance design and also performance results. The design is validated heuristically by
inspecting elements like reliability, trust, failures, risks and survivability [103] [183].
Performance results can be validating through assigning a confidence rating to the results,
similar to the methods used by [73] [42].
Although heuristic approaches provide practical and simple solutions to a
complicated problem, they could suffer from subjective interpretation. For instance, what
does it mean that a CSIRT executed a response that is in the range of [90-80%] cost
effective. Such statement can be interpreted by different parties, e.g. financial officers vs.
technical staff, in different ways. Therefore, heuristic approaches need to follow clear
definitions and assessment processes, which could be argued to resemble effective
qualitative assessment.
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3.6 Phase IV: Implementing a CSIRPE Model
3.6.1 PE Functional Models
While the PE Design Process focuses on actions to build a PE model for a specific
environment, it only describes actions that are performed at the preparation stage. Another
model is needed to address when and how PE actions are executed during the life cycle of
a response. These models will be referred to as: “PE functional models”.
The design of PE functional models highly depends on when PE analysis is
expected to be performed, which is expressed in the design parameter D.5: Analysis Time.
Three functional models are presented below corresponding to the three possible values for
parameter D.5. The presentation of these models takes into account Assumption A2.1 about
the use of the Hybrid Model for the IR life Cycle.
#

Name

D.5 Value

Description

F.1

Design-CollectAnalyze (DCA)

Post-Incident

Measurements collected during incident
handling, all analysis done afterwards

F.2 PE Monitor

Continuous

PE is monitored throughout the incident
response, frequently assessed and results are
fed-back to the CSIRT

Incremental
Model

Incremental

PE is analyzed at pre-defined points during
the incident handling process.

F.3

Table 31: Types of PE Functional Models

F.1 The Design-Collect-Analyze (DCA) Model:
The Design-Collect-Analyze (DCA) model is the simplest and most commonly
functional approach used by CSIRTs. The model concentrates performance evaluation
activities to the preparation and lessons-learnt phases, i.e. the first and last phases of the
CSIR life cycle. During incident handling, performance activities are confined to collecting
measurements for the pre-defined performance metrics, which could be done through
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automated tools. The main advantage of the DCA model is that it has minimal overhead
during incident handling, giving responders more time to focus on the technical aspect of
the response. The shortcoming is its lack of mechanisms to make corrective actions during
incident handling based on performance data.
The DCA model is to be used when parameter D.5 is set to “Post-Incident”. A
graphical depiction of the DCA function model is presented in Figure 15 applies.

PE Data Collector

PE Design
Preparation

Identification/
Analysis

Containment

PE
Analysis
Eradication/
Recovery

Lessons
Learned

Figure 15: DCA Functional Model

F.2 The PE Monitor Model:
The PE Monitor Model uses an on-going approach to performance evaluation.
During incident handling, a “performance monitor” is used to assess and report
performance throughout the incident life cycle, see Figure 16. This could be either done
through setting up performance triggers that send warnings/alerts about the performance
status of the response calling for the attention of the CSIRT leadership to take corrective
actions.
The PE Monitor model is suitable for complex incident responses that needs high
level of interaction or occupies long response time. In such scenarios, taking corrective
actions based on performance results would impact the cost-effectiveness of the response
and enhance the response time. For example, it is suggested that PE monitoring be used for
the effectiveness of the mitigation of security incidents targeting nuclear facilities [79].
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The Monitor model is to be used when parameter D.5 is set to “Continuous”. The
type and level of rewards expected from adopting a PE monitor model to the field of CSIR
remains shady. At the basic level, there is no immediate industrial need for using such
model [7].

Preparation

Identification
/Analysis

Containment

Eradication
/Recovery

PE Monitor

Lessons
Learned

PE Post
Analysis

PE Design
PE Analyzer

Figure 16: PE Monitor Functional Model

One of the main implications of adopting the PE Monitor Model is the need to
develop another type of performance measurements, called interactive PMs. The classical
performance metrics are generally classified as diagnostic or mechanistic tools, while
interactive PMs are tools for monitoring and control [187]. It has been noted that despite
interactive PMs being more “organic” the emphasis of the performance measurement
disciplines had been on the diagnostic tools [188] .
F.3 The Incremental Model:
The Incremental Model is a hybrid model that strikes a balance between the benefits
of the DCA and PE Monitor models. It follows the basic structure of DCA of condensing
performance evaluations at the preparation and lessons learnt phases, with one exception.
At specific marks of the incident handling, some partial performance analysis is performed
for purposes of the on-going incident procedures.
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The performance evaluation conducted at these marks are condensed and launched
for specific purposes. It can be as simple as a short report on response time and cost, or
more informative with a summary of current values to a short list of performance
indicators/metrics readings. The main motivation of making such intermediate PE analysis
is the early detection of any major deficiencies in performance to enable planning for
corrective actions.
The marks at which incremental analysis is performed can be phase-based, i.e. after
each phase or a group of phases; at specific time slots during incident handling, e.g. main
CSIRT meetings; or at/prior to some major activities, e.g. media release, first executive
summary. Since performance evaluation done at these marks should be simple and
informative, it can be considered as semi-analysis or partial analysis that will be updated
later during the more comprehensive analysis done at the lessons learnt phase.
The incremental model avoids the high overhead associated with continuous
monitoring but at the same time keeps the team alert if major performance issues need to
be addressed. In its simplest form, the incremental analysis can have a single mark during
incident handling. This could be mid-time-point of the incident handling, i.e. after detection
and initial containment and before full containment and recovery. A depiction of such
scheme is presented in Figure 17.
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Preparation

Identification
/Analysis

Containment

Eradication/
Recovery

Lessons
Learned

PE Post
Analysis

PE Design
Data
Collection

Partial
Analysis

Data
Collection

Figure 17: Incremental PE Functional Model with a Single-Mark

3.6.2 Assigning Roles and Responsibilities
Discussion about role assignments could have been presented in earlier sections but
was postponed to this part of the dissertation to provide a description of various activities
before discussing the expected roles.
There are various activities related to performance evaluation that need to be done
prior, during and after incident handling. It is impractical to assume that all of the above
duties will be carried by a single individual as this involves high overhead and will result
in poor execution. From the management point of view, this is also undesirable because it
gives the impression that performance is the responsibility of an individual not the whole
team; and it tends to view performance evaluation as a separate activity instead of an
integrated activity within the CIR life cycle. However, it is reasonable to assume that the
management of the performance evaluation activities will be coordinated by an individual.
This individual will be referred to as: “computer security incident response performance
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officer (CSIRPO)”. For simplicity, it is assumed here that the CSIRPO is a CSIRT member
other than the CSIRT leader.

Main responsibilities
 Propose PE system for CSIRP and oversee all relevant planning activities
 Monitor CSIRT performance during incident handling and provide
briefings to CSIRT leadership
 Supervise performance metric development by technical teams
 Collaborate with Quality Officers for quality assurance, enforcement of
policies and continuous performance enhancement
 Submit final PE report with recommendations
Interact with Higher Management to

Collaborates with Quality Office to

 Define PE Goals & Aspects
 Approve CSIRPE model
 Approve PE Analysis Results and
recommendations

 Align CSIRPE with the
organization quality system
 Approve PIs
 Ensure quality assurance
 Enforce quality measures

Collaborates with CSIRT leadership
 CSIRP planning & budgeting
 CSIRT meetings during incident
handling
 Preparing post-media briefing

Works with Technical Teams
 Verify developed PMs
 Collect proper PM measurement
 Review sub-teams and individual
performance

Figure 18: CSIR Performance Officer Responsibilities

The CSIRPO collaborates with four main bodies within an organization: the CSIRT
leadership, the higher management, the quality office and technical teams. A summary of
main responsibilities of CSIRPO is outlined in Figure 18, and a collaboration chart is
presented in Figure 19.
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Management

CSIRT
Leadership

Technical
Teams

Quality Office

Define PE Goals
Define PE Aspects
Define Performance Indicators
Derive PMs

Validate & Review PE Model
Approve PE Model
Integrate to
CSIRP
Collect
Measurements
Brief Reporting

Monitor PE
Review Team &
Individual PE

Conduct PE
Analysis
Review PE Report
Approve PE recommendations
Update CSIRP

Figure 19: Collaboration Chart for CSIRPO and other officers

There are some basic features that should be satisfied with whoever is to be selected
for the “performance officer” role. A list of these features is provided in Table 32. In small
CSIRTs, the performance officer can be the same as the leader of the core CSIRT, while
in larger CSIRTs, it can be one of the sub-teams leaders. In both scenarios, the performance
officer is not hired for the sole purposes of performance evaluation, as it would be more
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practical and cost-effective to assign that role to an existing CSIRT member who would
have other tasks related to incident handling.
Feature

Rationale

1

Understands the organization’s To design PE framework that is aligned
quality assurance policies and with the organization’s quality assurance
procedures
system

2

Understands the management To properly delegate tasks among the
structure of the CSIRT
CSIRT members, avoid redundancies, and
avoid conflict of powers

3

Participates in the preparation or To be able to integrate PE within the CSIR
review of the CSIRP
documentation and implementation

4

Values the need for PE within Viewing PE as an additional unnecessary
CSIR
burden is detrimental to having an effective
design and inspiring team members

5

Has some leadership role within To be empowered to recommend, and if
the CSIRT
necessary to enforce, changes

6

Has basic understanding of the To help design effective performance
technical aspects of CSIR
metrics that have practical impact
Table 32: Desired Qualifications of the Performance Officer (CSIRPO)

3.6.3 Integrating CSIRPE into CSIRP
The method of integrating a CSIRPIE module into a CSIRP depends on two factors:
the type of CSIRP and the type of CSIRPE. As discussed in Section 2.1.4, a CSIRP can be
design to reflect the organizational perspective, to be action-oriented, to facilitate
maintainability or use a mixture of the three approaches. The selection of the document
structure will influence how CSIRPE will be embedded in the document. Also, the
complexity of the developed CSIRPE module will influence the level of details that will
be presented in the CSIRP.
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Transcending these variances, any CSIRP for a CSIR capability that uses a PE
module need to at least include the following five elements:
1- A list of PE goals/objectives that outline how a CSIRPE is expected to serve
the mission and the organizational goals
2- How does the CSIRPE relate to the overall quality framework of the
organization?
3- A higher-level description of the CSIRPE module and its components
4- Which aspects of the CSIR system will be subject to evaluation?
5- What are the key performance indicators?
There are two basic questions on how the above five points combined with the other details
of the CSIRPE need to be presented in the CSIRP:
1- Should the CSIRPE be presented in a separate section in the CSIRP, or should
its details be integrated across the existing sections?
2- Which information should be presented in the basic CSIR document, and which
details should be compiled in a separate appendix?
Answering the above two questions requires drawing a balance between making
clear presentation of the objectives and mechanisms of performance evaluation, and
making sure that this information does not distract a reader from the understanding the
main CSIR components. For instance, it is expected that details about performance metrics
and analysis and validation techniques would be put in an appendix.
In Table 33, a checklist for information that needs to be included in a CSIRP,
whether in the basic document or in the appendices, is presented. The checklist can be used
for updating an existing list or as a guideline when preparing a new one.
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#

Checklist Item

1

Does the CSIRP has a listing of the PE goals or a description why CSIRPE is
used?

2

Does the CSIRP has a summary of the CSIRPE module?

3

Does the CSIRP describe how the CSIRPE fits into the organization’s quality
framework?

4

Does the CSIRT structure include a CSIRPO? If not does the document assign a
primary owner for PE?

5

Does the CSIRP describe which aspects of CSIR would be subject to
performance evaluation?

6

Does the CSIRP outline the performance indicators and identifies the KPIs?

7

Does the CSIRP has formal definition of all PIs and PMs?

8

Are the PIs aligned to goals, and PMs aligned to PIs?

9

Does the CSIRP outline when PM readings should be collected and analyzed
(i.e. functional model)?

10

Does the CSIRP include a section about the analysis techniques that will be used
to analyze the PM results?

11

Does the CSIRP outline a mechanism for validating performance analysis
results?

12

Does the CSIRP outline when and how PE results will be reported?

13

Does the CSIRP outline mechanisms for documenting and maintaining PE
results?

14

Does the section on the review phase of the CSIR life cycle include PE analysis
in the lessons learnt and the enhancement process?
Table 33: Checklist for CSIRPE integration into a CSIRP
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CHAPTER FOUR

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

The objective of this chapter is to formulate a list of performance indicators (PIs)
that CSIRTs can apply to measure performance and generate performance metrics. Because
organizations define their goals in various ways, it is practically difficult to generate a
confined list of performance indicators that is applicable to all environments. Therefore,
this chapter focuses on developing performance indicators that measure the major CSIR
activities and are more likely to be applicable to a “conventional” CSIR environments.
The PIs presented in this chapter were selected through the following criteria:
1- Provide a broad coverage of the CSIR activities, by generating enough PIs that
correspond to each phase of the CSIR cycle. Several PIs are also presented to
measure the overall performance.
2- Satisfy the major CSIR requirements set by the NIST standard [1] and the
CERT document [2]
3- Satisfy the incident response requirements set by the National Response
Framework (NRF) [110] and National Incident Management System (NIMS)
[109]
4- Capture the major recommendations of works that investigated some aspects of
CSIR effectiveness like [61] [74] [9] [97] [52]
For each performance indicator, a definition is proposed that is relevant to how
CSIRTs operate. A classification of the PI is provided based on its scope. This is followed
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by a brief summary of design and interpretation considerations for using the PIs. An
example or two is provided concerning possible performance metrics that can be derived
from each PI.
The chapter is composed of three sections. The first section discusses methods of
classifying CSIR PIs. The second section inspects guidelines of how an organization should
select its PIs from the provided list. The last section, which composes most of the chapter
content lists provides the definition and detailed information about fifty PIs. The list of PIs
is ordered alphabetically.

4.1 Classifying Performance Indicators
Four possible classification schemes could be used to categorize CSIR performance
indicators. The first scheme considers the value of the PI to the organizational goals by
distinguishing Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) from regular PIs. This scheme was
discussed in Section 3.4.4 and is integrated in the framework design. However, this scheme
is contextual and PIs will be classified differently depending on where there are deployed.
The second scheme considers the measurement method, i.e. qualitative or
quantitative. Despite the wide use of this scheme, it is incompatible with the design of the
proposed framework. It is suitable for frameworks that treat PIs and PMs interchangeably;
while this project treats PIs as a higher level measurement tool from which PMs will be
derived. Performance Indicators are designed to be generic such that various tools could
be used to measure it, which can be qualitative or quantitative or contain a collection of
both. Therefore, both the first and second approaches are not appropriate for a general
classification of PIs that is neutral to the environment.
The third approaches considers the scope of the PI. Performance indicators can be
classified as generic or specific. Generic PIs focus on the overall performance of the CSIR
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system, while specific PIs introspect a specific performance component of the system. A
general method to identify these specific components is to map it to the CSIR life-cycle.
Using this perspective and using A2.1, specific PIs can be further broken into the following
categories: [preparation, identification, containment, eradication & recovery, analysis].
Note that PIs concerning the “analysis” category can be considered as PIs for measuring
the effectiveness of CSIR performance frameworks, which is not the focus of this project.
Therefore, developing “analysis PIs” is limited for the purposes of this project.
The fourth categorization scheme is derived from the discussion of S.6 about
viewing performance in terms of CSIRP or CSIRT. A performance indicator can inspects
the CSIR design and preparation, i.e. activities before the occurrence of an incident. These
PIs are classified as CSIRP PIs, because the CSIRP is the main reference for readiness. On
the other hand, PIs that inspect the execution of a CSIRP can be considered CSIRT PIs.
These performance indicators are mainly interested in measuring performance during the
incident handling.
Different methods for categorizing PIs are possible to develop. For example, the
CSIR Balanced Scorecard model presented in Section 5.3. can be used to classify PIs based
on the stakeholder perspective. However, the classification of PIs in this chapter will be
limited to the third and fourth schemes due to their simplicity and potential applicability to
a wide range of CSIRTs.
Finally, the above classification schemes should not be treated as hard
classification techniques. The schemes are considered soft as there is a large intersection
between various categories. Therefore, categories will be selected based on the relevance
strength whenever there is an intersection.
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4.2 Selecting Performance Indicators
Out of the large pool of PIs presented in the following section, a CSIRT would
eventually settle on a small selection of PIs. This suggests that there needs to be guidelines
on how many and which PIs to select.
It is noted in [135] that having a small number of metrics has been proven to provide
practical advantages, as it is difficult to focus on more than five to seven indicators at the
same time. However, the authors note that this applies to PIs focusing on strategy, while
PIs focusing on process can be in hundreds. The NIST document on information security
performance measurement suggests using ten to twenty metrics [189]. The threshold of
twenty is also endorsed by [190].
Selecting which performance indicators to use depend on multiple factors, like:
1- CSIRPE Specifications: The specifications of the developed CSIRPE module
impact the selection of PIs, as some PIs might be incompatible or infeasible to
measure. For instance, a CSIRPE that relies on quantitative measures (D.7 =
“Quantitative) will exclude all PIs that cannot be measured quantitatively.
Another example is when a CSIRPE is scoped to measuring the execution
effectiveness (D.8 = “CSIRT”) is not fit to use PIs that are classified under the
“preparation” category.
2- CSIRT Structure: For instance, using the sufficiency PI is incompatible with a
distributed CSIRT that relies on external entities. Also, a small size CSIRT, e.g.
composed of two or three individuals, might not be best to implement PIs
concerning communication and team dynamics.
3- CSIR Goals: The goals of the CSIR, outlined in a CSIRP, determines areas of
CSIR that are of high importance to each specific CSIRT. For example, a
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CSIRT order to pay high attention to the protection of classified data would be
interested in using PIs like Confidentiality, Containment Effectiveness, and
Shielding Effectives; compared to a CSIRT that focus on ensuring the
availability of digital resources which may be more interested in PIs like:
Availability and Continuity. Some PIs are only applicable to special situations like
attacking host identification which only applies to when prosecution is needed.

4- PI Interdependency: As a general rule, in order to make reasonable assessment,
the analysis need to read results of several PIs at the same time [7]. This is due
to the fact that PIs demonstrate high interdependency, in which performing well
accordingly to one PI would normally result in performing well according to
other
To expand on the above last point about PI interdependency, it is noticed that PIs relate to
each other in the following ways:
1- Inclusive: a PI can be generic such that several PIs are considered its
subcategories. For instance, The Containment Effectiveness PI includes the
following PIs: Confinement Effectiveness, Shielding Effectiveness and
Mitigation Effectiveness.
2- Complementary: Several PIs can measure components of a specific aspect. For
instance, the Comprehensiveness and Completeness PIs measure different
aspects of CSIRP effectiveness. However, both PIs compositely constitute the
overall effectiveness of the plan, and thus are better to be analyzed together.
3- Contentious: some indicators attempt to measure aspects of performance that
are tension with other PE aspects. For instance, the Conformance and Flexibility
PIs demonstrate opposite objectives.
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4- Influence: Some PIs influence the results of other PIs. For instance,
Containment Effectiveness impacts the Stability PI. Another example, detection
effectiveness PI impact the result of containment effectiveness.
5- Exclusive: The situation in which PIs are independent of each other, and could
be analyzed separately. For example, the consistency PI is exclusive to the
Availability PI.
From the above discussion, I agree with the recommendation of selecting few, i.e.
ten or less, performance indicators. However, these indicators should be considered the key
performance indicators (KPIs) that focus on the main PE aspects as defined by the
designated CSIRT. At the same time, several other PIs can be used for the purposes of
enhancing performance and improving the functionalities of the CSIR as needed. These
PIs can be used as needed, and can be consigned to sub-teams in the CSIRT to evaluate
their own activities.
With regards to which PIs to select, a CSIRT would start by selecting PIs that are
exclusive to each other. Then, based on the defined goals, outlined PE aspects the team
expand by adding PIs that are relevant to each other depending on the needs. For instance,
a CSIRT that have just prepared a CSIRP might use several PIs that measure the
effectiveness of the plan. These PIs can be used for the following years until the plan and
its update procedures has reached a maturity state. If the team later finds out, for example,
that the detection phase is ineffective, then several PIs under the category of
“Detection/Identification” could be introduced.
In summary, a CSIRT needs to have static and dynamic list of PIs. The static list
constitutes of few generic KPIs that offer comprehensive assessment of the CSIR
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capability. On the other hand, the dynamic list constitutes of PIs that are deployed for
several used based on the enhancement requirements of the CSIR.

4.3 CSIR Performance Indicators
Accuracy

PI.1.

Definition
Category

The proximity of predictions and estimations made by the CSIRT
during incident handling to actual or reasonable range of values
validated post-incident
Identification

CSIRT

This PI measures the effectiveness of the CSIRT’s decision making
capability under uncertain conditions
There are two domains for measuring accuracy:
1- Accuracy of estimations made during the incident response
to measures validated during post-incident analysis
2- Accuracy of predictions prior-to-incident with actual events
during the incident
The first domain is the main focus of the Accuracy PI as the second
domain is more concerned with preparedness PIs.
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

When deriving PMs from this PI, there are two methods to define
accuracy:
1- Compare against actual values (e.g. incident classification)
2- Compare against a reasonable range of values (e.g.
estimation of number of compromised records – it is
difficult to get exact number at the early stages of the
response).
Another consideration when defining accuracy PMs,
1- Does the PM measure level of proximity (i.e. how far from
actual values), or
2- Was acceptable accuracy achieved (e.g. was the
classification accurate? Yes or No)

PM Examples
Relevant PIs

Let incident severity be classified in the range: [𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , … , 𝑆𝑛 ]
Accuracy of incident classification = | 𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 − 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 |
Identification Effectiveness
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Adaptability

PI.2.
Definition

The ability of the CSIR capability to effectively adjust to the change
of needs or to changes of incident circumstances

Category

Generic

CSIRT

For meaningful application of this PI, the environment should be
dynamic (i.e. contains several non-static factors).

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

When designing adaptability PMs, the following two design factors
need to be considered:
1- Does the PM considers adaptability to predicted conditions,
unpredicted conditions, or both?
2- What is being measured? Is it the adaptability inputs (e.g.
member training), the adjustment process (e.g. how did the
team adjust), or both
When analyzing adaptability PMs:
- It is more reasonable to record the ability of the team to
adjust to a list of changes more than attempting to measure
the “degree of adjustment”
- Is failure to adapt a result of poor preparation or inability to
adjust to some other factors?
Prior to defining adaptability PMs several descriptive PMs need to
be defined with regards to adaptability dimensions and levels. For
example,


PM Examples



adaptability to scalability changes (e.g. [100, 1000,
10,000] infected hosts)
adaptability to incident dimensions (e.g. [incident
severity, incident scale, incident type])

Adaptability PMs would measure differences or ratios along
multiple adaptability scales [191].
For measuring individual ability to adapt in changing
environments see [192]
Relevant PIs
PI.3.
Definition

Flexibility, scalability, survivability
Attacking Host Identification (AHI)
The ability of the CSIRT to accurately identify the attacking host(s)
in a timely manner
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Category

Analysis

CSIRT

It is a desirable outcome of incident handling to identify the
attacking host. However, as indicated by NIST [1] this should not
be the focus of responders.
Examples of situations that require using this PI:
- The incident results in request for legal investigation
- The technical requirements for recovery or containment
procedures require identifying the attacking host
- The incident is targeting government data or assets,
especially critical infrastructure.
Ability to identify attacking hosts is an indicator of good detection
and analysis capabilities of the CSIRT, but the reverse is not
necessarily true
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

This PI is applicable when root-cause analysis is used. However, it
only measures a specific aspect of root cause analysis, not the
effectiveness of the whole analysis process. For example, the root
cause of an incident can be determined to be a DDoS and resolving
the issue does not require knowing much about the identity of the
attacking host. However, legal prosecution requires more specific
details
To measure effectiveness of the attacking host identification:
1- Level of data collected (e.g. does the data identify the
perpetuators? Does the data allow for legal prosecution? Is
there information about associated individuals/groups?
2- Is the information accurate? (how much confidence does the
analysis provide?)
3- Is it done in a timely fashion? (data is provided when it was
needed, e.g. when making media release or court
testimony).
4- Was the identification process cost effective?
AHI confidence:

PM Examples

Relevant PIs

a probability is calculated about the confidence of results of AHI
process, based on collected facts. For instance, if the attacker is
confirmed to be from a specific subnet that contains 10 hosts, then
the probability of each is 0.1. (Note: A CSIRT needs to present
facts, not make judgements. The first is objective and the second
is subjective).
Root-Cause Identification
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Availability

PI.4.
Definition
Category

The ability of a CSIR to conduct a response that prevents and
minimizes the unavailability of service-providing resources
Eradication & Recovery

CSIRT

The above definition considers a CSIRT’s ability to protect
availability. The above PI can be redefined to mean the
availability of the CSIRT itself. Such definition would make the
PI a sub-category for the reliability, capacity and preparedness PIs

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

This PI is more generic than the continuity PI. For instance,
business continuity can still be achieved with the unavailability of
some resources.
Unavailability can be either due to the incident itself, or to a
decision taken by the CSIR for prevention or remedial purposes.
Performance metrics need to distinguish between the two.
Availability is normally measured by time percentages. However,
it is more reasonable to couple that with business outputs, e.g.
number of customers, loss [193]
Several levels of availability can be defined based on factors like
quality of service or number of users
availability =

PM Examples

Relevant PIs

𝐴𝑆𝑇−𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑆𝑇

AST= agreed service time, DT = down time ( see ITIL v3 [194]
[195])
Survivability, Continuity
Capacity

PI.5.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

× 100

The boundaries of the CSIR system that define the maximum
potential outcomes and quality for the offered services
Preparation

CSIRP

The above definition need not be confused with how the term is
used in some CSIR publications which used “incident response
capacity” and “incident response capability” interchangeably [60]
[31] [136].
It is desirable to have high system capacity as it reflects good
preparation and grants higher confidence in the response system.
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High capacity systems are also expected to offer faster responses
and more adaptability to incident changes. It was practically proven
that offering effective and efficient response requires sufficient
capacity [111]
The Capacity PI is mainly defined in terms of descriptive metrics,
which can be mapped to performance metrics.
Some benefits for using capacity PMs include
1- Recognizing when the IR system reaches its maximum
capacity. In such case, seeking additional or external
support is necessary
2- It can be used in developing preventive measures. For
example, if networks are working under near maximum
capacity, then the likelihood of a successful DoS is high. [1]
Some of the factors that could be used in defining capacity PMs:
1- number and availability of responders and support staff
2- Competency and readiness of responders
3- Type and number of equipment and software
4- Type and quality of CSIR offered services.
Some limiting factors to capacity include jurisdictions, budget and
company size.
Example 1: Defining maximum response capacity (𝑅𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) in
terms of reliability probability is explained in [103]

PM Examples

Relevant PIs
PI.6.
Definition
Category

Example 2 [111] [109]:
1- Identify CSIR resources
2- Record the capacity of each resource
3- Identify CSIR services
4- Map each service to the resources
5- The capacity of each service is the minimum capacity of the
associated resources
Preparedness, Utilization, Scalability, flexibility
Communication Effectiveness
The ability of the CSIRT to establish communication links that
enable efficient transmission of data
Generic

CSIRT
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Communication effectiveness can be assessed from the following
different angles. Note that the above definition emphasizes the first
two, but it could be re-defined as appropriate:
1- Are there established communication links and what is their
reliability?
2- How much resources and overhead does the
communications cost?
3- What is the impact of CSIR communications on incident
handling decisions and actions
4- What is the value of the content of communications in terms
of correctness and being timely?

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Some features of effective communication:
1- Accessible: to all those involved or affected by the incident
[110]
2- Coordinated: enables different responders to learn about
updates and taken actions throughout the CSIR life cycle
3- Low Redundancy: no unnecessary repeated messages are
exchanged
4- Resilient: withstand and continue to perform after damage
absence of resources
5- Low Overhead: messages provide concise content that
serves the purpose of the communication exchange.
6- Confidentiality: observed whenever required
Although low redundancy is a desirable feature, this should not be
confused with the need to establish alternative or back-up methods
of communication as a measure of preparedness [109]
Communication effectiveness might be impacted by the level of
trust established between various parties [136] it also may be
impacted by the level of competency [79]
The assessment of communication effectiveness can focus on intercommunication between CSIRT members, intra-communication
with constituencies within the organization, and communicating
with external agencies and/or the public

PM Examples

The following report discusses some generic metrics for assessing
communication effectiveness in incident response [196]. Examples
include: financial investment in communications capabilities,
capacity of mass notification, frequency of updating contacts and
communication links, and compliance with communication
requirements (e.g. encryption).
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Several works suggest the need to test and assess the
communication between those responsible for patch management
and the CSIRT. See [74] [1].
Relevant PIs

Partnership Effectiveness, Team Cohesion
Competency

PI.7.
Definition
Category

The sufficient mastery of the knowledge, skills and abilities
needed to perform CSIR tasks. (adapted from [61]).
Preparation

CSIRT

The difference between competency and readiness:
- Competency: focuses on knowing in terms of technical
information and necessary skills
- Readiness: focuses on applying the acquired knowledge and
skills

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Competency could be defined in terms of competency levels. For
instance:
1- Minimum competency [74]: knowledge and skills for
performing basic CSIR activities
2- Quality competency: needed to perform diverse CSIR
activities with quality outputs
3- Advanced Competency: needed to perform advanced and
complex CSIR activities
CSIRT members need not only be competent with current practices
and tools, but also with new technologies, potential threats and
trending solutions.
There are several scales for competency. For instance:
- Individual vs. Team: Is the team as a whole competent as
well as each individual?
- Technical vs. non-Technical: Do all CSIRT technical and
non-technical members (e.g. support teams) demonstrate
competency

PM Examples

Continuous Professional Development [7]: What type and how
frequent are CSIRT members offered professional development
programs?
See the CERT publication “Competency Lifecycle Roadmap:
Toward Performance Readiness” [61]

Relevant PIs

Readiness, Preparedness
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Competitiveness

PI.8.
Definition
Category

The ability of a CSIRT to deliver services in a quality level similar
to, or higher than, the quality level offered by its peers
Generic

CSIRT/CSIRP

This PI offers a mechanism for comparing the performance of the
team to that of its peers.
Competitiveness can use:
1- Absolute measures: comparing performance against
expected quality as defined by standards and best industry
practices
2- Relative measures: comparing performance against
performance of other peer institutions over similar incidents
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

In business settings, this PI is normally measured in terms of
financial metrics [197]. However, for CSIRTs this should focus on
effectiveness metrics
This indicator is best used when benchmarking is adopted as an
analysis method
Using this PI helps an organization Identify performance areas
which are potential for enhancement
Using this PI requires minimum normalization at two levels:
1- Institutional Level: a CSIRT is compared to one of similar
size and capability,
2- Incident level: comparison is performed over incidents of
similar category

PM Examples

Depends on which areas are selected for peer-comparison

Relevant PIs

Compliance, Conformance

PI.9.
Definition
Category
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Completeness (of CSIRP)
Preparing a CSIRP that addresses all essential aspects of incident
handling in terms of policies, procedures and support.
Preparation

CSIRP

Completeness is an indicator for preparedness and readiness
For each IR activity, there needs to be some outlined policies or
procedures for handling, and how and where to seek support
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A CSIRP does not necessary need to have pre-prepared solutions.
it only needs to have instructions on how to approach all
possibilities
There are two time frames for measuring completeness:
- Prior-IR Completeness: can be assessed over the
completion of all of the planned activities produced in the
design phase.
- Post-IR completeness: if during incident handling the
CSIRT is faced with a procedural issue that has no
guidance in the CSIRP then it is a sign of incompleteness.
Completeness has another two dimensions: the completeness of
the documentation of incident handling and the completeness of
performance analysis
CSIRP completeness is integrated into the NFP Unpredictability
platform presented in Section 5.5
Prior-IR completeness:
PM Examples

-

Break a CSIRP into components
Translate each component into actions needed for
completion
Define completion status levels or percentage scale for
completion
Assess the completion of each activity and
validate/approve by higher management

See the list of metrics outlined in [74]
Relevant PIs

Comprehensiveness, Preparedness, Readiness
Compliance

PI.10.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The degree of conformance of CSIR processes and procedures to
standards and regulatory specifications
Generic

CSIRP

CSIR Compliance has three aspects:
1- Ensuring that the outlined CSIR processes and procedures
of the CSIRP is in conformance with CSIR standards
2- Ensuring that an incident handling is in conformance with
(non-CSIR) legal and organizational standards and
regulatory policies
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3- Ensuring that CSIR is in compliance with organizational
policies
There are no formal CSIR standards. However, awaiting formal
standardization, the NIST [1], CERT [2] or SANS [30]
documentations can be treated as standards.
Examples of government and industrial standards that a CSIR might
need to comply with include: ISO 27001 on Information technology
and security [198] and the Health Privacy Rules (HIPAA) [199]
PM Examples

Compliance can be confirmed through certifications or external
auditing

Relevant PIs

Conformance

PI.11.
Definition
Category

[CSIRP] Comprehensiveness
Issuing a CSIRP that outlines procedures for all categories of
incidents
Preparation

CSIRP

Having a CSIRP that is capable of handling the various types of
incidents is a sign of preparedness.
The PIs Comprehensiveness and Completeness are complementary
to each other. The comprehensiveness PI ensures that the CSIRP is
applicable to a wide spectrum of incidents; while completeness
ensures that there are detailed procedures for handling the defined
spectrum of incidents.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The term Comprehensiveness alternatively can be used to refer to
the performing of comprehensive performance analysis. See the
Documentation Effectiveness PI.
Due to the variance and the continuous emerging nature of security
incidents, it is impossible to outline handling details for every
possible incident, Therefore, procedures should be outlined for
every group of similar incidents.
To achieve comprehensiveness, a “comprehensive” classification
scheme is needed, i.e. is capable of mapping an incident to a predefined category of incidents, which in turn are associated with
handling procedures.
The incident classification scheme may differ depending on the
business sector (e.g. incidents in health sector can use distinct
incident classification from financial institutions). For
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classification of cyber incidents from the perspective of educational
institutions see [200] and for nuclear agencies perspective see [79].
Whenever an incident cannot be classified under the defined
categories, a procedure should be outlined in a CSIRP on how the
incident should be handled.

PM Examples

Comprehensiveness can be measured through exhaustive testing or
simulation for different categories of incidents. For instance, the
DHS NCCIC cyber security incident scoring system [201]could be
used. A CSIRP need to contain enough information on how to
handle each incident level.

Relevant PIs

Completeness, Documentation Effectiveness
Confidentiality

PI.12.
Definition
Category

The ability of the team to secure and maintain the confidentiality of
the data in the system during incident handling
Generic

CSIRP/CSIRT

The above definition points to three aspects of confidentiality.
When defining this PI in a specific environment, the designers need
to specify which points are considered:
1- The CSIRT preventing confidentiality compromise after incident
detection
2- The CSIRT mitigating and minimizing confidentiality
compromise impacts
3- Conducting a response that conforms with the confidentiality
policies

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The usage of this PI presumes that an information security
assessment was conducted in which:
1- Digital data that needs to be retained confidential are
identified
2- The confidentiality level of each data is defined
3- Security policies are implemented to maintain the
confidentiality of the data.
Confidentiality metrics could be defined using:
1- Security metrics used in the CIA model
2- Requirements set by privacy laws
3- Liabilities defined in contracts
4- Information security standard compliance requirements
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PM Examples

Root privilege count metric proposed in [190] can be adapted to
measure how many root privileges were compromised, restored or
modified during the response. The above metric provides an
indication for potential level of compromise to confidentiality.

Relevant PIs

Availability

PI.13.

Definition
Category

Confinement Effectiveness
The ability of a CSIRT to identify and isolate infected portions of a
system and to prevent the negative impacts of the incident of
spreading to the healthy portions
Containment

CSIRT

This PI is similar to the containment effectiveness PI; however, this
PI is focused on preventing the spread, while containment is more
generic and involves reducing harm and preventing escalation

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Ineffective confinement can indicate:
1- Poor identification mechanisms for infected areas
2- Poor isolation mechanisms
3- Flaws in the security architecture, e.g. too many
dependencies or inconsistencies.
4- Team incompetency
This PI is applicable when the infected parts of the system has been
identified. Therefore, inputs from the identification phase would
impact measurements of PMs derived from this PI.
To measure confinement, it should be clearly defined how infected
vs non-infected portions are identified. In that direction, it is
possible to define levels of confinement depending the level of
infection dripping to the healthy portions.
Confinement Strength Metric (CSM):

PM Examples

1- Divide the system into “confinement zones”. The smallest
zone (Z1) contain all portions confirmed to be infected. The
largest zone (Zn) contain the entire system. The remaining
zones are associated with probabilities of infection.
2- Define infection levels through characteristics of the threat,
in which fully infected is denoted by (Fn) and non-infected
is denoted by (F0).
3- A scoring table is to be developed over the values of Z and
F. The highest score would indicate the least likely parts of
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the healthy portion getting fully infected. The lowest score
would indicate the highly vulnerable parts getting the lowest
level of infection.
4- Assuming that CSM = 1 means full strength, i.e. proper
conferment; CSM is defined as 1 minus the score obtained
from the scoring table defined in step 3. Higher values of
CSM indicate relatively good confinement, while lower
CSM values indicate poor confinement.
Relevant PIs

Containment Effectiveness, Shielding Effectiveness
Conformance

PI.14.
Definition
Category

The ability of a CSIRT to execute a response that abides by the
outlined procedures and processes in a CSIRP
Generic

CSIRT/CSIRP

In an ideal scenario, a comprehensive and complete CSIRP is
sufficient to guide responses to any incident. However, building
such CSIRP is practically difficult, expensive and sometimes
infeasible. This indicator targets both the effectiveness of execution
and effectiveness of the CSIRP design

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Nonconformance could indicate:
1- Failure or poor performance from the CSIRT
2- Incorrect or inconsistent CSIRP design
3- Incomplete CSIRP design and poor planning
4- None of the above (i.e. it was to not conform, e.g. decision
by higher management to overcome a policy or procedure)
Conformance can extend to cover other procedures and policies
followed in the organization, not only the CSIRP.
Measuring conformance is only meaningful when requirements are
defined. These requirements can be security or quality
requirements.
An organization can decide for zero tolerance for nonconformity or
define a range of tolerance for nonconformity
Since conformance is too generic, the definition of this PI can be
scaled down to conformance to requirements that impact CSIR
performance.
It is best to interpret this PI along with the flexibility PI, as both
PIs are contentious.
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PM Examples

Relevant PIs

The degree of conformance can be applied to some aspects like
timetables. A PM would provide the difference between actual
time and scheduled time
A qualitative measure in the form of a checklist that assess the
degree of conformance (e.g. minor, major and critical
nonconformance). See ISO 9001 [202] and ISO 27001 [203].
Compliance
Consistency

PI.15.
Definition
Category

The ability of a CSIR to follow consistent procedures for
detection, analysis and reporting of incidents [109]
Generic

CSIRP

Consistency is a desirable feature of CSIR because it reflects good
design, enables comparative analysis and facilitates identifying
performance obstacles.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The CERT document considers consistency essential for CSIR [70]
and several works echo the need for consistency in security metrics
[123].
It remains challenging of how to ensure consistency in qualitative
and subjective measurements [78]
Automation is an effective tool for enhancing consistency [145]
Consistency domains can be classified as:
1- consistency of procedures (e.g. detection methods)
2- consistency of measurements (e.g. collection methods)
3- consistency of reporting and notification

PM Examples

Designing quantitative PMs for consistency is non-trivial. Most
common methods use a qualitative method of using a checklist that
verifies that a specific procedure or data representation is consistent
with the response or quality requirements

Relevant PIs

Conformance, compliance

PI.16.
Definition

Containment Effectiveness
The ability of a CSIRT to effectively prevent an incident from
spreading, escalating, or causing further damage after its detection
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Category

Containment

CSIRT

This PI can be considered the highest-level indicator for the
containment phase. The PIs: Mitigation effectiveness,
confinement effectiveness and shielding effectiveness are special
of this PI.
Containment effectiveness strongly impacts incident stability.
Therefore, both PIs should be read together.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Measuring containment effectiveness is sensitive to accuracy of
and effectiveness of the identification / detection processes.
Therefore, usage of multiple identification techniques is
recommended before starting the containment process [1].
Examples of factors that contribute to containment effectiveness
include:
1- Containment time
2- Containment/mitigation rate/level
3- Containment cost
4- Degree of harm reduction (quantification of how much
harm is saved through applied containment procedures)
5- Containment robustness (maintain effectiveness despite
change of circumstances)
The above factors can be defined over a spectrum of containment
levels, e.g. partially contained and fully contained.

PM Examples

See containment factor defined in Section 5.1.3.

Relevant PIs

Confinement effectiveness, shielding effectiveness, mitigation
effectiveness, Stability

PI.17.
Definition
Category
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Continuity Maintenance
The ability of a CSIRT to execute a response that maintains
business continuity
Generic

CSIRP/CSIRT

The CERT document considers business continuity and disaster
recovery planning as one of the services that a CSIR offers under
the category of security quality management [2]
Maintaining business continuity is a joint task between the CSIRT
and business continuity planning team. [131]. Therefore, the
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integration and communication between the two teams need to be
effective [70] [198].
This PI is especially relevant to incidents that involve denial of
service (DoS) attacks [1]
One of the common mechanisms used to ensure business continuity
during incident handling is called application whitelisting in which
safe applications are permitted to run and all other applications are
blocked [56].
It is important that maintaining business continuity does not result
in loss of digital evidence [204].
PM Examples

Impact of business continuity management on breach cost [4]

Relevant PIs

Availability, Survivability

PI.18.

Definition
Category

Coordination Effectiveness
The ability of various security and support teams in an organization
to collaboratively execute a response that uses effective
communication and reporting and efficient allocation of resources
Generic

CSIRP/CSIRT

There are various levels of coordination [31]:
1- Coordination among CSIRT sub-teams
2- Coordination between CSIRT and security teams in the
organization
3- Coordination between CSIRT and support teams, e.g.
logistics and human resources
4- Coordination between CSIRT and management, e.g.
executives
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Coordination must occur throughout the phases of the CSIR life
cycle [74]
Elements of effective coordination:
1- Leadership, i.e. every task has a leading team to avoid
duplication of efforts [2]
2- Centralized point for information dissemination [167]
3- Proper management of task interdependencies [104]
4- Effective communication
Preparedness contributes to better coordination among different
teams [109]
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PM Examples

A qualitative analysis of the CSIR system that involves inspecting
1- Acknowledgement of shared goals and objectives
2- task ownership (are there tasks with no owners? Are there
duplicate owners for the same task)
3- task process associated with sub-outcomes.

Relevant PIs

Partnership Effectiveness, Communication Effectiveness, Team
Cohesion
[Response] Cost

PI.19.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Amount of financial resources dedicated to responding to an
incident
Generic

CSIRP/CSIRT

CSIR Costs can be classified into four categories:
1- CSIR Cost: Fixed Costs associated with establishing,
maintaining and operating a CSIR
2- Response Cost: Costs endured due to incident handling
including detection, containment and recovery
3- Incident Cost: Financial loss due to the incident
4- Incident Maintenance Cost: financial resources needed to
implement post- incident recommendations
Although it is desirable to minimize response cost, this should not
be on the expense of effective response. Other indicators like cost
effectiveness strike that balance
Cost can be actual or estimated (e.g. when averages are used)
Incident Cost estimation proposed by [205]:
incident_cost = non_productive_cost + response_cost
non_productive_cost = U*hup*V*DT
response_cost = A*hap*V*RT

PM Examples

U = number of affected users,
A = number of responders
hup = average user’s page,
hap average responder pay
DT = hours of downtime,
RT = response time
V= overhead cost (vary from company to another)
For another incident cost estimation scheme see: [200]

Relevant PIs

Cost Effectiveness
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Cost Effectiveness

PI.20.
Definition
Category

The degree at which the CSIR capability was able to save on costs
while achieving the same quality of outcomes [206]
Generic

CSIRP/CSIRT

This PI strikes a balance between the organizational need to
decrease costs and the need to fulfill CSIRT quality requirements
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Cost can be compared to latest cost, average cost, or average cost
obtained from a benchmark
In order for cost calculation to be meaningful, cost needs to be
compared to similar incidents in terms of severity level and
delivered quality service level

PM Examples

Cost Saving per data record = V - L/N
N = number of compromised records
L = total loss due to data breach
V = average loss per record due to data breach
(benchmark value obtained from [4])

Relevant PIs

Response Cost

PI.21.
Definition
Category

Detection effectiveness
The ability of a CSIR to accurately detect incidents in a timely
manner.
Identification

CSIRP

The two main elements of detection effectiveness are:
1- Accurate identification of the incident (distinguish
between events and incidents) and classify it under the
correct severity scale
2- Detecting the incident in a timely manner
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Other factors that could be used in defining detection effectiveness
include:
1- Intelligence capacity
2- Detection cost
3- Incident classification method
4- Mechanism to distinguish between incident precursors
(incident might happen in the future) and incident
indicators (incident has occurred or is occurring) [1]
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For the purposes of using this PI, incidents can be classified based
on their detection complexity. An example of such classification
is:
1- Detectable attacks: attacks known to the CSIRT and
relevant procedures are defined in the CSIRP
2- Resolvable attacks: attacks undefined in the CSIRP, but
solutions are available by consulting external entities.
3- Zero-day attacks [56]: Attacks are unknown to the CSIRT
and no solutions exist yet.

PM Examples

For precise measurement of detection time, the metrics defined by
the VERIS project can be used [73]:
1 First malicious action time (FMAT): Beginning of the
threat actor's malicious actions against the victim. Initial
compromise time : First point at which a security attribute
(C/P, I/A, A/U) of an information asset was compromised.
2 Data exfiltration time(DAT): First point at which nonpublic data was taken from the victim environment. Only
applicable to data compromise events.
3 Incident discovery time(IDT): When the organization
first learned the incident had occurred.
Detection time = IDT - FMAT

Relevant PIs

PI.22.

Definition
Category

Containment effectiveness, intelligence capacity.
Documentation Effectiveness
The ability of a CSIRT to provide consistent post-incident
documentation that is comprehensive and provides effective
traceability.
Analysis

CSIRT

This is a generic PI that can encompass several PIs like
comprehensiveness, consistency and traceability.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Documentation comprehensiveness can be defined by:
1- Breadth: There is documentation for each activity taken
during incident handling [31].
2- Depth: There are detailed information recorded for each of
the incident handling activities
3- Coverage: documentation is not limited to technical steps.
It includes support and secondary activities like legal,
financial and media [7].
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Consistency in documentation contributes to better traceability
and allows for comparability and trend analysis
Traceability is the ability to quickly access the documented data
when needed.
Other factors that contribute to documentation effectiveness:
1234-

Clarity
Simplicity
Accessibility
Conciseness (providing summaries for executives)

Note that the above definition does not consider correctness as a
factor for effectiveness. It is not required that all documented data
be correct because there is a need to document mistakes and
wrong decisions and actions for quality purposes.

PM Examples

There are several metrics developed by the Association of Clinical
Documentation Improvement Specialists [207] that could be
borrowed by CSIR. Examples include: review rate, query rate (e.g.
number of queries before getting the right information) and
quality/revenue impact.

Relevant PIs

Consistency, Comprehensiveness, Traceability

PI.23.

Definition
Category

[Response] Effectiveness
A generic indicator about the CSIRT’s ability to achieve its desired
objectives and to reduce harm in a manner that is timely and uses
minimum number of resources
Generic

CSIRT/CSIRP

The above definition considers efficiency to be part of effectiveness
(See: Section 1.4.2), but a CSIRT may choose to separate the two.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

In the CSIR context, there are four factors that determine if a
specific activity was “effective”
1- Success level of achieving a goal/objective
2- Amount of used resources (financial and nonfinancial)
3- Response Time
4- Level/amount of reduced harm
Response effectiveness can also a collective indicator of the
effectiveness of the various CSIR phases, i.e.:
1- Preparedness Effectiveness
2- Identification effectiveness
225

3- Containment Effectiveness
4- Eradication/Recovery Effectiveness
5- Analysis Effectiveness
PM Examples

Not Applicable

Relevant PIs

Goal Achievement, Response Time, Response Cost

PI.24.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Eradication Effectiveness
The ability of a CSIR to eliminate the key components of the
incident with speed and precision. (adapted from [29])
Recovery & Eradication

CSIRT

An effective eradication process involves:
1- Fully deactivating the active components of the
attack/incident
2- Remedying the system and fixing the vulnerabilities that
were exploited
3- Removing the remnants of the incident that may cause the
incident to reoccur.
4- Conducting the above with speed and precision [92]
Not all incidents would require distinct steps for eradication, as
the steps might be included in the recovery [1]. An example is
unauthorized access due to password obtained through social
engineering.
The two most common actions in eradication are patching
vulnerabilities and disabling malware code (part of malware
analysis processes [208]).
Since eradication processes are OS and application-specific,
designing PMs that are applicable across incidents is not feasible.

PM Examples

An example of a PM for eradication that involves vulnerability
fixing is the patch dissemination speed discussed in [209].
Scalability and Accuracy are common PMs for measuring the
effectiveness of malware analysis techniques [210].

Relevant PIs

Recovery Effectiveness, Mitigation Effectiveness
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PI.25.
Definition
Category

Evidence Retention Effectiveness
The ability to extract and retain digital evidence according to the
CSIR objectives
Analysis

CSIRT/CSIRP

Not only digital evidence is preserved for prosecution purposes, but
also for conducting internal intelligence analysis.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

An “effective” evidence retention is one that is:
1- Cost effective: use least amount of resources
2- Authentic (legal effectiveness): the digital evidence
demonstrates authenticity through following proper
procedures
3- Timely: availability of digital evidence data when needed
4- Redundant: ensures that redundancy policies are followed
to make several backups of evidence [15].
The NIST document (page 41) suggests two metrics for measuring
evidence retention effectiveness:

PM Examples

Data Retention Length: For how long is data (e.g. emails) are stored
in the storage devices (e.g. 180 days)
Storage cost: cost of storage devices and media used for storing
evidence.

Relevant PIs

Forensics Readiness, Intelligence Capacity
Flexibility

PI.26.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The ability of a CSIR system in terms of capacity and readiness to
address and adjust to the variations in in incident conditions
Generic

CSIRP

The flexibility PI is a higher-level indicator that includes the
following three PIs:
1- adaptability
2- scalability
3- capacity (i.e. high capacity)
The dynamic nature of CSIR environments makes flexibility a
necessity (CERT [2])
Elements of flexibility include:
1- Flexible policies and procedures [2]
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2- Adaptive performance of CSIRT members [97]
3- The ability to expand and scale [111]
4- Ability to handle any type and scale of incident [109]
5- Ability to carry proactive and reactive measures
Flexibilities can be mapped to uncertainties, as each uncertainty
requires a specific flexibility [211].
Since flexibility deals with future uncertainty, then it cannot be
measured accurately and approximation methods need to be used

PM Examples

A plan need to be tested/simulated for flexibility. The testing need
to test flexibility at the micro-level (changing specific conditions
of an incident) and at the macro-level (changing major conditions
of the CSIR system). Qualitative assessment by experts can be
used to report on the CSIRP’s flexibility.

Relevant PIs

Adaptability, Scalability, Capacity

PI.27.

Forensics Readiness

Definition

The ability to conduct forensics investigations and extract digital
evidence in a cost effective manner. (Adapted from [204])

Category

Generic/Identification/Analysis

CSIRT

This PI is defined in a manner to include all forensics activities.
However, it can be broken done to several PIs. The “Evidence
Retention Effectiveness” PI is derived from this PI but with more
focus on evidence maintenance. This PI also intersects with the
“intelligence capacity” PI when applying forensics techniques to
extract intelligence information and artifact intelligence sharing
[50].
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Elements of forensics readiness:
1- The capacity to perform forensics investigations
2- The competency to perform forensics activities
3- The ability to extract and retain digital evidence
4- Determine attacking host and incident root-causes
5- Interaction with law enforcement and legal teams
The benefits of having forensics readiness include: minimizing the
cost of investigation, blocking attempts to cover internal malicious
activities and reducing regulatory and legal disclosure costs [212].

PM Examples

Metrics for various aspects of forensics readiness can be found in
the following works:
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1- For measuring the relevance of intelligence data to forensics
readiness see the framework presented in [186]
2- Cost-benefit analysis techniques for forensics activities are
studied in [213]
3- Value of digital evidence extracted from the cloud [214]
Relevant PIs

Intelligence Capacity, Evidence Retention Effectiveness
Goal Achievement

PI.28.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

A higher level and generic indicator about the extent of a CSIR’s
achievement of its outlined goals.
Generic

CSIRP/CSIRT

Goals here refer to CSIR goals that are derived from the
organization’s mission
Achievement can be measured in several methods like:
achievement percentage, threshold surpass, subjective assessment
(e.g. surveys), or collective analysis (e.g. cost of achieving multiple
goals).

PM Examples

The CERT publication of [19] provides a platform for evaluating
the higher level objectives of CSIR related to the organization’s
mission. The goals are investigated through assessment surveys
focusing on mission drivers. Drivers are identified as factors that
have strong influence on achieving a mission.

Relevant PIs

Response effectiveness
Harm Reduction

PI.29.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The ability to reduce or eliminate harm and side-effects of an
incident after its discovery
Generic

CSIRT

Harm endured due to incidents is normally measured in dollars or
lives. In the context of CSIR it is normally the former (i.e. dollars)
Estimating harm has similarities to estimating risk. However, risk
assessment is more generic. Thus estimating harm can be a viewed
as a focused analysis of risk assessment taking the particulars of a
specific incident. In addition, risk assessment is performed prior to
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the occurrence of incidents, while harm reduction measurement is
done post incident.
To fully quantify the damage of an incident is a challenging task, as
highlighted in Chapter 2. However, works like [200] provide
practical evidence that producing good approximations is possible.
Calculating how much a response was successful in decreasing
harm needs three major estimations:

PM Examples

1- How much actual loss was endured due to the incident (Li)
2- What is the worst scenario of the damage that would have
resulted from the incident (Lmax)
3- Had the CSIRT not responded, how much additional
damage would have resulted? (Lavoided = Lmax – Li)
To calculate (Lmax), simple risk assessment techniques that use
multiplicative metrics of probability of events by the expected loss
[190] can be used.
The quantification of harm can be done through loss of revenue,
loss of reputation and insurance deductibles [215]

Relevant PIs
PI.30.

Definition
Category

Response Cost
Intelligence Capacity
The ability of a CSIR capability to collect and analyze intelligence
information about current and potential vulnerabilities and
breaches in a manner that supports and enhances incident handling
Detection/Containment

CSIRP

An intelligence capability of a CSIRT can be divided into two
categories:
1- Intelligence gathering and collection capability
2- Intelligence analytics capability.
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Intelligence collection can be from external sources (e.g. public
alerts, information sharing, other CSIRTs) or from internal
sources (e.g. information gathered from internal networks).
Intelligence analysis provides responders with situational
awareness. It aims at knowing motivation, tactics and disruption
methods used by attackers [29].
An intelligence capability will also involve how a CSIRT some of
its intelligence information with other external agencies,
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government or business [74]. Therefore, this metric could be
linked to partnership effectiveness.
Part of intelligence analysis includes artifact intelligence done
through forensics analysis [186].
According to a recent SANS survey [8], only one third of business
implement intelligence gathering and analysis techniques.
Value of intelligence information can be qualitatively measured
through several factors [24]:

PM Examples

1- Robustness level of information assurance (IA)
2- Controls allocated to the protection of collected
information like: mission criticality, sensitivity and
releasability and perishability.
3- Potential impact of loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or
availability of information
A metric for measuring capacity of intelligence gathering is
membership with intelligence gathering communities/groups [7].
For example: REN-ISAC for educational and research information
[216] and infraGrad for sharing information between FBI and
private sector [217].

Relevant PIs

Partnership Effectiveness, Intelligence Capacity, Attacking host
Identification
Mitigation Effectiveness

PI.31.
Definition

The ability to execute ongoing and sustained actions to reduce the
probability of, or lessen the impact of, an incident [183]

Category

Containment

CSIRT

Mitigation is a higher level indicator that includes confinement/
containment and eradication see NIST [1] and NIMS [109]. Some
works, include recovery processes in mitigation recovery [79]
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Mitigation is mainly concerned with actual threats, but it can also
be used for potential risks [19] [24] [25]
Mitigation strategies can be developed from analysis of incident
data or from advisory/alert data [31] .
Actions in the mitigation process include:
-

Applying threat/risk reducing controls
Applying countermeasures to the security violation
Neutralizing the propagation of the incident
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-

-

PM Examples

Changing/updating the security infrastructures, e.g.
updating firewall filters, IDS signatures, and installing
patches [74]
The ability to do the above through assistance of
automated software [1]

The DHS publication [162] called researchers to develop baseline
measurements for the fraction of infected machines at any
moment. Mitigation can be measured through the reduction over
time.
The absolute/relative risk estimate metric [183] is used to compare
the cost of a risk to the cost of mitigating it.

Relevant PIs

PI.32.
Definition

Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Confinement Effectiveness, Containment Effectiveness, Harm
Reduction, Eradication Effectiveness
Partnership Effectiveness
The extent a CSIRT builds associations with external bodies to
exchange information and achieve common goals to serve the CSIR
objectives
Generic

CSIRP

The CERT document [2] defines the following types of
Partnerships:
1- Education or training
2- Out-of-hours coverage
3- Technical expertise
4- Cooperative work
5- Other opinions
6- Point of contact to other teams or experts
Partnerships can also be established for project-based objectives,
for sharing of information, or for long sustainable relationships.
Any assessment should distinguish between these three types.
Although assessment of partnership effectiveness can be performed
by one of the parties, it is better to be collaboratively performed by
all partners involved.
Assessments of this PI would either focus on evaluating the level of
achievement of the agreed upon goals or measure the gap between
the intended and actual level of participation.
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A list of metrics for measuring partnership effectiveness for
educational institutes are found in [218]. These metrics are generic
and can be applied to CSIR.
PM Examples

Relevant PIs

For assessing partnership that involves information sharing, the
following metrics could be used [2]:
1- Confidentiality and secrecy
2- Appropriate use
3- Disclosure
4- Proper acknowledgements
Preparedness, coordination effectiveness
Preparedness

PI.33.
Definition

Category

A generic PI that encompasses CSIR activities performed before
the occurrence of incidents which contribute to readiness,
competency and efficient allocation of resources.
Preparation

CSIRP

Preparedness is the most effective tool to avoiding the risk of
cybersecurity incidents and minimizing their negative impact on the
business and information security [14].

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Elements of preparedness include:
1- Approving a complete and comprehensive CSIRP
2- Deployment of detection and intelligence mechanisms
3- Availability of software and hardware for containment,
analysis and recovery
4- Allocation of fiscal resources
5- Establishing partnerships with external agencies
6- Coordination between various internal bodies of the
organization
7- Ensuring the competency and readiness of the CSIRT
members
8- Adopting procedures for continuous enhancement and
professional development
9- Providing communication channels and situational
awareness mechanisms
Signs of unpreparedness include:
1- Instability of the response
2- Incapacity to respond
3- Facing frequent “surprises” during incident handling
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PM Examples

The DHS publication of [103]
preparedness of CSIR

Relevant PIs

Capacity, Competency, Completeness, Comprehensiveness,
Readiness, Flexibility, Reliability, Forensic Readiness, Partnership
Effectiveness

PI.34.
Definition
Category

is dedicated to measuring the

Response Public Impact
The ability to conduct a response that receives positive response
from the public.
Generic

CSIRT

Not all incidents have “public” considerations. Some incidents are
completely private to the organization with no impact to external
entities.
The term ‘public’ should be clearly defined. It could be simply
defined to include all individuals/entities that are not part of the
organization. Alternatively, it could be defined to include all those
not participating in the decision making processes related to the
incident handling (in this case, employees can be considered part of
the public – this intersects with the Constituency Satisfaction PI).

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Measuring the public impact is challenging, but there several
qualitative and quantitative measures that could collectively
indicate how the public perceived the response:
1- Media coverage: positive and negative.
2- Post-incident surveys analyzed against pre-incident surveys
3- Letters/emails to the organization
4- Value of the shares in the stock market
5- Post-incident sales compared to sales during similar seasons
of previous years
6- Customer retention.
A response that is considerate of the public would do some or all of
the following:
1- Communicates with the public and responds to concerns
2- Demonstrates transparency in communication
3- Shows that the organization cares about the public concerns
(e.g. leak of private data) as much as it cares for the
organization’s reputation and financial status.
4- Maintains the established trust with various partners and
clients
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5- Demonstrates compliance to best incident response
procedures.
Sometimes a team could have executed an effective response, but
the public perceive it otherwise. This indicator should help in
analyzing factors that contribute to such unfortunate incident sideeffect.
Since all incidents come with undesirable consequences, it is
expected that all incidents will be associated with some negative
reception from the public. Therefore, it is better to focus on
measuring the extent of this negative consequence compared to
“how well” did the public perceive the response.
PM Examples

Customer satisfaction post-incident survey results compared to
results obtained from pre-incident surveys.

Relevant PIs

Constituency Satisfaction, Harm Reduction, Communication
Effectiveness, Transparency, Response Cost
Readiness

PI.35.
Definition
Category

The ability to apply a set of competencies to execute CSIR tasks
(Definition adapted from [219] and [61])
Preparation

CSIRP/CSIRT

Readiness and Preparedness are used interchangeably in most
publications. The distinction is made in compliance with DHS
terminology [219] [110] and other works like [29]
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Competency ensures understanding the tasks while readiness
ensures the ability to carry out the tasks.
Measuring readiness can be broken to measuring two main subtasks [61]:
1- Evaluate whether a specific task can be performed as
required
2- Evaluate whether competencies can be appropriately
applied to tasks

PM Examples

See readiness assessment methods outlined in [61].

Relevant PIs

Preparedness
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PI.36.
Definition

Recovery Effectiveness
The ability of a CSIRT to executes a response that fully recovers
the affected systems in a quick and cost effective fashion.
Recovery means restoring the system/environment to its state
before the occurrence of the incident but with the addition of
preventive measures that disallow the incident from re-occurring.
Recovery of affected systems can take long time. Therefore, it is
better to divide the recovery process into phases. The phase that
restores the basic operations should be “quick” while full recovery
should be thorough and intrusive to ensure that all incident impacts
are removed.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The technical aspect of recovery includes the following:
1- removing the malicious components of the incident and
conducting a thorough scan for remnants of the system (this
intersects with eradication)
2- Restoring the system from backups and conducting a clean
re-building of the environment.
3- Applying measures to prevent the incident from reoccurring (e.g. installing new equipment, vulnerability
patching, enforcing new policies ..etc.)
4- Conducting the above steps in quick and cost effective
manner.
Measuring recovery effectiveness can be divided into several steps
each focusing on a separate activity of the above.
A recovery process may include monitoring the system for a period
of time for re-infection [140] [79].
Measuring the effectiveness of recovery effectiveness can be
conducted as a separate activity or as part of evaluating the
effectiveness of implementing the business recovery plan [74].
The restoration process can be measured as per the availability of a
resource or per the availability of a service.
The metric recovery_time.

PM Examples

The start of the time period could be:
 The time of incident declaration or discovery
 The start of the eradication/recovery phase
The end of the time period could be:
 The time the system is declared fully restored
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Relevant PIs

The time the system is fully restored and passed the reinfection monitoring process

Eradication effectiveness, Mitigation effectiveness
Reliability

PI.37.
Definition
Category

The capacity of a CSIRT to operate in failure free mode
Preparation

CSIRP/CSIRT

Failures in the domain of CSIR can appear due to unavailability or
incompetency
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The study of reliability includes the CSIRT members, tools,
machines, support and other services.
Should focus on critical aspects of the system whose
absence/failure leads to failure of the whole CSIR system
As reliability is normally expressed in probabilities, some aspects
of the system can tolerate 97% reliability but others need to be
fully reliable
If there are [x1 , x2 , … , xn] critical tools need for a successful IR,
with probability of failure: [p1 , p2 , … , pn]

PM Examples

Then the reliability of the tools is: 1- max [p1 , p2 , … , pn]
For a comprehensive study on how to measure reliability of
incident response see [103] and for fault-tree analysis for
reliability see [183].

Relevant PIs

Survivability
Response Time

PI.38.
Definition
Category
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The ability of a CSIRT to carry out CSIR activities in a quick
manner
Generic

CSIRT

Almost all incident response time use response time performance
metrics. Having a shorter response time is a generic sign of good
performance. It may also demonstrate a sign of security maturity
[220]
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Response time can be used as a method for ensuring quality
requirements are met. For example, it could be validated postincident if response time to offering a specific CSIR service
exceeded the promised value [2].
Since response time is critical, a CSIR needs to identify activities
that could be performed offline, i.e. not during incident handling.
Response time can also be geared towards some security services
or hardware/software metrics [83]
Response time may vary from incident to incident for several
factors like [1]:
1- Type of incident
2- Incident Severity
3- Existing service level agreements (SLA)
4- Criticality of resources involved.
Because of the diversity of the above conditions/factors, response
time needs to be analyzed taking into considerations the totality of
the incident. It is better to read it along with other PIs to formulate
a correct representation of the response performance.
The VERIS project a list of response time metrics, like the first
compromise time, discovery time and containment/restoration time
[73].

PM Examples

The containment/restoration time (P4_RT) which measures the
time span of the fourth phase in the CSIR cycle, can be broken into
several time slots. The total time is a summative metric.
P4_RT = CT + PRT + FRT
CT = containment time
PRT = partial recovery time
FRT = full recovery time

Relevant PIs
PI.39.
Definition
Category
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Response Effectiveness, Goal Achievement

Robustness
The ability of the CSIR capability to deliver the same level of QoS
throughout various incidents and under various circumstances
Generic/Preparedness

CSIRT

There are various definitions of robustness. The above definition
considers the aspect not included in the definitions of other PIs.
Examples of other usages of the term:
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1- Robustness is defined in terms of reliability and
correctness [24].
2- Robustness of response is a synonym to response
effectiveness [221]
3- Robustness is defined in terms of flexibility, i.e. ability to
adapt to unplanned activities [211].
4- Robustness is defined in terms of stability and ability to
react to erroneous inputs to the system [155].

PM Examples

Comparative metrics that measure the delivered incident response
quality of service across incidents. This could be used through
metrics of other PIs like stability and flexibility.

Relevant PIs

Stability, Flexibility, Adaptability

PI.40.
Definition
Category

Root-Cause Identification
The ability to successfully identify the factors that cause the
incident to occur .
Identification / Analysis

CSIRT

Although it is not always necessary for the incident’s root-cause to
be known to executive effective handling, to be frequently unable
to determine the causes is a sign of poor analysis capability [92].
An incident may have a single or multiple root-causes, each can
be direct or indirect

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Knowing the root-cause can help in:
1- Guide the organization where to invest and allocate
resources to prevent and mitigate future incidents [4].
2- Decide if the incident involves criminal activity and hence
reporting to law enforcement and legal teams
3- Develop solutions to eliminate the root-cause [19]
The root-cause can be:
1- Poor infrastructure or lack of resources
2- Poor defense mechanisms
3- Improper on-going process or policy [79]
4- Inadequate design of service objectives or levels [82]
5- Human error or unaviodable factors
Trend analysis is an effective mechanism for identifying rootcauses [74]
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PM Examples

The following while paper [222] proposes four metric for
measuring the effectiveness of root-cause analysis:
1- Does the event exceed the triggers for failures
2- Completeness of implementation of corrective actions
3- Meeting the success measure for implementing corrective
actions
4- Net return on investment for using root-cause analysis

Relevant PIs

Attacking Host Identification

PI.41.
Definition
Category

[Constituency] Satisfaction
The satisfaction degree of CSIR constituencies on responses
conducted by a CSIRT
Generic

CSIRT

Constituency satisfaction can be used in one of two ways:
1- Estimating the impact of an incident on its constituencies
[200].
2- Measuring constituency consent on executed response
Emphasizing “customer” satisfaction over “conformance” is a
characteristic of Total Quality Management (TQM) [39]

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Although satisfaction is an indicator for overall quality level of
performance [223], the results can be misleading. For example,
results will be impacted by the level provided to the surveyed
individuals, transparency of the CSIR process and the design of the
survey form. Therefore, I recommend not relying only on survey
tools unless it is supported with validation schemes.
There needs to be a careful process for identifying constituencies
and grouping them.
The use of this indicator should be coupled with an analysis process
to identify factors that lead to dissatisfaction of the constituencies.
Satisfaction could be measured for individual incidents and over
multiple incidents

PM Examples

The most common method for measuring satisfaction is through
surveys and questionnaires

Relevant PIs

Goal Achievement, Harm Reduction
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Scalability

PI.42.
Definition

The ability of a CSIRT to deliver service, maintain service quality,
or increase capacity in response to incident escalation

Category

Identification

CSIRP

Scalability could be measured in terms of system outputs, inputs
or both.
Scalability is correlated to how incident escalation is defined, e.g.
incident size, severity, cost …etc.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Scalability can appear as [224]:
1- Scaling up: enhancing current resources
2- Scaling out: adding more resources
There are three types of scalability:
1- Ability to respond despite the quality dimensioning
proportional to incident escalation.
2- Ability to maintain delivered quality despite incident
escalation
3- Ability to effectively increase the capacity of the response
system
Descriptive metrics need to be used to define scalability zones or
levels [225].

PM Examples

For type 1: Use two thresholds: maximum capacity and minimum
acceptable quality level. Then use a binary metric to evaluate if
the CSIRT is prepared to respond within that boundary. This
should be validated post-incident.
For type 3: Introduce metrics that measure how the change from
one capacity level to another is done effectively. Examples:
upgrade time and cost effectiveness
For using stress testing for measuring the scalability of software
and security tools see [226]

Relevant PIs

PI.43.
Definition
Category

Capacity
Shielding (Protecting Critical Assets) Effectiveness
The ability of a CSIRT to protect uninfected critical resources and
assets from the impacts of an incident
Containment

CSIRP
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Shielding effectiveness as defined above is related to containment
effectiveness PI, but is different in two aspects:
1- It is focused on critical assets, while containment is generic
to all assets
2- It is mainly proactive measures, while containment is
mainly reactive
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

A critical resource/asset could be infected or uninfected.
If infected:
1- Isolate the resource in order not to infect other resources
2- Mitigate and minimize damage
3- Execute quick and effective eradication and recovery
If uninfected:
1- Shield the resource to prevent infection
2- Ensure continuity of functionality
interruption

with

minimum

A matrix with the list of critical resources over the CIA
requirements (confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) could be
constructed. The grid is filled with timestamps about when each
asset is declared “protected”.
PM Examples

PM metrics are constructed to provide analysis over the grid. For
example, time to declare all assets available, number of records
protected.
The above metrics could be coupled with confidence ratings, e.g.
fully protected, partially protected, unprotected.
Also, a scale for the level of “criticality” of the asset could be
assigned.

Relevant PIs

Containment Effectiveness, mitigation effectiveness, confinement
effectiveness
Stability

PI.44.
Definition
Category
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The ability of a CSIRT to prevent an incident from unexpected
escalation and to maintain the response in a controllable state
Identification

CSIRT

This PI detects scenarios when the response reaches non-stable
states. Analysis of the results can help the team develop solutions
that enable future stable response.
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Instability, as defined above, can, but not limited to, appear in two
forms:
1- Unexpected escalation
2- Reaching non-controllable state
There needs to be prior definition of what constitute “unexpected
escalation”. For instance, sf an incident is forecasted to escalate and
the CSIRT develops a response that takes that into consideration,
then this does not reflect instability. On the other hand, the
unavailability of a staff or a resource (which could have been
avoided by better preparedness) can cause a sudden escalation
which complicates the response procedures.
There needs to be metrics or precursors to identify when a response
is considered “uncontrollable” like high variety in the incident
severity, contradicting decisions, unreasonable expenditure …etc.
The main activities that impact stability are the actions taken right
after incident declaration, i.e. the end of the detection phase and
during the containment phase. Therefore, the stability PI is strongly
related to the Containment Effectiveness PI, but the two are not
identical. An incident could be stable but the containment
procedures are ineffective, and vice versa.
PM Examples

A metric that measures the variance of the incident classification
during the response life cycle. See Section 5.1.1.

Relevant PIs

Containment Effectiveness, Detection Effectiveness, Accuracy

PI.45.
Definition
Category

Sufficiency [or Self-Reliance]
The ability of a CSIR to execute a response without seeking
external assistance.
Generic / Preparation

CSIRT

A CSIR that demonstrates sufficiency is an indicator for
competency, reliability and good capacity
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Assistance and support to the CSIR can come from internal support
teams or from external entities. The internal teams are considered
secondary assets to the CSIR; therefore using them is not a sign of
poor performance. However, seeking external assistance “might”
indicate poor preparedness.
Not all external assistance indicate insufficiency. For example,
exchange of information between entities is genetic to the work of
CSIR. Assistance from law enforcement might also be necessary.
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Therefore, insufficiency should be defined in terms of technical and
logistical support that could have been prevented through proper
prior planning
Insufficiency can result from:
1- Insufficient competency and staff training
2- Insufficient tools and instruments
3- Insufficient planning budget
4- Insufficient support services

PM Examples

A simple binary qualitative metric can be used by asking: “did the
team seek external assistance”. This can be broken into several subquestions each corresponding to a component of the response cycle.
This helps identify areas in the CSIR that might require
enhancement.
Insufficiency can be quantized by measuring the impact of external
assistance on the success of the incident handling. One possible
method to do this is through finding the ratio between the cost of
external assistance to the overall incident response cost.

Relevant PIs

Capacity, Reliability, Competency
Survivability

PI.46.
Definition

The ability of a CSIR capability to preserve essential services in the
system despite the presence of compromise (adapted from [227])

Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Generic

CSIRT

The above definition considers survivability as a special case of the
availability PI. Availability is more general and focuses on offering
service, while survivability focuses on completing a mission or
ensuring that a specific system cycle is not interrupted. Also,
availability can be defined based on quality levels, while
survivability focus on availability of a resource while offering the
minimum acceptable QoS.
Aspects of the system that need to survive need to be identified, like
network connection, database access, and some critical assets.
Another dimension of survivability is the ability of the CSIRT to
complete its own mission during incidents [162].

PM Examples

Tools for measuring network survivability during compromising
incidents are outlined in [227]

Relevant PIs

Reliability
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Team Cohesion

PI.47.
Definition

Category

Ability of a CSIRT to execute a response in which every team
member effectively collaborate with the rest of the team to achieve
the outlined goals (adapted from [228])
Generic

CSIRT

Depending on the nature of the CSIRT, cohesion can be defined
between individuals, i.e. team members [97], or through
organizations [109].

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

There are three PIs that focus on evaluating the effectiveness of how
various parties collaborate to achieve the CSIR goals. The Team
Cohesion PI focuses on members of the CSIRT, the Coordination
Effectiveness PI focuses on the various groups within the
organization and the Partnership Effectiveness PI focuses on
collaborations with external entities.
Factors in which team cohesion could be defined through [228]
[97]:
 Members attraction to the team/group (feeling proud to be
part of the team)
 Trust between team members
 Communication between parties
 Interaction inside and outside assigned tasks.
Team cohesion evolves over time, so measurement should be done
over a relatively long period of time.

PM Examples

A qualitative approach of conducting surveys or interviews with
team members to measure cohesion in multidimensional fashion:
(see [228])

Relevant PIs

Communication Effectiveness, Coordination Effectiveness,
Partnership Effectiveness

PI.48.
Definition
Category

Traceability (Documentation Effectiveness)
The ability of a CSIR to document its actions in a manner that
permits accessible reachability to their sources
Analysis

CSIRP
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This PI measures one aspect of the analysis phase effectiveness,
namely the documentation and reporting.

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

Benefits of having good traceability include:
1- Provides means for validation and verification of data and
analysis results.
2- Saves the team’s time during incident handling by
reaching to relevant data in a timely manner
3- Gives opportunity to easily use/apply holistic and trend
analysis techniques
4- Facilitates demonstrating compliance
Aspects of CSIR traceability include:
1- Traceability from measurements back to the goals [78]
2- Traceability from actions back to policies (ISO 27001
[198])
3- Traceability from analysis results back to data
4- Data provenance, i.e. source of information [24]
5- Trace performance problems and failures to their sources
[135]
6- Traceability of digital evidence through forensics
processes [204]
7- Traceability of actions/decisions to individuals

PM Examples

A metric can be developed to count the number of broken links
from the source to the source. In situations when data is linked
directly to its source, a simple count over number of searches can
demonstrate overall traceability. In situations that involve multiple
links from source to destination, the distance needs to be measured
from the broken link to the source and to the origin.

Relevant PIs

Documentation Effectiveness
Transparency

PI.49.
Definition
Category
Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

The feature of conducting CSIR activities, reporting results and
disseminating incident information in honesty and openings.
Analysis

CSIRP

Some benefits of having transparent incident response:
1- Contributes to CSIR sustainability [178]
2- Minimizes the probability of surprises and enhances risk
assessment [183]
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3- Establishes trust between various parties, especially external
bodies [51]
4- Provides means for validation and verification
5- Better customer/constituency satisfaction

Elements of transparency:
1- Transparency in definitions of authority and autonomy [51]
2- Transparency in sharing of information [81]
3- Transparency in data collection and analysis methodologies
4- Transparency in assessment of risks and caused damage
In the above definition, “honesty” means reflecting what actually
happened. This leads to transparency being contentious with the
need for confidentiality. Balance can be reached by outlining in a
CSIRP what information is to be exchanged and how.
The transparency and consistency PIs are related to each other, as
enhancing one normally leads to enhancing the other.
Assessing transparency would require assessing the level of
disclosure, accuracy and clarity

PM Examples

The following study [229] suggests using the following four
metrics for measuring transparency in the context of
organizational management (which can be customized to CSIR):
1- Involvement
2- Feedback
3- Level of details
4- Ease of finding information

Relevant PIs

Consistency, Communication Effectiveness, Accuracy,
Traceability, Documentation Effectiveness
Utilization

PI.50.
Definition
Category

Design &
Interpretation
Considerations

A generic indicator concerning the degree at which a specific CSIR
resource or service is used against its capacity.
Generic

CSIRT

High utilization of resources can lead to better response time [149],
indicate better resource allocation and management, and make more
cost-effective responses.
Reaching full utilization is an indicator of reaching system capacity
which can possibly cause performance bottlenecks.
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Utilization is an indicator for measuring the effectiveness of the
response process not the outcomes [230].
Some resources are “used-as-needed”. Under-utilization of these
resources is not an indicator of poor performance, especially if the
unavailability of this resource is critical to CSIR incident handling
Utilization is also applicable to how responder time and experience
is being applied [15]. Good utilization would be reflected in
assigning tasks to responders with the proper experience.
Backup_utilization (BU) = ABT / BC


PM Examples

backup_capacity (BC): total time (in minutes) needed to
backup the full system using full utilization of resources
 actual_backup_time (ABT): actual time (in minutes)
consumed for backuping the full system during incident
handling
The BU metric is applicable whenever the recovery process
requires backing-up the full system before applying new updates,
e.g. vulnerability patches.
PM2: Average team member utilization (ATMU):

𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑈 =

∑𝑁
𝑖=1 ℎ𝑖
∑𝑁
𝑗=1 𝐻𝑗

N = total number of CSIRT members
Hx = Available hours of member x
hx = actual hours of member x used in incident handling
Relevant PIs

Cost Effectiveness
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CHAPTER FIVE

FRAMEWORK SUBCOMPONENTS

This chapter builds on the proposed PE framework presented in Chapter 3 by
providing a variety of models and methodologies with more emphasis on implementation
considerations. Several concepts which were presented in an abstract form in the previous
chapter are investigated in this chapter for their potential operational characteristics. The
detailed practical aspects presented herein complement the higher level design concepts
presented beforehand. However, the themes of generality and flexibility are maintained to
allow deriving a diverse range of implementations that suit various environments.
The chapter presents five modules. The first module is a comprehensive theoretical
framework for building performance evaluation systems for CSIR. The second module is
an integrated model for analyzing and validating performance evaluation results. The third
module presents a multi-perspective stakeholder analysis of CSIR. The fourth and fifth
models address the challenges of CSIR complexity and unpredictability.

5.1 The Universal PE Framework (CSIR-UPEF)
The Universal Performance Evaluation Framework (UPEF) is proposed as a
CSIRPE framework that encompasses all of the desirable features of various frameworks.
It is an idealistic super-framework that outperforms all other CSIRPE frameworks. It is
also the most generic in the sense that all CSIRPE frameworks can be derived from it.
The main feature of UPEF is that it is capable of effectively and accurately
assessing the performance of any CSIR. The UPEF is unboundedly scalable, has
unrestricted access to resources and can be deployed to any CSIRT, environment or
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incident. It also conducts comprehensive assessment, produces accurate measurements,
and uses a comprehensive list of performance analysis technique, performance indicators
and performance metrics. A list of all of the desired features of the UPEF is provided in
Table 34.
#

Feature

Description

CSIRT Type

Can be used to evaluate any type of CSIRT, e.g.
centralized, distributed, coordinated or customized

D.2

Evaluator Type

The framework is equally equipped to be used by any
type of evaluator (e.g. self-evaluation by CSIRT,
internal auditors, or external auditors)

D.3

Number of Incidents

Can be used to analyze performance to a single
instance of incident handling or to a collection of
incident handling instances

D.4

Incident
Concurrency

Can be used to evaluate performance of response to
incident occurring simultaneously or in spaced
intervals.

D.6

Benchmarking

It can be interfaced with any internal or external
benchmark

D.8

CSIRP Scope

Measures both the effectiveness of the CSIRP design
and the performance of the CSIRT

A1.1

CSIR Environment

Can be used unrestrictedly in any environment

A1.2

Team Structure

Can be used to evaluate a CSIRT composed of any
number of members

A1.3

Incident Complexity

Can evaluate response to incidents of any degree of
complexity

F.4

Functional Model

Contains performance monitoring capabilities, is
able to provide partial results at any instance of the
incident cycle, and produces comprehensive analysis
at the end of the incident

S.5

CSIRPE Overhead

It involves no overhead in the collection of PMs and
analysis results are produced instantly with no postincident overhead. Also, there is no overhead

D.1
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imposed on the team to design or maintain the
CSIRPE.
PI.x

Performance
Indicators

Has the capability to use and produce results for all
PIs defined in Section 4.3.

PI.1

Accuracy

Provides measurements in optimal accuracy, i.e. full
precision
Table 34: Features of the Universal PE Framework (UPEF)

The UPEF is theoretical, i.e. unrealistic to implement. However, it is an effective
design and analytical tool for understanding and evaluating the performance of CSIRTs.
The author found the UPEF to be useful in developing several components of the CSIRPE
framework proposed in this dissertation, due to the complexity nature of the problem.
Below is a brief discussion of how UPEF could be used in the design and analysis of
CSIRPE frameworks.
The idealistic approach of the UPEF can be mapped to one of the methodologies
used for understanding and developing security metrics through idealistic analysis [162].
For instance, in [190] seven idealistic dimensions of security were used to derive security
metrics. These dimensions include perfect knowledge of the system, and the attacker
knowing nothing about the control system, the system has no vulnerabilities and the
security team is capable of instantly detecting an attack and restoring the system. These
dimensions are then used to derive operational metrics, or real world measures of these
ideals. The UPEF adopts a similar approach.
There are several advantages for the conceptualization of UPEF.
Framework Generator:
Since UPEF provides the most theoretically generic CSIRPE framework, all other
frameworks could be generated from it. While developing the CSIRPE framework of this
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project, I found that there were two theoretical approaches to conceptualizing and defining
CSIRPE frameworks.
The first approach is to build a very simplistic model and gradually add parameters
to expand the model. Any simplistic model is expected to be unrealistic as it will fail to
capture the complex parameters of the problem. The careful expansion of the model
through realistic considerations should eventually lead to partial capturing of some
practical performance aspects of the system. This approach views performance bottom-up,
i.e. starting from measuring system components to the overall performance.
The main advantage of the simplistic approach is its practicality. Most organizations need
to start their performance systems small and then grow. It also seems to be the most
commonly used approach in the works focusing on measuring security. Indeed, the SAC
Complexity model proposed in Section 0 suggests using this approach due to its
practicality.
However, the reductionist nature of the approach raises concerns about the validity
of measurements and most importantly its practicality [93] [34], which is a counter result
to the initial goal. In addition, from the design perspective, in order to build a simplistic
model the designers need to generate a long list of assumptions. Since the CSIR
environment is very complex, it is very easy to overlook some parameters which might be
necessary for producing meaningful performance analysis.
The second approach starts from unrestricted and unbounded framework and
gradually add delimiters to bring it from the theoretical to the practical domain. It is a topdown approach that focuses on the overall system performance down to the system
components’ performance. It is appealing to higher managers who are interested in
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strategic planning and generic performance indicators. It is also appealing to researchers
who endeavor to study the various aspects of the complex CSIR system.
The UPEF adopts the second approach which suits the concept of developing
general frameworks compared to specific models. Each of the UPEF features defined in
Table 34, when modified, can be used to generate a different type of CSIRPE framework.
CSIRPE Design Tool:
The UPEF could assist a CSIRT interested in building a performance system in
three different ways. First, it gives the designers a perspective on the various possibilities
to build a CSIRPE. Second, it outlines the desired features of CSIRPE, despite being
theoretical. Consequently, it helps in setting the PE goals and setting the design parameters
introduced in this project.
Several adopted emergency incident management frameworks set goals that seem
unrealistic, demonstrating similarities to the features of a UPEF. For example, the National
Response Framework (NRF) [110] aspires that frameworks be designed to handle any
emergency situation, regardless of the scale, scope or number of simultaneous incidents;
which is realistically very difficult to establish.
Another design benefit that comes with UPEF is its basic structure that can assist
software developers interested in developing a CSIRPE generic software solution. These
solutions are generic and comes with customization properties to meet specific client needs.
It will also provide insights to those developing simulation and automation modules for
CSIR.
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Analytical Tool:
The UPEF has several benefits to bring forward to CSIR performance analysis. It
could be used as a baseline for comparing the benefits and shortcomings of various PE
frameworks. It also could be used as a tool to measure the gap between the optimal and
practical characteristics of PE frameworks. With the absence of benchmarks, UPEF can
also be used as a tool to set optimal values for performance metrics and compared measured
results against it. The aforementioned gap analysis would assist in identifying operational
factors that deviate performance evaluation from being perfect. These factors could be then
subjected to further PE analysis.

5.2 The Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IAV)
The Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IAV) is a generic model for using
analysis and validation schemes in the process of CSIR performance measurement. The
model is generic in two perspectives. The first is its use of a variety of techniques that
makes it applicable to various CSIR environments. It is not necessary that a team uses all
techniques, as the model can be customized based on the CSIR goals and needs. The second
perspective is that the proposed techniques are derived from distinct paradigms that could
generate performance results from different perspectives.
The term ‘integrated” suggests that the model is interfaced with the CSIR modules
across different phases. It also stresses the need to view performance analysis as an
integrated process in the CSIR life cycle instead of treating it as a separate activity applied
post-incident.
A higher level design of the IAV model is presented in Figure 20. Starting from the
top of the chart, the CSIRPE design and planning activities would produce a CSIR
performance evaluation framework. When incidents occur, the collected data is input into
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the analysis schemes, which produce performance results. These results are used as input
to the validation schemes. The right-side of the chart displays a performance evaluation
database (PED), which acts the main repository for storing incident and analysis data. The
PED is queried by the design and planning activities for enhancement recommendations,
and also by the analysis schemes for performing comparative or trend analysis.

CSIRPE Design & Planning

CSIRPE Framework

Validation
Schemes

Incident Data

PE
Database
(PED)

Analysis Schemes

Performance Results

Figure 20: Higher-level Design of the IVA Model

The left-side of the chart displays the validation schemes box, which is fed by the
performance results. The validation schemes target, the CSIRPE framework through
validating its design and its performance. Note that there is a double edge arrow between
the analysis schemes and the validation schemes boxes to highlight the fact that some
techniques are used for analysis and validation purposes at the same time.
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The detailed component structure of the IAV model is presented in Figure 21. The
analysis scheme box is broken into three major interconnected components. The first IAV
analysis component is called the Component Analysis which targets focused performance
analysis into the separate parts of the CSIR system. These techniques normally use
comparative methods, like benchmarking or performing gap analysis to compare current
performance to expected, ideal, or best industry results. For instance the performance
pertaining to the detection/identification phase can be investigated through benchmarking
the PE results to that of other peer-institutions (benchmarking) or to an expected/ideal
values (gap analysis). The same applies to the other phases of the CSIR life cycle. Overall,
this component inspects performance of a specific part of the CSIR system independent
from the other parts.
The second analysis scheme component is the deficiency analysis component which
focuses on identifying sources and causes that negatively impact performance. Example
techniques include bottleneck analysis and root-cause analysis. Notice that the targeted
analysis scheme intersects with the deficiency and component analysis components. Notice
also that both components interacts with the PED in bi-directional manner, and feed the
feedback system validation scheme.
The third component is holistic analysis which inspects the performance of the
CSIR system as a whole. Example of holistic techniques include assessment of goal
achievement and performing analysis from different stakeholder perspectives. In addition,
the trend analysis technique inspects the overall system in terms of positive or deficient
performance over historical windows. The predictive analysis scheme can be used as a
method for holistic analysis, validation or both.
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Validation Schemes
CSIRPE Design & Planning

Bootstrapping

PE Goals

PE Aspects

Performance Indicators (PIs)

Compliance

CSIRPE
Framework

Performance Metrics (PMs)

Incident Data
PE
Database
(PED)

Component Analysis
Gap
Analysis

Benchmarking

Targeted
Analysis

Feedback
System

Deficiency Analysis

Bottleneck
Analysis

Root Cause
Analysis

Holistic Analysis

Predictive Analysis

Goal
Achievement

Trend
Analysis

Stakeholder
Analysis

Performance Analysis Results

Heuristic
Validation
of Results

PE
Reports

Lessons
Learnt

Figure 21: Detailed Design of the Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IVA)
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There are five components to the validation scheme box. Starting from the top, the
boot-strapping method is used to validate the design and planning activities by continuous
interaction with higher management or constituencies. The compliance module validates
the structure of the CSIRPE in terms of its policies and procedures. The feedback system
synthesizes incident and performance data to produce practical recommendations for
enhancement. Finally, the heuristic method inspects the level of confidence of the accuracy
of performance results.
The IAV can be customized in three different ways:
1- Basic Design: a CSIRT might choose to have a basic or advance application of
analysis and validation schemes. The detailed design presented in Figure 21
presents an advanced design that does not suit most CSIRs. In its most basic
form, a CSIRT need only to use a single analysis technique and the feedback
system as a validation scheme (see Figure 33 in Appendix A). The basic design
can be then gradually enhanced by introducing other
2- Expansion: The IAV model is not limited to the modules presented under each
component. A team may opt to add its own customized analysis or validation
schemes while maintaining the overall structure of the model. For example, a
team may choose to use a different comparative technique. In that regard, a new
box needs to be added within the ‘Component Analysis’ box, while maintaining
the other parts of the model.
3- Interaction: The interaction between various components of the IAV can be
modified without affecting the overall functionalities of the model. In its basic
design, only the presence of the PED and the feedback system is necessary for
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conducting analysis and validation schemes. If a new scheme is introduced, it
only needs to connect directly or indirectly to the PED or the feedback system.
As demonstrated above, the IAV model can be viewed as an elastic skeleton of how
analysis and validation could be used in CSIR performance measurement.

5.3 The CSIR Balanced Scorecard Model
The objective of the CSIR Balanced Scorecard model is to adapt the concept of
stakeholder analysis, see Section 3.5.2, to the discipline of CSIR. The name of the model
borrows the term balanced scorecard from a widely used multi-perspective performance
analysis technique used in the industry [134]. The model shifts attention from the uniperspective of analyzing performance by financial indicators to a wider inclusion of
stakeholder perspectives. The aforementioned model uses the perspectives of: financial,
customer, internal, and innovation and learning. Following the same spirit, the CSIR
Balanced scorecard model presented in this section, attempts to build a method of
analyzing CSIR performance from multiple perspectives.
The first question that arises is: who are the stakeholders of CSIR? The answer to
that can be found in several works have identified the stakeholders for CSIR [29] [68] [92].
From these works and through analyzing the stakeholders interested in assessing the
performance of CSIR, five groups can be identified, each representing a different
perspective:
1- Organizational Stakeholders: include executives, managers and administrative
staff. This group is interested in a response that restores and minimizes interruptions
to business operations. The group is also interested in a response that conforms to
the organizational policies and procedures.
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2- Financial stakeholders: include investors, shareholders and financial executives.
This group is interested in a response that is cost effective and guards against
financial loss.
3- Technical Stakeholders: include the CIO, CSIRT, security team, network team,
helpdesk and other IT support staff. The focus of this group is conducting a
response that utilizes available software and hardware tools and protects the CIA
(confidentiality, integrity and availability) of the system.
4- Client Perspective (Information Stakeholders): include customers and contractors
whose main concern is the protection of their private information and the fulfilment
of their contractual terms.
5- Community Stakeholders: focus on the public safety at large and the implications
of the incident on various dimensions like: legal, law enforcement, social, media
…etc. It is also interested in information sharing and raising community awareness.
A graphical representation of the above five perspectives is found in Figure 22.
Oganizational Persepective
(Busiuness Operations)

Technical
Perspective
(System Security)

CSIR
Balanced
ScoreCard
Model

Community Perspective
(Public Safety & Info
Sharing)

Financial
Perspective
(Financial Loss)

Client Perspective
(Information Security)

Figure 22: The CSIR Balanced ScoreCard Model
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Using the list of performance indicators compiled in Section 4.3, example of PIs
that can be used in analyzing each of the above five stakeholder perspectives is presented
in Table 35.
Stakeholder

Sample PIs

Organizational
Stakeholders

Competitiveness, Adaptability, Flexibility, Goal Achievement,
Compliance, Conformance, Consistency

Financial
Stakeholders

Response Cost, Capacity, Cost Effectiveness, Business Continuity,
Utilization, Sufficiency

Technical
Stakeholders

Detection Effectiveness, Containment Effectiveness, Accuracy,
Eradication Effectiveness, Root-cause Identification, Stability

Information
Stakeholders

Confidentiality, Availability, Constituency Satisfaction, Shielding
Effectiveness, Transparency , Documentation Effectiveness

Community
Stakeholders

Harm Reduction, Intelligence Capacity, Partnership Effectiveness,
Attacking Host Identification, Evidence Retention

Table 35: Performance Indicators for the CSIR Balanced Scorecard Stakeholders

5.4 The SAC Complexity Model
The SAC model is mainly adapted from field of complex systems, but similar
approaches are also used in supply chain management. The two main applications of the
field of complex systems are the biological systems and engineering systems. A complex
system is defined as “system made of a large number of microscopic components
interacting with each other in nontrivial ways” [231]. Performance evaluation of CSIR can
be viewed through the aforementioned definition of complex system where the microscopic
components are the activities performed by the CSIRT or the data portions that need to be
analyzed. In that regard, the field of complex systems poses as a potential rich resource for
researchers interested in developing PE models for CSIR.
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It is noted in [232] that performance evaluation techniques for complex systems
can be classified into two categories. The first category uses measurements, benchmarking
and prototyping and is suitable for evaluating existing systems; while the second category
uses modeling and is suitable for evaluating systems before their actual implementation.
Through this classification, CSIRPE would fall under the first category. However, due to
the fact that finding and fixing errors in complex systems before they are deployed is much
economical than fixing errors afterwards [233], the complex systems field paid more
attention to the second category. Therefore, the consultation with the complex systems field
needs to be selective to the extent of benefit to CSIRPE.
The suggested model is abbreviated by the “SAC Complexity Model” referring to
the three strategies that are used in deriving the model. The three strategies are;
Simplification, Approximation and Cascading.
The feature of simplicity is considered an essential element of many incident
response systems [111]. The strategy of simplification suggests that in order to measure
the PE of an IR system, the system should be analyzed and divided into singular or small
activities that can be subject to analysis independent of the overall system. This strategy is
intuitive, simple to implement and is backed by research findings. For example, [103]
suggests simplification as a method to identify the failure modes of a complex system. The
authors found that treating each failure mode independently provides a good approximation
of the system performance, despite the simplification.
A sample of how simplification could be applied to the field of CSIR is shown in
Figure 23. The diagram uses the hybrid model (See Table 2) and presents a possible
simplification of the identification phase. The identification phase is broken into three main

262

activities: incident detection, initial assessment and incident declaration. Incident detection
includes the analysis of events and precursors and documenting the initial reporting; while
incident declaration involves, assigning a severity scale and following proper procedures
of reporting the incident. Focusing on the initial assessment activity, it could be further
broken down into three activities (See Table 3), functional impact assessment, information
impact assessment and recoverability impact assessment. If a specific CSIR environment
uses advanced methods for impact assessment then the three assessments can be further
broken into simpler activities.
CSIR Activities

Preparation

Identification

Containment

Incident
Detection

Initial
Assessment

Incident
Declaration

Event or
Incident?

Impact
Assessment

Functional
Impact

Information
Impact

Recovery

Analysis

Recoverability
Impact

Figure 23: Sample of Simplification of the Identification Phase

Once the CSIR system is simplified into “simple” activities, each could be subject
to independent effectiveness assessment. This starts by asking: “Does the CSIRT conduct
functional impact assessment effectively?”, as an example. The advantage of this
simplification is to enable identify performance issues at the micro-level.
The second principle, i.e. approximation, is stimulated by a lesson learnt from other
disciplines that tackled the issue of IRPE that suggests that attempts to precisely measure
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the system will either fail or produce an analysis platform that is impractical. Therefore,
the strategy of approximation here invites CSIRTs to view PE in non-precise terms. It also
suggests that CSIRT should seek to analyze the CSIR system in a manner that identifies
issues that impact performance more than attempting to develop performance metrics with
scales that are sensitive to minor changes. This is backed by the analysis provided in [116]
that performance measurements today are about the tradeoffs between quality and available
resources in replacement of the original theory of measurements that emphasizes accuracy,
precision and objectivity. Another study [137] highlights that approximation is normally
needed for feasible use of benchmarking.
The cascading strategy suggests that after performing analysis on singular
activities, several activities can be combined for another analysis. The process will
continue until reaching the overall performance of the system. This cascading process been
recommended as an effective method for the design of performance indicators and metrics
[135]. In this referenced work, cascading is performed vertically and horizontally. Vertical
cascading is when performance metrics are gradually cascaded up to satisfying a specific
strategy. Horizontal cascading applies vertical cascading but across various strategies or
domains of analysis.
This cascading strategy is also frequently used in the field of supply chain
management (SCM). For example, a model presented in [107] [108], divides the analysis
into four types, each corresponding to a phase within the supply chain. The first type is
called functional measures and focuses on analyzing specific functions in the process. The
second type is called “internal supply chain measures” and analyzes a combination of
several functions in the production process. The third type is called “one sided integrated
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measures” and analyzes the overall system from one perspective like a specific customer
or supplier. The fourth perspective is called “total chain measure” and analyzes the system
through the inputs of the three previous steps. The four types of this ordered method of
analysis are depicted in Figure 24.

Figure 24: Depiction of the four types of ordered analysis for SCM. Source: [107].

There are several challenges to the application of the above SAC model. First, the
simplification process which ignores the strong correlation between the various system
components might render the performance analysis unrealistic. To overcome this, the
approximation strategy might need to be also applied by making estimations of the values
of various factors that might impact the performance analysis. For instance, measuring the
effectiveness of “impact assessment” is not a simple process of assessing how the outlined
procedures are being executed. The analysis is influenced by who does the analysis, the
reliability of detection mechanisms, the rate of false alarms, correctness of outlined CSIRP
procedures, and documentation effectiveness of previous similar events. Therefore, some
estimation of these factors could be recorded to reflect how much confidence is displayed
by the PE analysis of that specific component.
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A second challenge comes from the fact that compositing several components for
analysis is non-trivial [162]. Therefore, although the SAC model suggests the use of
approximation, this should not be done without guiding procedures of how approximation
is to be applied. These procedures should demonstrate some basic level of objectivity and
uniformity. In addition, the cascading should be done carefully such that coherent parts of
the system are aggregated together.

5.5 The NFP Unpredictability Platform
The NFP Unpredictability Platform is a tool for understanding and analyzing
unpredictability for the purposes of conducting performance evaluation in the context of
CSIR. The platform is based on three incident response principles: non-deterministic
decision making, flexibility and preparedness. In this section, the three principles of the
NFP unpredictability platform will be translated into policies and operational guidelines
for responders.
The first principle (N) recommends that each CSIR be equipped with a capability
that allows for effective decision making in nondeterministic environments. Whether the
CSIRT decides to follow a simple-informal process or a validated analytical model
borrowed from decision making theories, the capability should have three main features:
1- Decision makers are provided with timely and correct information. This has been
highlighted as one of the critical issues for responders operating in challenging
environments [97].
2- Available data is analyzed and summarized to decision makers in the form of
probabilities of possible events along with risks associated with potential decisions
[129].

266

3- Available data is analyzed for forecasting purposes and decision makers have
outlined procedures of how to enforce proactive measures [110].
The above three steps are graphically modeled in Figure 25.
NDDM Capability
Analyzer
Decision Maker
Data
Validator
Incident
Data

Response
Planning

Solutions

Event
Analyzer
Forecasting
Risk
Evaluator

Proactive
Measures

Figure 25: NDDM Component of the NFP Unpredictability Platform

The principle of flexibility (F) has been highlighted in NIMS [109], NFR [110],
CERT [61] and in other publications [97]. This principle intercrosses with the principle of
preparedness (P), as both aim at ensuring that the CSIR capability is able to respond to
unpredictable situations. The term flexibility is used here in contrast to rigidity. A CSIRT
can be trained to handle unexpected scenarios, but if the CSIR system, e.g. policies and
procedures, is inflexible then there is little that can be achieved. The same is true if an
organization has a flexible response system but the team is incompetent to address “outof-script” situations.
The flexibility principle can be translated into three main policy/strategy elements:
empowerment, scalability and adaptability. Empowerment means granting sufficient
executive powers to responders to initiate and implement solutions with minimum chains
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of command. A balance should be made such that executive powers do not exceed predefined scopes, do not override specific policies, or contend with higher executive
decisions. This concept is expressed in the national response framework (NRF) by
entrusting local authorities to respond within their jurisdiction without the need to report
to state or federal teams. Therefore, whenever assistance is needed, there needs to be a clear
chain of command on how decisions are made among various parties [110].
The concept of scalability focuses on the CSIR capability able to respond to
incidents of various magnitudes. Normally non-Scalable response systems are also
inflexible. To be flexible, an organization needs first to define its response capacity. Then,
there needs to be mechanisms to recognize when the capacity is over-reached [111]. In
such scenarios, the CSIRT needs to immediately seek external assistance. It has been
highlighted by [66] that failing to do so is considered one of the ‘seven deadly sins’ that a
CSIRT can make.
Besides scalability, the system should be adaptable. Adaptability means the
capability of responding to the change of needs [109]. Adaptability intersects with
scalability when responding to the escalation of incidents. However, adaptability stands
out when reliability issues arise or when there is a need for corrective measures. To
overcome reliability issues, the CSIR system should avoid dependence on single-point
resources or tools by outlining in the CSIRP alternatives and secondary options and
contacts. Also, it is common in IR that responders would need to perform ad-hoc planning
as needs arise [99]. There needs to be outlined and disciplined procedures for how this
could be achieved.
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The principle of preparedness (P) is more particular than the generic requirement
for CSIRTs to be prepared through having the proper competency and the preparation of a
CSIRP. Preparedness here means the ability to respond in stressful and unpredictable
situations. This is a joint result of having a complete CSIRP and competent CSIRT.
To reduce unpredictability, the CSIRP should have details about the variance of
response steps to different security incidents. The plan also needs to be complete in terms
of policy and support. The presence of such guidelines will facilitates the process of
responding to the unexpected events. Otherwise, the team’s efforts will be diverted from
developing solutions to also finding “proper” processes of how to implement them.
The CSIRT’s competency require that the team gets proper training in terms of
problem solving and collaboration during difficult scenarios. The various modules
presented in are a good resource serving this aspect of competency [97].
Another aspect of CSIRT’s competency is the for need of effective integration and
partnership as highlighted in [109]. Integration here refers to coordination between various
internal bodies of the organization, while partnership refers to coordination with external
entities. A well-qualified CSIRT can be hindered during incident handling by the
ineffectiveness, inefficiency or even unavailability of services and support expected from
other departments in or out of the organization. Therefore, the effectiveness of these links
should be regularly evaluated to avoid surprises during the response handling.
A summary of the action points pertaining to flexibility and preparedness are available
in Table 36.
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Strategy/Policy
Category

Action Items
Define authority categories and domains with clear delegations of
executive powers relevant to CSIR

Executive
Empowerment
(F)

Inspect authority channels to omit overlaps and redundancies
Trust responders with autonomy to implement and execute
necessary measures within predefined boundaries
Evaluate and record the capacity of the response system

Scalability (F)

Outline procedures to recognize when the system capacity is overreached and how to execute the process of seeking external
assistance
Outline procedures for how to respond to incident escalation
Outline procedures for how to respond to unavailability of staff,
tools and support services

Adaptability
(F)

Enhance procedures for how to take corrective measures during the
incident handling
CSIRP
Completeness
(P)

Ensure that the CSIRP has outlined procedures for handling
different types of security incidents
Ensure that the CSIRP has outlined descriptions and contacts of
various support services
The CSIRT is trained to operate and coordinate under stressful and
non-predictable conditions

CSIRT
Competency
(P)

Establish effective integration channels between various bodies
within the organization
Establish effective partnerships with external bodies who might be
involved in the CSIR activities
Table 36: Flexibility and Preparedness in the NFP Unpredictability Platform
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CHAPTER SIX

FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

In this chapter, several techniques will be used to analyze and assess the framework
presented in the previous chapter. The first section, analyzes various aspects of the
framework through hypothetical scenarios. three scenarios are presented in which the first
demonstrates how to construct a simple PE system through the development process
presented in Chapter three. The second scenario demonstrates how performance analysis
could impact technical decisions by CSIRTs through the use of performance metrics. The
third scenario involves the analysis of the notion of response time in the context of CSIRT.
The second section provides the expert feedback on the framework. Four experts
were interviewed to discuss issues and challenges relevant to CSIRPE and provide a
holistic assessment of the framework components presented in this work. The third section
demonstrates how the framework displays the three characteristics of being
comprehensive, flexible and industry compatible.

5.1 Scenario Analysis
5.1.1 Scenario I: Confronting Incident Instability
Objectives:
To demonstrate how to design a simple PE system for measuring a component of the CSIR
system. The scenario focuses on analyzing response stability and provides an alignment of
goals/aspects with PIs and PMs. In addition, an example is provided of how several PMs
can be derived from a PI. A quantitative approach is used for the definition of PMs.
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Background:
HumanDev is a semi-government organization that works with government agencies
and the private sector to recruit new college graduates for available work
opportunities. The organization maintains two large databases, one for college
graduates and one for potential employers. The two databases are connected through
a software portal called Connect, from which HumanDev Staff can create a profile
for each client, find suitable work vacancies and later monitor the work progress of
each client.
Due to several breaches targeting private personal data stored in the databases,
HumanDev invested in contracting with a CSIR capability. This CSIR serves several
departments in the government ministry that HumanDev reports to and maintains a
unified CSIRP across the ministry.
Incident Details:
For several incidents, it was noticed that the team would declare an incident on a
specific severity level, but then it escalates to higher levels. In some instances, it was
recorded that the severity level would be updated several times during the incident
handling. During a meeting between senior members of HumanDev and the CSIRT,
it was acknowledged that responses suffer from instability issues. A committee was
tasked with analyzing the previous responses to come up with a list of
recommendations to improve the response stability. The committee was also tasked
with formulating a mechanism for evaluating the stability of future responses.
Analysis:
The above scenario is confirmed to have issues with incident response stability,
which frequently arise in the field of IR [101]. Although it is sometimes expected for an
incident to escalate or de-escalate after its declaration, the observation found in the above
scenario suggest that incidents would escalate in uncontrollable fashion or would be
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frequently re-classified during incident handling which indicate signs of ineffective
response.
There are several factors that could lead to response instability. Examples include:
1- Inaccurate detection and classification of the incident
2- Incomplete or inadequate containment procedures
3- Ineffective execution of the CSIRP
4- Poor communication or coordination between team members
The analysis of the scenario will focus on the performance evaluation side. A
simplified partial PE system is proposed using the process flow of the CSIRPE framework
presented in Chapter Three.
The first phase of developing the PE system is to specify the design parameters and
general strategies. Assume that the “Basic Environment” settings are used as specified in
Table 45.
Using the second phase, since this is a simplified problem space either the definition
of a PE goal or a PE aspect would be sufficient. A sample goal statement would be: “to
develop mechanisms to measure the stability of the incident response system”.
Alternatively, the following PE aspect could be used: “Incident Response Stability”. In this
specific scenario, the derivation of PIs would be similar regardless of which method is
used. For simplicity, the aspect “IR stability” will be used.
The next step would be to define performance indicators that map to the IR stability
PE aspect. Five indicators are selected, see Figure 26. The PIs are defined as presented in
Section 4.3. Note that the first PI focuses on measuring the overall system stability, while
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the other four PIs map to the four potential causes of instability as mentioned at the
beginning of this analysis.
IR Stability
(PE Aspect)

Stability

Accuracy

Containment
Effectiveness

Conformance

Communication
Effectiveness

System Stability

Detection
Effectiveness

Containment
Eff.

CSIRP
Execution

Team
Coordination

Figure 26: Scenario I: Selection of Performance Indicators

Using the PI Template presented in Table 49, the Stability PI is formally defined as
the following:
Name

Stability

Code

STPI

Description

The ability of a CSIRT to prevent an incident from unexpected
escalation and to maintain the response in a controllable state
(See PI.44)

Classification

Generic

Priority

KPI

Goals & Aspects

PE Aspect: “IR Stability”

PMs

Escalation: STPI.(E)
Fluctuation: STPI.(F)
Table 37: Scenario I: Definition of the Stability PI

The next step, which is the start of phase III, is to design performance metrics. Two
PMs will be defined for the Stability PI. The same procedure could be applied to the other
PIs (For an example of an Accuracy PM see Scenario II, and see Scenario IV for an
example of containment effectiveness PM).
There are various methods to measure the system stability. Focus here would be to
monitor the classification of the incident, across the severity scale, from the time the
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incident is declared to the time of full recovery. Two metrics will be used, one focusing on
measuring the escalation of the incident, and the other on capturing the fluctuations
(escalation or de-escalations) of the incident state. Both metrics will use quantitative
methods.
Let the severity scale be:
𝑺 = {𝑺𝟏 , 𝑺𝟐 , … , 𝑺𝒏 }
Where S1 represents the least severity level an incident could have and Sn the highest.
Let the severity state of the incident throughout the incident handling life cycle be
represented through the following vector:
𝑺𝑺 = [𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 , 𝑺𝑺𝟏 , 𝑺𝑺𝟐 , … , 𝑺𝑺𝒌 ]
Where 𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 is the severity of the incident upon declaration, and the rest of the states
represent the fluctuations in the severity level during different milestones of executing the
incident response plan.
In an ideal and stable response, the value of SS vector would only contain
𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 or in addition to other values such that all the other subsequent values of 𝑺𝑺𝒊
are smaller than 𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 . In that specific case, it means the incident gradually deescalated. This could be represented mathematically as:
𝑺𝑺𝒋 ≤ 𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅

∀𝒋: 𝒋 ∈ 𝑺𝑺

The first performance metric which measures the incident escalation is defined in
the following table, which uses the PM Template of Table 50.
Metric Name

Escalation Metric

Code

Escalation: STPI.(E)

Description

A performance metric to record the occurrence of incident
escalation and its extent against a pre-defined severity scale.
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Where 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥

𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐼 . (𝐸) = 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑
= max{𝑆𝑆}

Classification

Performance metric

Measurement

Quantitative

[Conditions]

There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that
contain at least three severity levels.

[Attributes]

Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , … , 𝑆𝑛 }

Interpretation

When no escalation occurs the value of STPI.(E)=0,
Because: 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑
A higher value of STPI.(E) represent higher magnitude of
escalation.

PIs

The stability PI: STPI
Table 38: Scenario I: Definition of Incident Escalation Performance Metric

The second performance metric, the fluctuation PM, records the changes of the
incident state, not necessarily the escalation. For instance, if 𝑺𝑺 = [𝑺𝑺𝟑 , 𝑺𝑺𝟏 , 𝑺𝑺𝟑 , 𝑺𝑺𝟒 ], it
represents an escalation of one level, i.e. from SS3 to SS4. However, it is noticed that the
incident de-escalated, then went back to the declared level, then escalated before it was
finally contained. This fluctuation is not captured through the escalation PM. The following
table represents a formal definition of the metric:
Metric Name

Fluctuation Metric

Code

Fluctuation: STPI.(F)
A performance metric to record the changes in the incident
severity level through its cycle.
𝑘−1

𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐼 . (𝐹) = ∑ 𝑟𝑗

Description

𝑗=0

0
𝑗+1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑗

Where 𝑟𝑗 {𝑆𝑆

𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑗+1 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑗
∀ 𝑆𝑆𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑗+1 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑗

Classification

Performance metric

Measurement

Quantitative

[Conditions]

There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that
contain at least three severity levels.
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[Attributes]

Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , … , 𝑆𝑛 }

Interpretation

When no fluctuation occurs the value of STPI.(F)=0,
Whenever there is an occurrence of escalation, or a de-escalation
followed by an escalation, the value of the PM gets incremented
by a magnitude equal to the difference between the two states.

PIs

The stability PI: STPI
Table 39: Scenario I:Definition of Incident Fluctuation Performance Metric

For the analysis of the PM readings, the following remarks could be made:
1- A simple internal benchmark that compares the stability of the current incident
to previous incidents within the organization would be sufficient.
2- If the PM results show that instability remains a matter of concern, then a trend
analysis of several responses should be conducted to identify patterns and
common causes
3- If there is interest to compare the stability of responses with external bodies,
e.g. other ministry departments, then it would only be meaningful if the severity
scales are very similar in terms of their classification mechanism and the
number of defined severity levels. If there is a disparity between the two
classification systems, then it would be feasible to compare the presence of
instability by recording the occurrence of escalation or fluctuation, i.e. positive
values for the escalation and fluctuation metrics.
4- The occurrence of escalation is more likely to happen compared to fluctuation
which could occur due to very poor incident handling or within highly dynamic
environments. Therefore, the escalation PM should be maintained for longer
period, even when stability is maintained; while the fluctuation metric could be
applied for a period of time until the fluctuation issue is diminished.
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5- It is noticed that when both metrics have the same positive value, then it
indicates the occurrence of an escalation. However, if a fluctuation occurs then
the value of the fluctuation metric would be higher than the escalation metric.
Therefore, both metrics should be analyzed collectively for better
understanding of the system stability.
Conclusion:
The above scenario addressed a CSIR system with a specific performance issue,
namely stability. Through the use of the CSIRPE framework development process, the
issue was addressed through a simple process structure that provided guidance to how the
issue should be controlled and measured. The process started from goals to indictors to
performance metrics and finally to analysis recommendations. In summary, the scenario
demonstrated how CSIR PE issues could be addressed in a systemized manner through the
use of the CSIRPE framework.

5.1.2 Scenario II: Enhancing Incident Declaration Strategy
Objectives:
To demonstrate how performance analysis can impact incident response strategies. The
scenario involves a situation in which both financial and non-financial performance metrics
are to be used. The scenario applies several performance analysis techniques like trend
analysis, gap analysis and predictive analysis.
Background:
FastRescue is a computer security incident response team that serves a large business
corporation. The core team is composed of five highly talented security professionals,
and is partnered with several logistics and support teams inside and outside the
corporation to provide as-needed assistance during incident handling. The team
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operates in a relatively high budget. However, the FastRescue services had been
viewed positively by the executives who are convinced that despite the high operating
costs of FastResecue, the financial and management disadvantages of not using such
CSIRT would have caused the corporation more damage.
Scenario Details:
In the past year, the corporation was undergoing financial difficulties that require
making several cuts to the various departments. A committee consisting of the CIO
and a group of risk assessment analysts was formed to review potential cuts to the
operation costs of FastRescue.
During the assessment, the committee noticed that the team follows a response
strategy in which every incident is declared at the highest severity level (Degree Five)
and is gradually decreased to the actual severity level. This strategy ensures that no
incident is ever declared below its actual severity level. The committee is evaluating
whether such strategy is cost-effective.
Analysis:
The above scenario involves a situation in which financial objectives seem to be in
tension with CSIRT objectives. In order to conduct performance evaluation of the
effectiveness of the top-down approach of incident declaration, several financial and
security performance metrics need to be deployed. The committee would need to conduct
a trend analysis on data from previous incidents; in addition to predictive analysis on how
eliminating the above strategy would impact the cost effectiveness of the incident response.
In order to achieve the above, the trend analysis time domain was defined between
2012 to 2016. The committee defined four PIs from which a total of nine PMs were derived,
see Table 40. The definition of these PIs is as defined in PI.21, PI.19, PI.20 and PI.38
respectively.
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Performance Metric (PM)

Performance
Indicator (PI)

Name & Code

Code

Brief Description
Was the incident declared on the
correct severity level?
How long did it take to approve or
disapprove the initial incident
classification?
What is the average incident
operating cost per incident
(depending on incident
classification)?
Average financial loss due to
incident handling (despite the use
of CSIRT)
Predicted average financial loss
per incident due to cyber incidents
(without CSIRT intervention)

Detection
Effectiveness (DE)

Incident Classification
Accuracy

ICA

Detection
Effectiveness (DE)

Time to Confirming
Incident Classification

TCIC

Response Cost (RC)

Hourly Average
Operating Cost

HAOC

Response Cost (RC)

Average Loss

AL

Cost Effectiveness
(CE)

Predicted Loss

PL

Cost Effectiveness
(CE)

CSIRT Cost
Effectiveness

CCE

Cost Effectiveness
(CE)

Detection Inaccuracy
Cost

DIC

Cost Effectiveness
(CE)

Incident Classification
Strategy Cost

ICSCE

Average Response
Time

ART

Response Time
(RT)

Average financial savings per
incident due to the use of CSIRT
Average financial loss due to
inaccuracy of initial incident
classification
Cost effectiveness of incident
classification strategy (top-down
approach)
Average incident response time,
from incident declaration to
incident resolution, depending on
incident severity

Table 40: Scenario II: List of Performance Indicators and Metrics

For the purposes of this scenario analysis, only the ICA and TCIC PMs are defined,
see Table 41 and Table 42. The remainder of the PMs, which are mainly financial metrics,
could be defined in a similar manner.
Metric Name

Incident Classification Accuracy

Code

DEPI.(ICA)

Description

A performance metric to compare the actual severity level of an
incident to the initially declared level:
𝑛 − |𝐴𝑆 − 𝑆| − 1
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼 . (𝐼𝐶𝐴) =
𝑛−1
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Where S is the incident severity level upon incident declaration,
AS is the actual incident declaration as confirmed later during
incident handling, and n is the total number of severity levels (in
this scenario 5 levels)
Classification

Performance metric

Measurement

Quantitative

[Conditions]

There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that
contain at least two severity levels.

[Attributes]

Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , … , 𝑆𝑛 } [In this scenario n = 5]

Interpretation

If the actual and declared severity levels match, then the value of
ICA would be 1, meaning full accuracy.
If the declared value is on the edge side of the scale, and the actual
is on the other edge, then the value of ICA would be 0, i.e. no
accuracy.

PIs

The detection effectiveness PI: DEPI
Table 41: Scenario II: Definition of Incident Classification Accuracy

To be more thorough in defining the above performance indicators, several
descriptive metrics (See: M.1: Metric Type) are needed. These descriptor PMs could be
defined using the same above PM template, with the exception that under the
“Classification” field, the value would be “Descriptor Metric” instead of “Performance
Metric”. A list of these descriptive metrics along with a brief definition is presented in
Appendix A: Table 52.
Metric Name

Time to Confirming Incident Classification

Code

DEPI.(TCIC)

Description

A performance metric to measure the time in hours from the
moment an incident is declared on a specific severity level to the
time that level is confirmed or approved to be otherwise.
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼 . (𝑇𝐶𝐼𝐶) = 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇
Where DT is the timestamp of declaring the incident, CT is the
timestamp of approving the severity level of the incident and the
above subtraction is time subtraction

Classification

Performance metric

Measurement

Quantitative
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[Conditions]

There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that
contain at least two severity levels.

[Attributes]

Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , … , 𝑆𝑛 }
Escalation: Yes/No (did the incident escalate)

Interpretation

The above metric is suitable when gradual incident classification
strategies are used, like the top-down approach.
If an incident classification is validated only during post-incident
analysis, then this PM should not be used.
When using this PM, a CSIRT should be aware to the fact that
incidents may escalate. In such scenario, the above time
measurement might not be representative of actual events.

PIs

The detection effectiveness PI: DEPI
Table 42: Scenario II: Definition of the TCIC Performance Metric

The committee started by collecting data about the number of incidents per year,
categorized by the severity level, see Appendix A: Table 53. Then a break-down of the
fixed (Appendix A: Table 54) and operation costs (Appendix A: Table 55) associated with
incident handling was recorded. Incident response fixed costs would normally include
CSIRT members’ salaries, software licenses, equipment, continuous professional
development budget and contractual obligations. For simplicity, the fixed costs are
minimized to the core team salaries, broken over the period of the five years. Similarly, a
summative figure related to the operation costs of the core, logistics and support teams is
used for the representation of operational costs. The calculated costs were averaged based
on the severity level of incidents, per each hour of incident handling.
Next, the analysts conducted a financial and risk assessment to investigate the
overall cost effectiveness of the organization’s use of the CSIR capability, see Appendix
A: Table 56. For each incident, two financial estimates were made. The first is the actual
financial loss caused by the incident despite the use of CSIR, while the second is a predicted
figure of how much loss would have been endured if there was no CSIR. The difference
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between the two numbers, averaged over each category of incidents, represents the cost
effectiveness of using the CSIR capability.
The third step was to analyze the technical incident data for time stamps. Two main
time stamps were analyzed: the total response time and the time it took to approve or
disapprove the initial severity level of the incident, see Appendix A: Table 57.
The final step is to analyze the cost effectiveness of using the top-down approach
to incident declaration. To achieve this, two main compound performance metrics were
used. The first metric, Detection Inaccuracy Cost (DIC), measures how much unnecessary
cost was endured due to classifying an incident on a higher severity level compared to its
actual level. This could be calculated through analyzing the data (over the severity scale)
of the ICA and TCIC PMs, along with the hourly operating cost and the total number of
incidents under each incident category. Note that when an incident is actually on the highest
scale (degree five), then there would be no inaccuracy cost, because the CSIRT is operating
in its full capacity. On the other hand, when an incident is of the lowest severity level, the
inaccuracy cost would be high due to the fact that the team has used too many unnecessary
resources at the early stages of the response. The obtained data for the DIC PM is presented
in Appendix A: Table 58.
The second performance metric targets assessing the current incident declaration
strategy against other possible strategies. A proposal was made to limit the incident
classification period to a maximum of three hours, in which the capacity of the CSIR is
boosted through providing additional financial, technical and logistical support. An
estimation was made about the expected increase in the financial resources based on the
statistical occurrences of incidents over the severity scale. This estimation is coupled with
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a risk assessment of the expected financial loss endured if the CSIRT fails to adequately
classify the incident during the three hour period. The addition of both figures summarizes
the financial costs of the new proposal. This is compared with the detection inaccuracy cost
currently endured due to the top-down incident declaration approach. The difference
between the two numbers represent the cost effectiveness of using the top-down incident
declaration approach.
The results of the above two PMs are presented in Appendix A:Table 59. As the
data displays, the financial benefits of using the top-down approach by FastRescue are far
more than the condensed identification proposal. Indeed, in this specific scenario,
abandoning the above strategy would have costed the company an amount similar to the
cost of doubling the size of the CSIRT.
Conclusion:
The above scenario analysis demonstrated how a variety of performance metrics
and indicators could be grouped to solve an issue pertaining to performance. The scenario
involved a tension between financial and technical objectives. The reckoning that the
adopted top-down approach of incident declaration might be costly is reasonable. However,
an objective analysis through the use of performance metrics proved otherwise. This asserts
one of the foundations in which the framework of this project is built upon, namely the use
of performance analysis would lead to objective decision making. The quantitative analysis
using the performance metrics provided means for making decisions that are based on
operational data compared to relying on speculations and subjective analysis. In this
specific scenario, the performance analysis had an impact on the technical functionalities
and response strategies of the CSIRT. Had the PE analysis recommended the disapproval

284

of this strategy, significant changes would have been applied to the CSIRP and the overall
execution of the incident response activities.

5.1.3 Scenario III: Analyzing Response Time
Code

Performance Metric

AT

Analysis Time

CT

Compromise Time

CST

Classification Time

CTT

Containment Time

DAT

Detection Analysis Time

DCT

Declaration Time

DET

Data Exfiltration Time

DT

Detection Time

DVT

Discovery Time

EHT

Enhancement Time

ERT

Eradication Time

FMAT

First Malicious Action Time

FRT

Full Recovery Time

HT

Incident Handling Time

ICF

Incident Containment Factor

ICT

Initial Compromise Time

MT

Monitoring Time

PRT

Partial Recovery Time

RT

Response time

Table 43: List of Performance Metrics for Scenario III

Objectives:
To analyze the notion of response time in the context of CSIR. The scenario will
demonstrate how the principles outlined in the SAC complexity model can be used in the
development of performance metrics.
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Background:
SecureLab is a small but dynamic CSIRT that operates in higher education
institution.. The SecureLab team is part of a larger CSIRT, SecureEd that covers all
types of security incidents in the institution. The SecureLab team is focused on
responding to security incidents targeting the institution’s 36 educational computer
laboratories. Most of the incidents handled by SecureLab are worms and viruses that
spread across the network subnets, mainly due to students’ attaching external devices
like flash drives.
Scenario Details:
In response to claims of slow responses, SecureEd is interested in developing a
mechanism to measure the response time for incidents defined within the scope of
SecureLab. The current mode of operation consists of three main steps:
1- SecureEd detects, classifies and then pass incident handling to SecureLab
2- SecureLab works on the containment, eradication and partial recovery
3- SecureEd works on full system recovery, incident analysis and closing the incident.

The objective of measuring the response time is to identify elements of the incident
response that might contribute to the ineffectiveness of the response
Analysis:
Measuring response time is a common performance measure across various
disciplines. The definition of response time vary depending on the general specifications
of the environment in each discipline. Even within each discipline, there are various
methods to define response time depending on the specific characteristics of the underlying
environment. Failure to recognize this variance of methods may lead to incorrect analysis
emerging from inconsistent comparisons.
The principles of the SAC complexity model will be applied to the above scenario
to develop a mechanism for measuring response time that suits the environment of
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SecureLab. Measuring response time will be divided into measuring the time of completing
simple activities (the principle of Simplicity), which will be aggregated together to measure
more complex activities (the principle of Cascading). In addition, the principle of
Approximation will be used in defining some time-slots within the overall responsetimeline.
Using a top-down approach, the response-time can be divided into three main timeslots, see Figure 27:
1- Detection Time (DT): The time it took to detect and classify the incident by
SecureEd before its passed to SecureLab.
2- Incident Handling Time (HT): the time it takes SecureLab to contain, eradicate
and partially restore the system until it is passed back to SecureEd.
3- Incident Analysis Time (AT): the time it takes SecureEd to completely restore
the system, formulate recommendations and close the incident.
From the above description, the incident response-time (RT) can be defined as the
following:
𝑹𝑻 = 𝑫𝑻 + 𝑯𝑻 + 𝑨𝑻
Note that the above break-down of incident response time is analogous to the
general definition found in the transportation field, which defines the response time into
the following three main time-slots [117]:
1- Elapsed time from incident occurrence to detection
2- Elapsed time from the point at which the IR team is called out until its arrival onscene and completes the response activities.
3- Elapsed time to normal traffic flow restoration.
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Each of the three timeslots (i.e. DT, HT and AT) need to be subject to further
simplification. The following paragraphs investigates each time-slot independently.
Response Time
(RT)

Detection Time
(DT)

Incident Handling
Time (HT)

Incident Analysis
Time (AT)

Figure 27: Scenario III: Response Time Components

Detection Time (DT):
The detection time can be divided into two main time-slots. The first is the time an
incident is active in the system before it was detected by SecureEd; and the second is the
time period starting from the time an incident is reported/discovered to the time it is
classified, declared and passed to SecureLab. The first time-slot will be referred to as:
Compromise Time (CT) and the second as Detection Analysis Time (DAT).
To further break-down the Compromise Time (CT), the time-slots defined by the
VERIS project [73] will be used, which are:
1

First malicious action time (FMAT): Beginning of the threat actor's malicious
actions against the victim. Port scans, initiating a brute-force attack, and even
physical recon, are a few examples. This is only relevant to intentional and
malicious actions.

2

Initial compromise time (ICT): First point at which a security attribute (C/P, I/A,
A/U) of an information asset was compromised.

3

Data exfiltration time (DET): First point at which non-public data was taken from
the victim environment. Only applicable to data compromise events.
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Note that the FMAT, ICT and DET could be interpreted differently depending on
the nature of the incident. Such discussion is beyond the scope of this scenario. Overall,
the FMAT could be viewed as the preparation time of the malicious event, i.e. breach
activities before the actual security exploitation; the initial compromise time (ICT) is the
timeframe when security has been compromised, despite the fact that no harm has
occurred; and the data exfiltration time (DET) is the time when harm is endured before the
detection/reporting of the incident. Using the above, the three components are treated as
time periods instead of timestamps.
Detection
Time (DT)
Detection
Analysis Time
(DAT)

Compromise
Time (CT)
First Malicious
Action Time
(FMAT)

Initial
Compromise
Time (ICT)

Data
Exfiltration
Time (DET)

Discovery
Time (DVT)

Classification
Time (CST)

Declaration
Time (DCT)

Figure 28: Scenario III: Detection Time (DT) Components

The Detection Analysis Time (DAT) can be broken into three time events:
1- Discovery Time (DVT): The timestamp of the first reporting of the incident, i.e.
when SecureEd learnt about the incident.
2- Classification Time (CST): The timestamp the incident type and severity is
confirmed.
3- Declaration Time (DCT): the timestamp when the incident is declared and passed
to the SecureLab team.
Based on the above definitions the following equations are to be used for calculating
the Detection Time (DT):
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𝐷𝑇 = 𝐶𝑇 + 𝐷𝐴𝑇
𝐶𝑇 = 𝐹𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝐼𝐶𝑇 + 𝐷𝐸𝑇
𝐷𝐴𝑇 = 𝐷𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑉𝑇
Figure 29: Calculation of Incident Detection (DT) Time

When analyzing the above DT metric, having a long compromise time (CT) would
suggest that the environment has poor detection mechanisms or weak security measures
that would permit a threat to remain undetected for a long time. Ideally, an incident should
be detected as soon as it is present in the system, i.e. the value of CT is 0. However, this is
practically infeasible. Some studies [234][67] suggest that responders should be available
24x7; however, this imposes several practical challenges and might only be applicable to
governments or very large organizations. Therefore, there would be always a time period
between the detection of the incident and the actual execution of the response. It is obvious
that an effective response would require minimizing this time period.
On the other hand, the detection analysis time (DAT) depends mainly on the
readiness of the CSIRT and its effectiveness in executing the CSIRP. Ideally, a team should
spend very minimum time in classifying the incident and declaring it. But rushing this
could result in inaccurate understanding of the incident and consequently inadequate
response measures. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there will be a time-period
from when an incident is discovered until it is classified and declared. In an effective
environment, an incident should be declared as soon as it is classified, i.e. (DCT-CST = 0).
Yet, the logistics of classifying the incident and handing it to the appropriate team (in this
scenario, the SecureLab team) would require some time. One of the performance aims of
the CSIRT should be to minimize this time period.
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Incident Handling Time (HT):
The incident handling time (HT) represent the overall time spent by the team
SecureLab in responding to the incident. Applying the simplification-cascading process to
this time-period can yield the following three main time-periods (Figure 30):
1- Containment Time (CTT): The time-period taken to prevent the incident from
spreading beyond its initial infected area.
2- Eradication time (ERT): The time-period to fully remove the malicious components
from the system.
3- Partial Recovery Time (PRT): the time-period taken to restore the basic components
of the system to their initial state.
The incident handling time (HT) would be an additive metric of the above three
metrics, i.e. 𝐻𝑇 = 𝐶𝑇𝑇 + 𝐸𝑅𝑇 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇
The containment, eradication and recovery steps have many interconnected
activities. In addition, each step would involve a series of actions that would vary
depending on the type of incident. Therefore, defining time-periods that would separate
each step is not intuitive.
Incident Handling
Time (HT)

Containment
Time (CTT)

Eradication Time
(ERT)

Partial Recovery
Time (PRT)

Figure 30: Scenario III: Incident Handling Time (HT) Components

To overcome the above challenge, instead of measuring the time it takes a CSIRT
to execute specific activities, timestamps could be recorded when specific response
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indicators have taken place. For instance, the partial recovery time (PRT) could be
recorded based on the fulfillment of one or more of the following response indicators:


A computer lab is partially functioning such that all software required for
conducting a course session are running, despite some auxiliary software (e.g.
browsing or media players, printing software) being unavailable



Instead of focusing on software and applications, recoverability could be measured
based on availability of services. For instance, backup or alternative applications
could be launched until the original applications are restored.



A specific number of computers in a lab are fully restored. For instance, at least
half of the computers in a classroom are fully restored enabling classes to take place
(each two students could share a computer).
The above response indicators are quantitative metrics that rely on simple counting

methods. This does not necessarily apply to all response indicators. For instance, the
containment and eradication phase do not represent exclusive activities. It is a common
practice to get eradication activities initiated while the final steps of the containment phase
are still on-going. For such situations, it would be better to use heuristic response indicators
that rely on estimations instead of actual measurements. This is where the principle of
Approximation from the SAC model is applied.
A detailed example is provided below of how the containment and eradication
phases could be distinguished. Instead of waiting for full containment before declaring the
start of the eradication process, the CSIRT can make an estimation of when the containment
process is considered satisfactory to apply eradication measures. This is done through
observation some threshold metrics that estimate the containment achievement, e.g. 80%
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of containment is completed. In the example below, the metric containment factor is
defined. When the CSIRT has exceeded a pre-defined threshold, i.e. specific containment
factor value, the line between eradication and containment could be drawn.
Containment Factor Performance Metric
Whenever an incident happens, one of the objectives of the CSIRT is to isolate this
incident and prevent it from spreading to other points in the network. This is especially
important when incidents involve self-replicating or network spreading worms, or
distributed denial of service attacks DDoS attacks. The incident containment factor (ICF)
performance metric aims for measuring the success of the response team in blocking the
affected parts of the organization from infecting the healthy parts.
Within a specific environment, a security incident might be global or local. A global
incident happens when everyone in that environment gets infected by the incident. Most
organizations have security infrastructure empowered with some security policies to
decrease the likelihood of such incidents. Yet, it is not infrequent for an organization to be
subjected to a global incident. The occurrence of a global incident is a serious indicator
that the environment lacks basic defensive mechanisms and the whole security
infrastructure should be subject to scrutiny. In local incidents, part of the environment is
infected while other parts of the same environment remain healthy.
Note that the above understanding of global and local incidents as described above
is similar to the understanding provided in [235] which is different than how the terms are
used in the CERT document [2] which defines a global incident as one that involves
interaction with external entities like law enforcement, while local incidents remain
internal within an organization.
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Let the infected areas of the environment be identified through a descriptive metric
called incident locale. There are various methods to define the locale, depending on the
type of incident and nature of the environment. In most scenarios, the locale could be
defined in terms of either region or population. The region locale is the portion of the
network, physical or virtual, that is infected by the incident. These portions can be
identified as number of hosts connected to a local switch/router, number of hosts within an
IP range or within a specific subdomain, or number of departments within an organization.
The population locale represents the number of users or clients affected by the incident. In
some scenarios both locales should be defined, while in others only one is needed for a
meaningful description of the incident. This definition of locale can be easily incorporated
into VERIS [73] under: Incident description  Assets  Variety.
Let N denote total number of hosts in an environment. And let 𝑵𝑫 represent number
of hosts in a region or population infected by the incident as recognized by the
detection/identification phase. Note that if 𝑵𝑫 is very high then that may suggest weak
detection mechanisms and could be used along with the compromise time (CT) metric to
trigger a review of the adopted detection tools and mechanisms. The value of 𝑵𝑫 can also
help in determining the severity of an incident during the initial assessment.
Isolating and preventing an incident from spreading can be mapped to keeping the
number of infected hosts after declaration close to 𝑵𝑫 as much as possible. The incident
containment factor (ICF) performance metric measures the team’s effectiveness in
achieving this. Note that in order for the ICF to produce correct conclusions, the value of
N should be large enough. The ICF metric is defined as below:
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𝟎

𝑵𝑫 = 𝑵

(𝑵𝒇 − 𝑵𝑫 )
𝑰𝑪𝑭 = {
𝟏−
𝑵

𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆

Figure 31: Definition of Incident Containment Factor (ICF) Performance Metric

where 𝑵𝒇 is the total number of hosts infected prior to containment. The term (𝑵𝒇 − 𝑵𝑫 )
represents number of hosts infected after declaration and before full containment. In the
best scenario, when no hosts were infected in addition to 𝑵𝑫 , the value of 𝑵𝒇 = 𝑵𝑫 and
the ICF will be 1 which means the incident is not spreading which is an indicator of
containment. In the worst scenario, if only one host was initially infected and the whole
network gets infected, the value of ICF will be approximately 0, because the value of N is
large. For the special case where the whole network was initially infected, the containment
factor equals to 0.
Since threats have various compromise techniques, the team should be careful not
to assume that if an incident stops spreading then that it means it is contained. Instead the
team should rely on the application of containment measures like blocking traffic from
specific ports as indicators of containment. Again, the application of these measures do not
necessarily guarantee full and effective containment, but they do represent a reasonable
approximation of that.
The above definition assumes that all hosts/users in the environment are of equal
importance. In practice, this is not the case as hosts/users vary in their importance and
impact on business operations. One way to reflect this in the containment factor is to use
weighted values according to the following definition:
Let the environment holds the set of hosts:
𝑯 = {𝒉𝟏 , 𝒉𝟐 , … , 𝒉𝑵 }
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Let the set of infected hosts before declaration be:
𝑯𝑫 = {𝒉𝟏 , 𝒉𝟐 , … , 𝒉𝑫 }
Let the set of infected hosts after declaration and before containment be:
𝑯𝒇 = {𝒉𝟏 , 𝒉𝟐 , … , 𝒉𝑭 }
Let the importance (weights) of every hosts be represented by:
𝑾 = {𝒘𝟏 , 𝒘, … , 𝒘𝑵 }
Where 𝒘𝒊 represent the weight of the host 𝒉𝒊 ∈ 𝑯
The containment factor is defined as:
𝟎
𝑰𝑪𝑭 = {
𝟏−

𝑯𝟎 = 𝑯
[∑𝑭𝒋=𝟏(𝒉𝒋

∗ 𝒘𝒋 )] −

[∑𝑫
𝒌=𝟏(𝒉𝒌

∑𝑵
𝒊=𝟏(𝒉𝒊 ∗ 𝒘𝒊 )

∗ 𝒘𝒌 )]

𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆

Figure 32: Definition of Weighted Containment Factor Performance Metric

In either case, whether the CSIRT decides to use the standard or the weighted
definition, the end of the containment period could be decided by reaching a specific value
on the containment factor.
Incident Analysis Time (AT):
When the SecureLab completes its task, the incident is passed back to SecureEd to
finalize the incident, formulate recommendations and declare the end of incident response
cycle. This can be divided into three main time-slots:
1- Full Recovery Time (FRT): the time period it takes the CSIRT to fully restore the
system to its initial state; probably with enhanced security measures.
2- Monitoring Time (MT): A specific grace period which a CSIRT allocates to ensure
that the incident is not reoccurring. The same period could also be used to monitor
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the impact of introducing new enhancements to the environment as per the
recommendation of the post-incident analysis.
3- Enhancement Time (EHT): The time-period the CSIRT spends in formulating a list
of lessons learnt and recommendations. Some of these recommendations relate to
enhancing incident response and others for improving the environment security.
This time period can be further divided into two sub-timeslots. The first is the time
the team spends in conducting post-incident analysis until a list of
recommendations are produced. The second timeslot is spent in implementing these
recommendations, e.g. updating the CSIRP and enforcing new security policies.
It is noticed that the MT and EHT are not disjoint as it is expected that both times
will have an overlap.
The Big Picture:
Now that the notion of response time has been deconstructed into several
components, these components need to be reconstructed again into a summative figure
which is commonly referred to as the incident response time (RT). A CSIRT would need
to consider the following issues:
1- When does the response time start? Does it start with the discovery time (DVT)
or the declaration time (DCT)? Should the compromise time (CT) be
considered?
2- When does the response time end? Does it end after full recovery time (FRT),
or should some monitoring time (MT) and enhancement time (EHT) be
considered?
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3- What does long or short time-periods for the above metrics indicate about the
response, the CSIRP and the system security?
4- Does the SecureEd team need to use all of these time-periods, or should some
of them be summed together?
5- Which metrics can tolerate high values and which ones should the team attempt
to minimize?
6- From the implementation perspective, who is responsible for recording each
time-stamp? Is this done manually or through automation?

.

Conclusion:
This scenario analyzed one of the main concepts of performance evaluation, which
is incident response time. The scenario demonstrated how the construction of performance
metrics could be achieved through the SAC complexity model, which is built on the
principles of simplicity, approximation and cascading. The response time indicator was
deconstructed into the measurements of simple activities. Despite the fact that these
activities were simple, their measurement was not always straightforward. Although the
scenario analysis is generic can be applied to different CSIRT settings, as the major
components of the response time (RT) is the same across environments, it remains a matter
of design how to define the boundaries of the time and which time-periods should be
highlighted.

5.2 Expert Feedback
5.2.1 Methodology
The objective of consulting CSIR experts is not to provide survey results on where
practitioners stand with regards to various issues raised in this dissertation. Instead, experts
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are consulted for their perspective on these issues based on their professional experience .
Therefore, each expert’s view point might not necessary be the mainstream industrial view.
Four experts were selected in a manner that reflects experience and diversity. All
four experts have more than ten years of experience and have substantially engaged with
incident response, though in various contexts. The first expert comes from a law
enforcement background, the second from corporate and business background, the third
from legal investigations and digital forensics background, and the fourth from system
administration and computer security management background. All four experts have
technical experience in CSIR. In addition, the second and third experts have CSIR
leadership and management experience.
Each expert was interviewed separately. The shortest interview took two hours and
a half and the longest took four hours and a half. Upon the request of the interviewees, their
feedback was recorded anonymously.
Each interview covered the ten themes listed in Table 44.. However, the length and
depth of discussion varied depending on the interviewee experience and interest in the
topic.
The following sections provide an overview of the main opinions expressed by each
expert, followed by a holistic reflection on the collective feedback. Several components of
the framework were revisited or modified as per the feedback of the experts. Whenever
such modification was made, a citation to the interview was made.
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#

Theme

Sample topics

Need for CSIRPE

Is there a need for CSIRPE? Does the rewards exceed the
overhead? How is it expected to enhance CSIR?

2

Current Practices

How are CSIRT evaluated? Is it done in a systematic way?
Does the evaluation focus on pre or post-incident
evaluation?

3

Multidisciplinary
Survey

How is CSIR different than other disciplines? Should other
disciplines be visited for guidance? Why?

4

Challenges

What are the obstacles to developing a CSIRPE? Is it
feasible from the first place? Comments on the complexity
and unpredictability modeling

5

CSIRPE framework
features

Defining: comprehensiveness, flexibility and industrycompliance. Overall comments on the framework fourphases and ten components

6

Parameters &
Strategies

Comments on the list of parameters and strategies

7

Performance
Indicators & Metrics

What are the main indicators for effective incident
response? Qualitative vs quantitative methods.

8

Performance
Analysis

Comments on the analysis methods. Who are the
stakeholders for conducting the PE analysis?

9

Performance
Validation

Comments on the validation methods. Why do security
metrics suffer from practicality and validity issues

10

Overall Comments

Who would be interested in this research? How do you
view the value and need of this work? Issues of concern
and recommendations for enhancement.

1

Table 44: Expert Feedback Survey Themes

5.2.2 Expert 1 Feedback
Expert 1 [7] is a senior digital forensics and incident response investigator offering
consultancy services to state police. (S)He has ten years of experience in that role. The
expert received training from several leading industries in the field of digital forensics and
from the government bodies. The expert is notable for his/her contributions in the area of
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forensics and incident response to incidents involving mobile phones and mobile
computing devices.
The expert expressed high interest in the research topic acknowledging the need for
evaluating CSIR capabilities. Two comments were made with regards to that. First, the
need for evaluating CSIR is well-established industrial reality in which the main driving
force being liability and insurance. Second, such research direction is mainly beneficial to
organizations (i.e. the team as a whole) not individuals (i.e. team members). Therefore, this
type of evaluation would face reluctance or resistance, but the benefits would speak for
themselves after several years of implementation.
Commenting on the current industrial practices with regards to CSIR evaluation,
the expert noted that such evaluations exist but in scattered forms across different
evaluation schemes. For instance, different components of CSIR are evaluated under
security resiliency, vulnerability assessment, disaster recovery plan, business continuity
plan and risk assessment. The more technical evaluations are done in ad hoc fashion by
smart people.
It was affirmed by the expert that current evaluation practices focus on the
preparation more than the post-incident execution. Using the expert’s words: “makes sense,
but not good”. It makes sense because companies engage in continuous preparation, while
post-incident analysis is less frequent. However, it is “not good” for two reasons. First,
most preparation evaluation schemes are not comprehensive. The expert noted that only in
six instances at the national level (mostly military) there was a full team simulation, i.e.
engaging CSIRT with all support teams, e.g. legal and logistics. This makes preparationphase evaluation incomplete or ineffective. Second, these evaluations tend focus on
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preventive measures more than actual evaluation of the team performance. Thus,
enhancement recommendations are biased towards the technical preventive side.
Several components of the framework were considered by the expert as “too
advanced” for the current industrial needs. Examples include: the PE monitoring functional
model, the predictive analysis method, validation methods and concurrent incident
handling. When asked that some of these components are derived from the NIMS and NFR,
the answer was that cybersecurity response is not well-integrated into these national
frameworks posing several inconsistencies. This goes back to the fact that these
frameworks were not initially designed for cybersecurity response. When consulted if these
components should be omitted from the framework, the expert suggested keeping them for
research purposes.
The multidisciplinary survey was well-received by the expert. There is much to
learn from the other disciplines, speaking from the experience of working with police
departments. The expert noted that the only exception is that cybersecurity threats do not
pose immediate threat to human life. It was added: “but eventually it will”. The expert saw
“no industrial cry” for such multidisciplinary study. However, those working at the state
and national levels, like NIMS and NFR, would be directly interested in this type of
research.
When asked to comment on how a framework would be considered comprehensive,
flexible and industry-compatible, the expert provided the following answers:
1- Comprehensive: a framework that leads to an end point that is useful, i.e. there
is a process that produces an output that could be used in the industry.
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2- Flexible: a framework that permits responders to develop their own customized
solutions (derived from the higher principles/policies). It is also one that does
not seek high granularity in measurements
3- Industry-Compatible: a framework that is derived from the NIST and CERT
documents. The SANS document was considered insignificant.
When requested to provide a list of the most important performance indicators to
evaluate CSIR, the following six indicators were suggested: detection effectiveness,
response time, intelligence capacity, professional development, partnership effectiveness
and documentation effectiveness. The expert emphasized that indicators should be
analyzed in a compound fashion in order to produce reasonable results. It was also noted
that qualitative methods are suitable for enhancing the team performance, while
quantitative measures are useful for improving the CSIR capability at the enterprise level.
Finally, the expert noted that large companies and research agencies like RAND
would be highly interested in the research findings of this project. The expert expressed
eagerness to actual implementation of the proposed framework.

5.2.3 Expert 2 Feedback
Expert 2 [66] [92] is a senior manager information security leader who leads a 24x7
global team of security professionals and senior management in breach preparedness
assessment and incident response to high stakes breaches. Extensive experience in
managed security services (MSS) and security & risk consulting (SRC) across twelve client
industries. Areas of expertise include incident response investigation, vulnerability
assessment, penetration testing, ISO 27000 series and digital forensics investigations.

303

As the interview started, the expert was quick in asserting two observations about
the topic. First, conducting this research is necessary for businesses, noting that current
performance evaluation practices are “sparse and varying”. Second, conducting this type
of research is difficult because executives do not like this type of research. It provides
evidence for lack of security and preparedness. In other words, despite this topic being
necessary there is clear reluctance in the industry about pursuing it.
To support the need for evaluating CSIRTs, the expert gave three examples. The
first is the catastrophe of the Catrina Hurricane. If no one is interested in the performance
of responders, why was there a public cry!, the expert noted. The second example was cited
from the findings of the Ponemon survey on incident cost [4]. Part of the survey
conclusions is that decreasing the time to detect would lead to a reduction in incident cost.
The third example, when an organization needs to higher an external CSIR capability. In
such scenario, defining SLAs is not possible without clear performance metrics. These
examples provide practical and empirical evidence for the need of evaluating the
performance of CSIRTs.
With regards to the multidisciplinary survey, the expert remarked that: “we like to
think we are special and different; but we are not”. This is because, at the end of the day,
most performance metrics go back to one main factor: return on investment. This explains
why most organizations quantify performance in financial metrics, which might not
necessarily useful for team enhancement.
According to the expert, the main challenge to evaluating CSIRT is that: “we do
not know exactly what are the objectives of CSIR”. In other response systems, the main
objective is to protect lives which is not applicable to CSIR. When asked to define these
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objectives, the expert replied with reducing costs, ensuring business continuity and
maintaining the CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) of the data. Interestingly,
these objectives are similar to the three CSIR objectives defined in Section 3.4.2.
With regards to the complexity and unpredictability of CSIR performance
evaluation, the expert acknowledged both factors to be a challenge, but they should not
stop organizations from building systems. To minimize the impact of these factors, the
expert suggested focusing on defining goals and outcomes of the evaluation instead of
focusing on the processes and activities which are complex and vary from one incident to
another. The expert liked the fact that the framework presented in this project considers
goals to be the highest design stage from which the other framework components are
derived from. The expert noted though this might seem intuitive, it is not how many in the
industry operate.
After being presented with the performance evaluation framework of this project,
the expert made the following comments:
1- It is a practical and desirable that the framework is “selection-based”, e.g. there
are list of parameters, strategic issues and analysis methods to select and
customize. This reflects the flexibility of the framework
2- The expert was reserved in describing the framework as “comprehensive”,
preferring to call it “holistic”. The term ‘comprehensive’ seem to have a
negative association in the industry to describe plans that are not-well defined
that attempt to achieve too many things but have little benefit.
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3- The structure and presentation of the framework is geared towards responders
and technical teams, and need further ‘translation’ is needed if it is to be
presented to executives and managers.
4- Noting that the industry is full of false and outdated performance metrics, the
expert was pleased to see a systematized approach to the definition of PMs.
5- Out of the framework components, the list of performance indicators along with
their definitions and interpretation guidelines, would be of most interest and
immediate need to CSIRT practitioners.
6- CSIR performance systems should center around the plans (CSIRPs) more than
the (CSIRTs), due to the dynamicity nature of teams (e.g. the team now is
different than the team after few hours when the shift changes).
7- Although the NIST and CERT documents are a good place to start, most
organizations end up having capabilities with features that drift from those
outlined in the two documents. Therefore, the expert argued that there needs
not be much emphasis put on compliance with these two documents.
8- The framework seems to address too many issues for a responder to read. It is
suggested that the framework be broken into several concise documents each to
be handed to professional organizations to review (e.g. auditing or
cybersecurity companies) and publish in their online platforms.
The above feedback provides excellent points about how the industry would receive
and interpret the proposed framework. Nevertheless, some of these points (e.g. Points 3, 7
and 8) are not feasible to apply considering that this project has some academic elements
to the research topic. Finally, the expert hoped that such research direction would close the
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gap between business executives and technical responders through giving both parties clear
outline of success measures.

5.2.4 Expert 3 Feedback
Expert 3 [15] has 20+ years of experience as a computer forensic examiner,
instructor and manager for a large US federal law enforcement agency, with a focus on
financial crimes and seizing/recovering digital evidence from a wide variety of data
systems and media. The expert also has 13+ years in academia at the University level
teaching computer forensics to undergraduate and graduate students. In addition, the expert
has four years in the US Army in a military law enforcement and has published numerous
whitepapers and been a frequent presenter in the computer forensic industry in the past 20+
years.
It was highlighted at the start of the interview that the expertise comes from incident
response that involves criminal investigations. Incident responders in similar positions
operate in environments that have standardized procedures to be followed, cost-free, and
focus on evidence extraction, analysis and presentation for prosecution purposes. Overall,
the expert described him/herself as a forensics responder noting that the field of digital
forensics intersects with CSIR but has the advantage of being a decade older than CSIR.
The current performance evaluation practices were described by the expert as:
“depends on the perspective of the team leader”, suggesting its subjective nature. The
expert adds that with specific topic (i.e. CSIRPE) there is not much guidance in the industry
about how to approach the topic. However, due to the publicity and liability issues related
to cyber-incidents, the need for developing PE metrics is arising. The expert notes that
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CEOs are now personally responsible for impacts of cyber-incidents, creating a highermanagement need for conducting and maintaining evaluation systems.
Three challenges were highlighted. First, the field of CSIR, being a branch of
computer security, highly depends on policies. Since policies are continually changing, it
is expected that so will evaluation systems. Second, there is an administrative burden
associated with performance evaluation. This burden is normally thrown on the technical
team, who struggle to see the benefits of this “extra administrative task”. This creates
resistance to the development and implementation of evaluation systems. Third,
requirements and expectations vary depending on the jurisdiction. This makes developing
unified performance models a difficult task.
When asked if the above three challenges makes developing CSIRPE models
infeasible, the answer negative. The expert replied: “whenever there are standard
procedures, measuring performance is possible”. Despite the field of CSIR having too
many variations, there are essential procedures that are common across these environments.
An important observation was made by the expert with regards to a common shortcoming of performance evaluation systems in the industry. Several companies conduct
surveys, and also provide analysis. But, does this analysis gets translated into actions and
enhancements? The expert finds this to be commonly lagging and foresees this as a
challenge for CSIR performance evaluation. In the military and criminal investigations,
this does not seem to be an issue, because the standard model of operation considers “postaction report” as an essential component of the review system. Referring back to the
criminal investigation environment, the expert notes that making post-incident review is
well-integrated in the process, despite lacking more guidance on the PE aspect.
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The expert views the multidisciplinary survey of specific interest to DHS and
similar government-like agencies. Incident response under these agencies involve several
teams of different backgrounds. When such interaction occurs across teams, which may be
collaborating in the same incident, creates a need to study how performance of these teams
contributes to the overall performance of the response.
Speaking about indicators for good incident response performance, the expert
highlighted the following five indicators:
1- Effectiveness of Team assignment: Was the right person, in terms of
competency and experience, being assigned the right task during incident
handling?
2- Evidence Retention adequacy: how is evidence stored and maintained and are
there redundancy measures being taking?
3- Effectiveness of training programs: there is a need to continually attend new
training programs. A cost-effective model would to be to send one member for
professional training who in return would train the other members of the team.
4- On-site analysis capacity: how much of the response was conducted on-site
compared to bringing machines to the office (i.e. off-site) for analysis.
5- Information Sharing: Were the lessons learnt from the incident shared with the
internal and external communities?
According to the expert, a comprehensive CSIRPE should have two main features.
The first is covering all the phases of the CSIR life cycle and second involving all parties,
e.g. CSIRT members, managers, technical teams, support teams …etc. With regards to
compatibility, the expert was satisfied with the selection of NIST and CERT, giving slight
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preference towards the NIST document. Nevertheless, the expert downplays strict
observance to these two documents, because the industry of has tens of CSIR operating in
a NIST-variant environments which are not necessarily what the original NIST document
has outlined.
The final comment made by the expert was: “this is an important and growing field.
If you have not done this type of work, someone else would have done it. It is going to take
time to accept PE, but soon it will be mainstream”.

5.2.5 Expert 4 Feedback
Expert 4 [174] is a cybersecurity expert with extensive experience in the areas of
system administration, networking, secure programming. He/she has eleven years of
experience of working with digital forensics teams and contributes to research in the areas
of information security and incident response. The expert is notable for his/her
contributions in vulnerability patching across various operating systems platforms.
Throughout the interview, the expert voiced strong skepticism to the concept of
CSIRT performance analysis. The expert believes that the process is infeasible, involves
unnecessary overhead and have little practical benefits. Therefore, the interview focused
on unwrapping factors which the expert’s skepticism is founded on.
According to the expert, there are three main reasons for objecting to the research
theme of performance analysis:
1- Computer security incidents are very diverse and each incident has its own unique
characteristics that make it stand in difference to other incidents. In other words, it is
very rare to have two incidents which are identical. Even when incidents display
similarities, their environments are different. Because of this diversity, incident
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response is also expected to be different. Consequently, there are two possible
approaches to designing performance systems: either design unique measurement
method that suits every incident, or design a generic system that is inapplicable to the
spectrum of incidents. In either case, it is infeasible to design performance metrics
that will allow comparisons or benchmarking. Since performance analysis is mainly
based on trend analysis and benchmarking, it is infeasible to apply to CSIR.
2- Just as there is no standard method to find solutions to cyber security threats, there
would be no standard method for measuring the performance of those who develop
unique solutions to the incidents. The expert notes that the higher-level goals could
be similar, but the underlying processes and procedures are different and most of the
time non-systematic. Viewing incident response as a spectrum starting from higherlevel management and goal-oriented tasks, to the more specific technical procedures,
performance analysis seem to be applicable to the management side of the spectrum
not the technical one. Since CSIR is mainly technical, then there is little to expect out
of evaluating its performance.
3- Even when it is possible to design performance metrics that are applicable to a group
of incidents, the expert thinks that it is unreasonable to infer performance aspects
from analyzing the PM data. The expert questions: “why do we infer that a short
response time reflects good performance?” A slower response time that produces
more sustainable solutions could be better to an organization. Based on this simple
example, the use of response time metric can be misleading to the organization. The
same criticism is applied to performance metrics that are derived from cost.
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Although the above expert feedback has no direct contributions to enhancing the
proposed framework, I believe it is important to have proper understanding and serious
discussion of the presented viewpoint. This viewpoint represent legitimate concerns that
are shared with a sector of computer security professionals in the industry. Even among
researchers, this is an extension of the on-going debate about the usefulness of introducing
metrics to the field of computer security [34] [42].
To answer the first concern on the diverse nature of computer security incidents, it
could be acknowledged that security incidents indeed pose some differences. However, the
claim that such differences hurdle the development of performance systems could be
disputed. The diversity argument seem to focus on the technical aspect of the response,
while ignoring that CSIR is an organic body of several response activities both technical
and non-technical. The management of the response, coordination between team members
and with outside parties, analysis from several technical point of views, and assessing
damage, cost and risk are all essential aspects of CSIR. For the sake of argument, let the
technical solutions be unique, there still remain strong similarities in the non-technical side
of incident handling that could be subjected to uniform methods of performance analysis.
The technical uniqueness of incidents could also be disputed. Even when incidents
use innovative techniques to compromise, strong similarities could be found in the
objectives, tactics and potential remedies. For instance, looking at incidents from the CIA
model, each incident will target one or a combination of the three security properties:
confidentiality, integrity and availability. It is difficult to argue against the fact that many
incidents could be detected in similar mechanisms, which are technical in nature. For
instance, computational hashing algorithms are used for verifying the integrity of data. The
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application of these algorithms in detecting a system compromise, which is a technical
aspect of CSIR, could be subject to evaluation in terms of detection effectiveness. Another
technical example is that most if not all incident responses involve some aspect of
analyzing system and network logs. The effectiveness of the tools used in this process can
also be subject to performance analysis.
A third example, which could also be used to address the second argument about the
difficulty of systemizing CSIR technical aspects, comes from the current maturity state of
the field of forensics analysis. Forensic professionals use standardizes methods to collect,
preserve and analyze digital evidence. Most incident handling involve some involvement
of the digital forensics which could be subject to performance analysis at least from the
perspective of readiness and conformance.
Overall, it seems that some objections to CSIRPE can be rooted in having different
or more narrow understanding of performance analysis, its methods and application
domain. It is true that some technical aspects of the response might not be applicable to a
large pool of incidents; however, this does not mean that this is true about all technical
aspects of CSIR.
With regards to the third argument about the disassociation of PM measurement
and performance effectiveness, the argument could be valid if PM readings are analyzed
independently. However, the CSIRPE framework presented in this project ensures that
performance metrics are only designed through a process that maps PMs to PIs back to
goals. In addition, it was argued that PMs should be analyzed collectively when drawing
conclusions about the performance. This means that PM readings are analyzed in the
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context of a higher structure of performance (goals indicators  metrics) and are
inspected along with other metrics (e.g. the Cascading principle in the SAC model).
In its early stages, the CSIR field suffered, and it continues to be a challenge to
some extent, to convince higher management of the need to establish a CSIR capability
despite the strong acknowledgement and recommendation of the security professionals to
establish and maintain such capability. The case seem to be reversed in the case of
performance evaluation. As the interviews reflect, managers and executives seem to be
interested enough in evaluating the effectiveness of the CSIR capability, while resistance
may come from security professionals dealing with the technical aspects of the response.
The fourth expert feedback is a sample of such expected resistance.

5.2.6 Summary of Expert Feedback
When analyzing the four expert interviews in a collective manner, several common
themes and recommendations could be highlighted. Despite the interviews being limited
in terms of number of interviewees, considering the long experience of the experts it could
be argued that these common themes reflect the industry perspective, at least partially. The
following points summarize points of agreement among at least three out of the four
experts:
1- Interest in the topic of CSIRT performance evaluation is proportional to the rank of
the individual associated with CSIR. More interest is expressed by those holding
managerial positions compared to those conducting “lower-level” technical or
support tasks. The interest is also proportional to the organization size where larger
companies are more likely to adopt performance frameworks. Therefore,
individuals with the highest interest in CSIRPE are those holding higher executive
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positions in environments that deploy a large CSIRT. The least interested group of
individuals are technical responders operating in a small CSIRT.
2- Unexpectedly, the experts downplayed the importance of designing a CSIR
performance framework that is strictly compatible with the CSIR industry
standards. The experts acknowledged the importance of building on the NIST and
CERT outlines, however, the vast variations that exist in the industry suggest that
more generic methods, not necessarily NIST/CERT adherent, are more useful.
3- The plan, not the team, should be the focus of the performance evaluation of the
CSIR. As more governments and businesses have working CSIRPs, CSIR teams
can be viewed as experienced staff that execute a plan. This is contrary to the past
decade experience in which CSIRT experts were viewed as the origin of plans.
4- The current status of PE indicators and metrics for CSIR can be described as scarce
and disorganized. The experts concurred that the list of PIs provided in this
dissertation is probably the most notable contribution of the project. The list is
expected to be well received by the industry, as it is timely and fulfills an existing
need.
5- The overall structure and process flow of the framework developed in this project
was approved by the first three experts. The level of details provided for each step
was satisfying. Comments of enhancement concentrated on simplifying the
framework for business settings as some aspects were considered too advanced for
the current industrial needs.
6- Building on the above point, there is a clear gap between how the industry and
academia treat the topic of CSIR performance evaluation. The industry is
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demanding simple and operational models. On the other hand, academia seem to
retain substantiate attention to rigorous models, validation schemes, and
mathematical models (e.g. quantification); which are of little interest to the
industry.
7- Despite the multidisciplinary survey being academic in nature, the experts viewed
that direction of research very positively. The experts acknowledged the uniqueness
of CSIR but disregarded the claim that it is too unique to borrow solutions from the
other disciplines. The NIMS and NRF were specifically highlighted as immediate
beneficiaries of the survey results.
8- Despite the challenges that face the evaluation of CSIR, the experts believe that
these challenges are not strenuous enough to consider developing CSIRPE systems
infeasible. However, the experts called for careful consideration of various factors
and expected the process to take relatively long time before having operational
models.

5.3 Evaluating Framework Features
5.3.1 Comprehensiveness
To the extent of the large number of works surveyed in this dissertation, there is no
clear definition or outline of the characteristics of a “comprehensive” performance system.
Therefore, to demonstrate the comprehensives of the proposed CSIRPE, the term
“comprehensive” is analyzed over the common usages of the term in several resources like:
[96] [7] [92] [79] [74].
It could be argued that the developed CSIRPE framework exhibits
comprehensiveness from four angles: development, component, aspects and perspective.
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Development:
The CSIRPE framework provides a complete process of development starting from
the early stages of defining goals and strategies to the final steps of implementation and
integration. This provides a comprehensive development guide to responders compared to
a non-comprehensive framework that would introspect a partial system development.
Component:
The CSIPRE framework unrestrictedly targets the various components of the CSIR
system. For instance, the framework encompasses the five-phases of the CSIR life cycle.
A framework that focuses on the PE analysis of some phases, e.g. detection or containment
could be viewed as non-comprehensive from that perspective.
Aspect
The CSIRPE framework does not limit performance to specific aspects, e.g.
reliability or readiness. Instead, it views performance comprehensively by allowing for a
holistic analysis that encompasses the various performance aspects.
Perspective
The CSIRPE framework views performance from the perspective of the plan
(CSIRP) and the team (CSIRT) (see S.6: Reference Analysis Point). It also considers the
viewpoints of various actors, like the organization (e.g. 3.4.2 Defining Performance Goals,
S.2: Quality Control), the technical team (e.g. D.1. CSIRT Type, V.1. Operational
Validation, 3.6.1 Functional Models) and the management (3.6.2 Assigning Roles and
Responsibilities, V.3 Bootstrapping).
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5.3.2 Flexibility
Arguing for flexibility will based on the understanding of the concept as in NIMS
[109] and the discussion provided in PI.26: Flexibility. The CSIRPE arguably demonstrates
flexibility from three angles: incident, design and environment.
Incident Flexibility
The CSIRPE framework could be used to evaluate responses to different incidents,
indifferent to their type, scope and severity. Unlike a performance system that is focused
on a specific type of incidents, e.g. DoS incidents, the framework focuses on analyzing
responses regardless of the nature of incident which gives it a flexible domain of
applicability. Note that the restrictions made in A1.1 (Civilian Environment), A1.3
(Incident Complexity), and A2.5 (Sequential Handling) have little practical implications as
they avoid special situations that are unlikely to occur in conventional CSIR.
Design Flexibility
The framework grant PE designers a large domain of design possibilities and
options. For instance, the selection of PIs and analysis techniques is left to the designers
based on its defined goals. Another example is the IAV model (Section 5.2) which allows
a CSIRT to select performance analysis methods that suit their capacity and environment.
The design parameters and strategies also provide a pool of options for each CSIR to
customize to its needs.
Environment Flexibility
The framework is compatible for use with various CSIR environments, regardless
of the CSIRT type and capacity (as long as there is a team of responders, see A1.2). It also
does not presume the presence of specific policies/procedures (other than A1.7) or the need
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for having a pre-established quality control unit. This means that a CSIRT can use the
framework to construct different PE models for different environments.

5.3.3 Compatibility
The CSIRPE framework is constructed in a manner that is in compliance with the
NIST [1] and CERT [2] documents, which are the two most commonly used CSIR industry
standards. Since both documents do not address how performance evaluation should be
administered, compliance here means that the CSIRPE framework is not in conflict with
any of the requirements set by them. In numerous occasions, the CSIRPE framework would
address direct requirements set by either document.
Below is a set of two examples, each containing eight examples, that demonstrates
computability with the NIST and CERT documents.
Compatibility with NIST
1- The definition of events and incidents (Section 1.4.1) is consistent with the
definitions provided in NIST (page 6)
2- The NIST document defines eight policy elements of any CSIR. The seventh
element is “Performance Measures” (page 8). The document does not outline
procedures for how that could be achieved. The CSIRPE framework can be
viewed as a guideline of how to design and implement this seventh policy
element.
3- The three selections for the design parameter: D.1 CSIRT Type is based on three
types defined by NIST (page 13): centralized, distributed and coordinated. The
term “customized” was used instead of “coordinated”, but was defined to
included coordinated in addition to other structures.
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4- The NIST recommends the use of both objective and subjective assessment of
incidents (page 40-41). This is adopted in the CSIRPE by allowing for both
quantitative and qualitative assessments (D.7: Measurement Type, and M.3:
Quantifiability)
5- Assumption A1.4 on Incident Handling Services is borrowed from an
assumption made by the NIST (page 23) which focuses the functionality of
CSIRTs to incident handling compared to ensuring system security.
6- The definitions and considerations set by the NIST were used in the definition
of several performance indicators like: PI.3, PI.16 , PI.21, PI.25 PI.31.
7- The use of the performance evaluation database (PED) in the IAV is inspired
by the recommendation set by NIST (page 3) on: “maintain and use a
knowledge base of information”
8- The strategy of using automation as a mechanism for decreasing overhead (S.5:
CSIPRE Overhead) in incident handling is highlighted by NIST (page 51) as a
recommendation.
Compatibility with CERT
1- Section 2.6 of the CERT document on Quality Assurance (page 42) is the
category at which the CSIRPE framework would fall. In this section, there is a
call for setting quality requirements and measurement mechanisms, which is
what the CSIRPE attempts to achieve. A similar reference to quality is also
made in page 22 when depicting the CSIRT service and quality framework.
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2- Assumption A2.2 (Member Dedication) is consistent with CERT (page 18)
which assigns incident handling responsibilities to CSIRT members with little
overlap with the other non-incident handling security tasks.
3- The definitions and considerations set by the CERT were used in the definition
of several performance indicators like: PI.17, PI.18 , PI.26, PI.32 and PI.38.
4- The first theme of the three suggested PE objectives (see Section 3.4.2) on
business continuity and growth is derived from the emphasis put in the CERT
document for aligning CSIRT goals with the organizations business continuity
plan (page 33).
5- The element of simplicity for performance evaluation systems as highlighted in
the SAC Complexity Model (Section 5.4) is explicitly highlighted in the CERT
document in page 46.
6- The stakeholder analysis as presented in the CSIR Balanced Scorecard Model
(Section 5.3) is consistent with the CERT document call for “Constituents’ view
on Quality” (page 48).
7- The flexibility element of the NFP Unpredictability Platform (Section 5.5) was
designed in accordance to the requirements set by section 2.7.1 of the CERT
document (page 50) on “The Need for Flexibility”.
8- Both the trend analysis and targeted analysis (Section 3.5.2) are referenced in
the CERT document in pages 26 and 81 respectively.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary of Contributions
Contributions made by this project can be summarized in the following six points:
First, the project produced an end-to-end process for developing performance
evaluation frameworks for computer security response systems. Although the process is
designed for the field of CSIR, the general structure and basic details of the development
process are generic and could be applied to various incident response fields.
Second, the study laid out a map of the various issues associated with the study of
performance evaluations of CSIR. These issues are presented in the form of design
parameters, strategies and challenges. The study does not claim to provide a solution for
these issues. Instead, the study identifies these issues, provides proper description,
summarizes work done towards addressing that issue and proposes basic recommendations
that are compatible with CSIR environments.
Third, the project presented a multidisciplinary survey of how various incident
response disciplines addressed the problem of team and plan performance evaluation. The
value of this survey to the field of CSIR is equipping researchers with lessons learnt from
these fields to avoid reinventing the wheel when constructing CSIRPE models. The survey
provides evidence that incident response disciplines have much in common in terms of
challenges, processes and measurement techniques. This calls for further advancement in
that direction of research.
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Fourth, the project presented a framework for evaluating CSIR capabilities. The
framework can be viewed as a fusion pot of tens of models, techniques and findings of
performance measurements. The framework took the skeleton of CSIR life cycle and
activities and embarked it with tools that could be used for evaluation. These evaluation
tools neither violate the basic CSIR processes nor confine the usage of tools. This design
flexibility allows for customization which suits the diverse status quo of CSIR
implementations.
Fifth, a list of fifty performance indicators for assessing computer security incident
response capabilities was formulated. The list covers the assessment of the major parts of
the response system and also the overall system performance. Each indicator was defined
and associated with interpretation considerations and examples of potential derived
performance metrics. The list gives CSIR practitioners a large repository of PIs to choose
from, and saves the effort of defining them and laying out the design considerations.
Sixth, the study made the first step in paving the way towards the implementation
of performance evaluation models in CSIR environments. Currently, there are no
implemented systemized approaches to CSIRPE and it was infeasible to deploy the
proposed framework in real environments. However, the study analyzed a wide list of
implementation considerations and made close contact with the industry through
integrating the expert feedback into the design and analysis of the framework and through
proposing several hypothetical scenario analysis that envision how the framework would
function when it is deployed.
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6.2 Summary of Findings
The major findings of studying the development of frameworks for performance
evaluation of computer security incident response in this project are summarized in the
following ten points:
First, the discipline of CSIR had undergone several advancements in the past two
decades. It could be argued that the field has reached a satisfying maturity in terms of
defining processes and procedures. The technical development of breach preventive and
countermeasures is a continuous process, but it is happening now within well-established
CSIR capabilities and through a wide network of national and international information
sharing.
Second, inspecting the evolvement of the CSIR discipline, it is not surprising that
attention to systemized approaches of performance evaluations has only started to flourish.
This is supported by several external factors that pushes the industry to adopt organized
methods of performance analysis, like liability, insurance and SLA contracting. There are
enough indicators that the industry acknowledges the need for conducting CSIRPE.
Examples include, the explicit call by the NIST document for developing PE measures and
the recent abrupt increase in the number of publications, blogs and white-papers that
address issues of effectiveness and PE measurement. However, the urgency and depth of
this need may vary depending on the maturity levels of various CSIR capabilities.
Third, discussion so far about CSIR effectiveness could be characterized by being
too generic, non-systemized and have narrow scope of performance domain. It was also
noticed that the discussion was concentrated on the preparation phase especially in
evaluating the effectiveness of a CSIRP. This study recognized the need for having
systemized approaches to CSIRPE that provide holistic and focused performance analysis
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of the CSIR system, be equipped with performance measurement tools, and establishes
balance between pre-incident and post-incident performance evaluation.
Fourth, the multidisciplinary survey of performance evaluation systems for various
incident response systems reveals that there are many commonalities across disciplines.
Despite these similarities, there are little efforts to share experiences across these fields and
attempts to build common models of analysis remain scarce. The perception that incident
response disciplines are very distinct from each other need to be challenged, and more
research should be directed towards understanding the similarities and differences between
various IR systems.
Fifth, the complexity of incidents, the large variance in threat techniques, and the
unpredictability nature of the response are the main challenges that face responders. This
suggest that evaluating the performance of the response require PE systems that are
sensitive to the uncertainty nature of incident handling, demonstrate reasonable
simplification and are flexible enough to allow application across the domain of incident
types and severity levels.
Sixth, the field of security metrics suffers from lack of validation, debatable
practical benefit, and unreasonable quantification techniques. Since CSIR performance
metrics are built on security metrics, these challenges are passed to the development of
performance metrics. Also, despite the several attempts across disciplines to quantify
performance measurements, the vast majority of metrics remain qualitative, with the
exception of financial metrics which are relatively easier to quantify. Based on this,
overcoming the subjectivity nature of qualitative measures is another consideration for the
design of CSIRPE measures.
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Seventh, the development of performance evaluation systems for CSIR can be
broken into four higher-level phases. The first phase defines the generic framework of
evaluation by setting the design parameters and outlining the strategies of evaluation. The
second phase defines the core of the PE model by defining goals performance aspects and
derive the approporiate performance indicators. The third phase focuses on specifying the
measurement mechanisms by deriving performance meterics and selecting analysis and
validation techniques. Finally, the fourth phase inspects the operational characteristics of
the CSIR system and integrates the PE model with the implementation requirements of the
environment.
Eighth, developing the framework for evaluating CSIR suggests that CSIRPE is
both a science and an art. It is scientific from the perspective of following systemazed
approaches and applying obective performance analysis techniques. On the other hand, the
artistic aspect is manifest in how the PE system is developed and configured and how PIs
are selected and used.
Nineth, there is a tension between the organizational and techincal needs that drive
performance evaluations. Organizations are interested in more cost-effective responses that
ultimately contribute to better return-on-investment. However, techincal teams are
interested in enhancing the detection, containment and recovery processes. Any CSIRPE
system need to address this tension by striking a balance between these two domains. This
could be achieved by insuring that the CSIRPE is integrated into the organizational qualtiy
system but at the same time is developed and maintained by the responders and techincal
staff.
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Tenth, there is valid skepticism on how much technical benefits are expected out of
the deployment of PE systems. Although there are sevearl theoritical projections of the
expected outcomes, the actual level of impact on system enhancement would only be
known after getting industrial feedback. Therefore, there is a need to monitor and
benchmark results of CSIRPE systems in the coming few years.

6.3 Future Work
Extensions of this work can be forked into two directions. The first direction
emerges from the design and findings presented in this work, while the second pertain to
the general development of the topic of performance evaluation of computer security
incident response.
Under the first research direction, there are four main direct extensions of this work,
namely the implementation considerations, the development of performance metrics,
integration with the VERIS platform and investigating the enhancement procedures.
Perhaps, the most stressing work awaiting the study of CSIRPE is implementing
CSIRPE on real-environments. Such implementation would indicate how the industry
reacts to CSIRPE measurement in an operational manner. Specifically, there is a need to
observe which PIs and which performance analysis techniques produce benefits to CSIR
capabilities. If the framework presented in this project is deployed, the following industrial
feedback is expected:
1- The industry will demonstrate how the design parameters are commonly set.
This leads to refinement of the options available to each parameter, possibly
eliminating some parameters and adding others.
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2- Testing the development process will reveal which development phase is
considered most challenging, which in return will stimulate the attention of
researchers.
3- The industry will determine which performance indicators are more valuable to
the assessment and enhancement of CSIR.
4- Investigating the actual extent of the variance of performance measurements for
the purposes of building common benchmarks and formulating best practices.
The second extension relates to the development of performance metrics. As this
work is focused on the development of performance indicators, there is a need to
investigate each of these indicators in terms of deriving performance metrics. The PM
examples presented in Section 4.3 were provided for elaboration purposes that serve the
understanding of the PIs. For each PM, there needs to be more specific and formal
definitions that would enable responders to use it and customize it. This opens a wide area
for research work, as each PI can be subjected to a dedicated research work in terms of
deriving correct and useful PMs.
The third extension relates to the VERIS platform. The current structure and
flexibility of the VERIS platform opens the door for potential integration of the CSIRPE
framework to the incident definition and sharing. There are three possibilities for such
integration. The first, under the block of “Response & Discovery” which consists of five
sub-blocks: {incident timeline, discovery method, root causes, corrective actions, targeted
vs. opportunistic}, a sixth sub-block could be added by the name: “response performance”.
The second possibility is under the block of “Indicators” which focuses mainly on
indicators of compromise, an additional category could be added under the title of
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“performance indicator”. The third possibility, under the block of “Impact Assessment”
which consists of: {loss categorization, loss estimation, estimation currency and impact
rating} a category could be added by the title: “response effectiveness”.
The fourth extension targets a common problem in performance systems that is
commonly known as “closing the loop”. A good performance model is capable of
producing good assessment and recommendations. However, this would be ineffective
unless there is a mechanism to ensure that these recommendations are correctly fed-back
to the system with enforcement policies and progress monitoring tools. In other words,
mechanisms for quality enhancement based on CSIRPE outcomes need to be carefully
studied.
From the general perspective of CSIR performance evaluation, there are several
research topics that are yet to be explored. First, there is more work needed to integrate the
preparation and evaluation mechanisms of CSIR with the NIMS [109] and NRF [110]
frameworks. Although both frameworks integrate cybersecurity incidents, this integration
seems primitive and sometimes inconsistent with CSIR processes [14].
Second, there is a scant of works that explore the notions of complexity and
unpredictability in CSIR. As this project demonstrated, both notions pose major challenges
to the discipline of CSIR and IR disciplines in general. The areas of complex systems, nondeterministic decision making and fuzzy performance systems are examples of disciplines
that could significantly enrich the understanding of these two notions under CSIR
environments.
Third, there is only limited number of works that address the distributed model for
operating CSIRTs. Once more refined understanding is available on the how the CSIR
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distributive processes are designed and executed, only then the development of
performance models is feasible.
Fourth, there is little work done on creating simulation exercises for CSIRTs. The
current training programs focus on the technical aspect of CSIR, while real environments
have high interaction between several technical and non-technical teams. The presence of
simulation exercises will work for the advantage of building performance evaluation
techniques. Assessment methods and mechanisms could be tested under simulated
environments providing useful predictive expectations of how these methods would impact
the functionality of CSIRTs.
Finally, there seems to be much variance on how the industry implements and uses
CSIR. In addition, the industry is continually updating its CSIR procedures in response to
the evolvement of technologies. For instance, response to incidents that involve cloud
computing is slowly developing its own distinctive response techniques. Such update to
the operations of CSIRTs would consequently require an update to how evaluation
techniques are to be used. At some point, there needs to be a study that identify the common
performance issues across CSIRTs and the distinct performance aspects displayed by the
various types of CSIRTs.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Practical Guidelines
A.1. Recommended CSIRPE Configuration
The following table provides suggested steps for how to configure a CSIRPE based
on the maturity level of the security system [220], especially the CSIR capability. These
configurations provide a starting point for how a CSIRT could configure its PE model in
terms of expectations and capacity. However, this needs to be further developed to match
the objectives of the team and the available capacity.
Configuration

CSIR Environment

Code

Name

Basic

Medium

Advanced

D.1

CSIRT Type

Centralized

Centralized or
Distributed

Customized

D.2

Evaluator Type

CSIRT

Internal

Internal and
External

D.3

Number of
Incidents

Single-incident

Multiple-incident

Adjustablewindow

D.4

Incident
Concurrency

Sequential

Sequential

Concurrent or
Elastic

D.5

Analysis Time

Post-incident

Post-incident

Continuous or
Incremental

D.6

Benchmarking

None or
standalone

Internal

External

D.7

Measurement
Type

Mainly
Qualitative

Mixed

Mainly
Quantitative

D.8

CSIR Scope

Execution

Mainly execution
+ basic design

Both execution
and design
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S.1

Quality
Assurance

None

Compliance

Compliance &
Auditing

S.2

Quality
Control

CSIRT

Mainly CSIRT +
Quality Unit

CSIRT + Quality
Unit

S.6

Reference
Point

CSIRT or
CSIRP

CSIRP

CSIRP

PI.x

Performance
Indicators

Few KPIs

KPIs + other PIs

KPIs and several
PIs

N.x

Analysis
Methods

Comparative

Comparative +
basic deficiency
& holistic

Comparative +
deficiency +
holistic +
predictive

V.x

Validation
Methods

Operational

Operational and
Development

Operational +
development +
heuristic

Table 45: Recommended CSIRPE configuration based on maturity level

A.2. Guidelines for Designing Adjustable-Window Framework
#

1

2

3

Step

Assess the need for an
inclusive PE
framework

Description
Does your organization really need a comprehensive
PE framework? If not, resources will be wasted in
planning without any valuable return.
If only periodic reporting is needed consider
multiple-incident frameworks. If special task force or
for directed customers consider single-incident
frameworks.

Re-define your goals

Create two lists of PE objectives: short-term and
long-term. The short-term objectives should be used
to derive PMs for single incidents, while long-term
goals should be used to derive PMs for multipleincidents.

Increase number of
descriptive metrics

Since descriptive metrics will be used in analysis of
both single and multiple incidents, increase its pool,
increase the pool of these metrics to enable designing
a variety of PMs. A reading that seems not useful now
might be useful later.
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Create two lists of PMs
for single-incident
analysis

In order to analyze incidents individually, prepare
two lists of PMs. The first list contains PMs that
always need to be used, while the second list contains
optional or special-case PMs. This strikes a balance
between uniformity of analysis across incidents but
also allows for flexible analysis

5

Describe PE setting

For each incident describe the environment and
setting in which PM readings were collected and
analyzed. This is important to make meaningful
comparison between incidents and to ensure that
statistical measures are consistent.

6

Define context for
interpretation of PMs

For multiple-incident PMs specify the proper
conditions for reading the results and if there is a need
to analyze multiple readings collectively

7

Conduct two-level
analysis

Do not mix single-incident and multiple-incident
analysis. First, analyze the incident individually then
analyze the incident over the larger spectrum. Record
results from both steps, and present results as needed

4

Table 46: Guidelines for designing an inclusive PE framework

A.3. Guidelines for Selecting Analysis Reference Point
The following simple questionnaire is a tool for CSIRT leadership determine which
analysis reference point to use. Having more answers of “Yes” than “No” hint that it is
probably better to select the CSIRP as the analysis reference point compared to the CSIRT,
and the reverse is true.
#

Question

Answer

1

Is your CSIRP applicable to several locations compared to a
single geographical location?

Yes

No

2

Is the size of your CSIRT composed of three or more
members?

Yes

No

3

Did your organization invest enough financial resources in the
preparation of its CSIRP?

Yes

No
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4

Does the CSIRT has good understanding of the implemented
security policies and the overall security of the system?

Yes

No

5

Does the CSIRP demonstrates a good level of completeness
and comprehensiveness?

Yes

No

6

Is the likelihood of inviting an external CSIRT to handle an
incident low?

Yes

No

7

Is it expected that the team performance will rely on the
received training compared to their previous expertise?

Yes

No

Table 47: Assessment questionnaire for selecting analysis reference point strategy

A.4. Guidelines for Identifying CSIR Performance Aspects
#

Key Term

Explanation

1

Selection of
Methodology

Before identifying the aspects, think which of the
methodologies best fit the nature of the CSIRT/CSIRP of the
organization

2

Multiple
Methodologies

Select at least two methodologies such that the combination
is both CSIRP and CSIRT centric.

3

Parallel
Analysis

Perform separate analysis using each methodology. Next,
find which one should take precedence and combine the
aspects

4

Use of Nouns

Use nouns compared to action verbs when phrasing the
aspects

5

Confined List

The list of aspects should not be too short or too long. The
number of aspects can be between five and ten aspects. Too
little or too many aspects is likely to cause difficulties in the
following steps for performance indicators and metrics
derivations

6

Overall
Performance

Remember to define the “overall system performance” as an
aspect.
Table 48: Recommendations for Identifying PE Aspects

335

A.5. Templates for Defining Performance Indicators and Metrics
The following two tables provide templates for formal definition of performance
indicators and metrics. The templates cover the basic requirements for defining the PIs and
PMs in addition to other supplementary optional fields.
Name

Term or a brief phrase that identify the PI

Code

[Optional] code to be used if automation is used

Description

A definition of the PI and how it reflects good performance

Classification

Generic vs. Specific (or using another categorization scheme)

Priority

KPI or PI (or another priority scale)

Goals & Aspects

Mapping to the goals and aspects in which this PI represent

PMs

Performance metrics that will be used to measure the PI
Table 49: Template for Formal Definition of Performance Indicators

Metric Name

Term or a brief phrase that identify the PM

Code

[Optional] code to be used if automation is used

Description

A definition of the PM (e.g. formula)

Classification

Performance vs. descriptive metric
Generic vs. specific

Measurement
Method

Quantitative vs. qualitative
Measurement Tool

[Conditions]

Conditions for correct collection of measurement

[Attributes]

Factors that impact interpretation
Range of allowed values
Accuracy/confidence

Interpretation

How do the PM reading reflect performance?

PIs

Mapping to the Performance Indicators that use this PM
Table 50: Template for Formal Definition of Performance Metrics
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A.6. Basic IAV Model Design
When a CSIRT is interested in using a basic design for the IAV model, then it could
use the basic skeleton presented in Figure 33. The only necessary components are the
feedback system, a database for storing incident data and performance results, and a single
analysis technique. The IAV system can be developed later by the addition of various
modules as the maturity level of the CSIR capability improves or as needs arise.

Optional
model

CSIRPE Design & Planning

Optional
model

CSIRPE Framework

Incident Data
Feedback
System
Optional
model

Main Analysis
method

Optional
model

Optional model

Performance Results
Figure 33: Basic Design of the IAV model
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PE
Database
(PED)

A.7. Guidelines for Selection of Performance Analysis Methods
#

Guideline

Description

1

Diversification

Diversify measurement and analysis techniques to broaden
the performance evaluation. As stated by [11]: “there can be
no single assessment of accomplishments overall”.

2

Avoid Fox
Paradox

Avoid the Fox paradox [137] by making sure to analyze
system components first and then making an overall PE
analysis.

3

Compatibility

Select analysis techniques that are compatible with the
selected performance indicators and derived performance
metrics.

4

Feasibility

Select analysis techniques that are feasible to apply taking in
mind the availability of tools/software, competency of team
members and expected cost

Future-Centric

Performance analysis should focus on the future, i.e. what to
enhance, more than the past, i.e. what went wrong. Solving a
past problem that does not have any future enhancements
should be ignored. This is especially relevant as technologies
advance in quick pace.

6

Target-Based

Predefine targets, thresholds, standards or benchmarks
during the preparation phase. Inspect which analysis
techniques are suitable to measure performance against these
predefined targets

7

Validation

After selecting both analysis and validation techniques,
investigate if analysis and validation could be combined
together in order to save analysis overhead

5

Table 51: Guidelines for Selecting Performance Analysis Techniques

A.8. Scenario II Data
PM Name

Code

Brief Description

Declaration Time

DT

The timestamp of the incident declaration

Confirmed Time

CT

The timestamp of when the severity level of an
incident is confirmed

Resolution Time

IRT

The timestamp an incident is declared resolved
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Incident Severity

The initial Incident Severity level upon incident
declaration

S

Actual Incident
Severity

AS

Actual incident severity level as confirmed during or
post incident handling

CSIRT Salary

CSA

Annual Salary of CSIRT core team

Number of
Incidents

ANI

Total annual number of incidents (per severity level)

Table 52: Scenario II: List of Descriptive Metrics

Degree 5

Degree 4

Degree 3

Degree 2

Degree 1

Total

2016
2015
2014
2013
2012

9
6
4
1
2

18
14
9
7
5

29
25
18
9
16

38
31
31
18
5

58
51
39
42
25

152
127
101
77
53

Total

22

53

97

123

215

Table 53: Scenario II: Data for Annual Number of Incidents (ANI)PM

2016
2015
2014
2013
2012

Average annual responder salary
107,000
103,790
100,676
97,656
94,726

Annual CSIRT Total Salary (CSA)
535,000
518,950
503,382
488,280
473,632

Table 54: Scenario II: Incident Response Fixed Costs(USD) [2012-2016]

Hourly Average incident Operating Cost in USD (HAOC) [2012-2016]
Degree 5
Degree 4
Degree 3
Degree 2
Degree 1
Core CSIRT
Support Teams
Logistic Teams
Total

440
390
230

360
340
180

315
290
165

270
240
120

250
180
120

1,060

880

770

630

550

Table 55: Scenario II: Average Incident Response Operation Costs (USD)
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Average Financial loss per incident in USD [2012-2016]
Degree 5

Degree 4

Degree 3

Degree 2

Degree 1

Average Incident Loss (AL)
(after CSIRT Intervention)

80,000

52,000

30,000

18,000

1,500

Predicted loss (PL)
(without CSIRT intervention)

365,000

273,000

191,000

103,000

56,000

Average CSIRT Cost
Effectiveness (CCE)

285,000

221,000

161,000

85,000

54,500

Table 56: Scenario II: CSIRT Cost Effectiveness Data

Average Incident Response Activity Time in hours [2012-2016]
Degree 5

Degree 4

Degree 3

Degree 2

Degree 1

Average Time to confirm
severity level (TCIC)

6.2

5.8

5.5

4.9

4.2

Average Response Time
(ART)

32

28

27

19

14

Table 57: Scenario II: Average Incident Response Time

Detection Inaccuracy Cost (Total cost in USD)
Degree 5

Degree 4

Degree 3

Degree 2

Degree 1

2016

0

18,792

46,255

80,066

124,236

269,349

2015

0

14,616

39,875

65,317

109,242

229,050

2014

0

9,396

28,710

65,317

83,538

186,961

2013

0

7,308

14,355

37,926

89,964

149,553

2012

0

5,220

25,520

10,535

53,550

94,825

Total

0

55,332

154,715

259,161

460,530

Table 58: Scenario II: Detection Inaccuracy Cost Performance Metric Data
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Total

Incident Classification Strategy Cost (ICS-CE)
Total detection
inaccuracy Cost

Risk
cost

Additional
detection cost

Strategy Cost
Effectiveness

2016

269,349

494,550

241,680

466,881

2015

229,050

388,875

201,930

361,755

2014

186,961

291,675

160,590

265,304

2013

149,553

165,150

122,430

138,027

2012

94,825

154,125

84,270

143,570

Table 59: Scenario II: Incident Classification Strategy Cost Effectiveness PM Data
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